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ABSTRACT
The thesis discusses the widely held view in social 
work that practice should be based on Intuitive and 
empathie understanding and that standard scientific 
procedures are inapplicable. I argue that this anti­
science attitude is misguided and that social workers can 
and should use scientific methods to test theories and 
develop more effective ways of helping.
There are practical and philosophical reasons for re­
examining this dismissal of science. Social workers' 
statutory powers and duties have increased rapidly but 
there is also growing concern about their professional 
competence. Moreover developments in the philosophy of 
science challenge social workers' assumptions about 
science.
The first two chapters discuss the importance of 
overcoming the hostility to science, examining social 
workers’ duties, training, and practice methods. The first 
objection to science examined is the claim that science 
studies only observable behaviour not mental phenomena. I 
argue that this is based on a false idea of science and 
suggest instead that there is great similarity in the way 
scientists and social workers theorise. The next chapter 
discusses the claim that the scientific search for causal 
explanations conflicts with a belief in free will; I argue 
that in fact there is no conflict.
The following chapter questions the reliability and 
scope of fieldworkers* intuitive and empathie judgements 
and sets out some reasons why they should be supplemented 
with scientific methods of testing. What counts as 
empirical evidence and how theories are appraised are the 
topics of the next two chapters. I argue that the 
traditional social work view of empiricism is unduly narrow 
and has hampered social work research. I also address the 
comparatively new objection to science in social work, 
namely the relativists' claim that science is not empirical 
and therefore should not be held up as a model to social 
workers.
The final chapter considers how scientific methods can 
be incorporated into practice.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
When a young child appears with broken bones in a 
hospital casualty department and staff suspect non­
accidental injury, they refer the matter to the social
services department. Social workers are then involved in a 
series of difficult judgements and decisions. They must 
determine whether this is a case of child abuse, consider 
who might be responsible, speculate on the possible causes, 
assess the risk of further abuse, and decide what actions 
to take.
Social workers, in this example, need to explain why
the abuse has occurred, predict the likely consequences of
different courses of action, and decide how to intervene. 
These aims of explanation and prediction resemble those of 
natural scientists. Whether the similarity can or should 
extend to social workers using the same methods as natural 
scientists has long been disputed. As in the social 
sciences generally, those who argue for a scientific 
approach (naturalists) are opposed by humanists who claim 
that understanding human actions requires different methods 
from those used in studying the natural world. The latter 
position has received most support in social work, 
particularly among fieldworkers.
In this thesis, I shall challenge this majority view 
and argue that social workers can and should use scientific
methods in order to develop the most effective ways of 
helping the many people in our society who have to rely on 
them. The thesis examines the philosophical debates 
underlying the conflicting views on science and argues that 
the widespread hostility to the use of scientific methods 
that exists among social workers is based on a false 
picture of them and hence an inaccurate understanding of 
how they can be used in social work.
Philosophical debate, though abstract, is of practical 
importance. Social workers, seeing so much human suffering 
and bombarded with requests for help, might be inclined to 
dismiss philosophy as a luxury, an arcane subject which has 
little to do with their day-to-day work. But social
workers inevitably take sides in the philosophical
arguments and the position they take influences the help 
they offer to clients. In assessing the risk of child 
abuse, for example, they have to decide what evidence is
relevant, how reliable it is, and how they can use it to 
make a prediction about the safety of a particular child. 
The social worker who favours the humanist approach may 
base his decision largely on an intuitive appraisal of the 
parents while his colleague who adopts a scientific 
approach will give more weight to empirical research
evidence on risk factors. Their philosophical differences 
have practical consequences, affecting decisions about 
whether or not a child stays with his parents and, in a few 
cases where the predictions are disastrously wrong, whether 
he survives.
Moreover, although the debate about using scientific 
methods in social work is as old as the profession itself.
It has recently received increased attention because of 
issues in both social work and the philosophy of science.
It is typically in times of trouble that disciplines 
become interested in their philosophical foundations and to 
many it appears that social work today is in difficulties. 
The steady growth in the statutory duties and powers given 
to the profession illustrates the increasing expectations 
society has of it to alleviate personal and social
problems. But at the same time, doubts are increasing 
about the competence of social workers. The public have 
been shocked by a number of cause célébrés where children 
have been severely abused or murdered despite being under 
the supervision of social workers. Within the profession, 
unease has developed because, in many areas of practice, 
scientifically based evaluative research has failed to 
produce convincing evidence of effectiveness. In this
unsettled period, attention turns to questions about what 
knowledge and skills social workers might have and how they 
can develop them.
The philosophy of science also provides a motive for 
re-examining social workers' assumptions about how they 
might understand and help their clients. There have been 
developments in thinking about the nature of scientific 
reasoning which substantially alter the premises of the 
traditional debate about using scientific methods in
studying human conduct. These philosophical changes have 
led to some re-appraisal of the disputes in social work and 
two opposing views are emerging. On the one hand, some 
propose a new argument against science, namely the
relativists' claim that criticisms of the former account of
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science also Invalidate the claim that science produces 
more reliable theories. Hence, it is said, science should 
no longer be held up as a model for social workers. On the 
other hand, it is argued that the more satisfactory 
empiricist account is not vulnerable to the criticisms 
humanists have traditionally levelled at science and so 
bridges the apparent gap between the two sides in the 
science debate. It is this view which I shall be 
presenting and defending throughout this thesis.
OUTLINE OF THESIS
My first aim is to show that these debates about 
knowledge are not just of interest to social workers but 
are of public significance. Chapter Two reports on the 
expanding role of social work in modern society and details 
the profession's increasing duties and powers laid down by 
parliament. In Chapter Three, I consider how social 
workers meet their responsibilities. A study of the nature 
of training programmes for social workers and the main 
approaches to fieldwork indicates that few use scientific 
methods in appraising theories or evaluating their work. 
Empirical research studies though cast serious doubt on the 
effectiveness of such a style of social work and provide 
grounds for arguing for a scientific approach.
Most social workers, however, would argue not that 
they should not use scientific methods but that they cannot 
employ them when trying to understand and help human 
beings. Their arguments to support this view are many and
varied, directed at different aspects of science. To 
review them, I have grouped them in relation to the stages 
of scientific reasoning. First, I examine claims that we 
cannot formulate scientific theories about human actions. 
Secondly, I look at the arguments against using standard 
scientific methods for testing theories, and thirdly, I 
review objections to using scientific criteria for 
evaluating the evidence.
Chapters Four and Five are concerned with claims that, 
in studying human behaviour, we cannot develop theories 
akin to those found in the natural sciences. Chapter Four 
examines the frequently made claim that scientific methods 
can only be applied to observable phenomena and not to the 
mental phenomena of thoughts, feelings, and hopes which are 
the focus of most social workers' interest. This 
assumption leads many social workers to think, mistakenly 
as I shall show, that the extreme form of behaviourism
which studies only behaviour and not mental processes is 
the paradigm example of a scientific study of human
conduct. Indeed, I shall argue that, far from being
different processes, there are in fact strong similarities 
in the way that social workers and scientists theorise.
Another argument against theory development, examined 
in Chapter Five, is that the scientific aim of developing 
causal theories conflicts in some way with the assumption 
that people have free will.
On the issue of testing theories or conjectures,
social workers, in current practice, seem to rely mainly on 
empathie and intuitive judgements. Although this thesis 
will not entirely dismiss their value, in Chapter Six, I
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shall argue that they have serious limitations and need to 
be supplemented with more rigorous, scientific methods of 
testing.
Chapter Seven discusses social workers' objections to 
using such methods. Their criticisms are based crucially 
on the belief that only behaviour provides scientifically 
acceptable evidence and this, they say, is an inadequate 
test of theories about mental processes. But this is one 
of the issues on which philosophical thinking has 
significantly altered. I shall argue for a revised 
empiricist account of evidence and discuss the implications 
it has for research methodology in social work. This issue 
also forms one of the strands in the relativists' claim 
that science is no more reliable or valid than other forms 
of reasoning. I examine their argument that there is no 
empirical evidence which can provide an independent test of 
a theory.
Evidence does not decisively prove or refute a theory 
and Chapter Eight considers how theories are appraised in 
the light of the evidence. This has been a major 
philosophical issue in recent years but the argument which 
has received most attention (and support) in the social 
work literature has been the relativists' claim that 
decisions to accept or reject theory in science, or in 
social work, are not determined by empirical evidence but 
by social and psychological factors. I shall criticise 
this view and offer instead a Bayesian account of 
scientific reasoning which considers that scientists reason 
in accordance with the probability calculus.
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This review of social workers' opposition to using 
scientific methods concludes that their objections are 
invalid, based on an inaccurate picture of science. Chapter 
Nine examines the practical Implications of the account of 
science I have presented. I shall discuss how fieldworkers 
can incorporate scientific methods into their daily work 
and show the differences this would make in cases such as 
the abused child mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter.
12
CHAPTER TWO
THE MODERN ROLE OF SOCIAL WORK
A general haziness and indeterminateness surround the 
whole concept of social work and social services, so 
that even now in the late 70s, some fifty years after 
the introduction of systematic training for social 
workers, colleagues in related professions - doctors, 
nurses, teachers - often ask in exasperation: "but
what do they do?" (Goldberg and Warburton, 1979, p.6).
This comment still rings true: other professionals
and indeed the general public often have only a vague idea 
about social work. And yet, such ignorance is surprising 
in view of the power and responsibilities social workers 
have in modern British society. Over the past two
centuries, the population's welfare has become more and 
more the concern of the State. Alongside the giants of
education, health, income maintenance, and housing, social 
work has progressed from its birth in the slums of
nineteenth century London, with a spurt in the post-war 
creation of the Welfare State, to its current standing as 
an important and costly public service.
Therefore, as a first step in arguing my case that 
social workers should use scientific methods, I need to 
dispel the "haziness" surrounding the concept of social 
work and outline the context in which the science debate 
occurs. This chapter provides a brief historical review of 
the development of social work and lists the main duties 
and powers of social workers today.
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EARLY HISTORY
A central theme in the history of social welfare is 
the changing balance between individuals' duty to provide 
for themselves and the community's responsibility to help 
those in need. In the past hundred years there has been a 
significant shift towards state services to prevent and 
ameliorate social problems and, within these services, 
social work has been given an expanding role.
Before the modern state involvement in welfare, the 
well-being of individuals was left mainly to themselves and 
their families with some charitable help from the Church. 
Since poor law legislation in 1598 and 1601, the state had 
authorised a minimal, local service for the destitute, 
offering some help to people in their own homes as well as 
running workhouses as a final refuge for those in need. 
This system, funded by local rates, functioned for two 
hundred years, being implemented in different times and 
places with varying degrees of generosity to the poor.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century however the 
poor law system came in for growing criticism as its cost 
and the number of paupers rose. Byrne and Padfleld (1990, 
p.6) cite three main causes for the call for change: the
growth in population; urban development resulting from 
industrialisation; and war with France which had caused 
inflation and disrupted the economy.
A Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, set up in 1832, 
produced a report which formed the basis of the 1834 Poor 
Law Amendment Act. This Act, which has become notorious for
14
its harshness, had a strong deterrent element. It was "the 
great discovery of a commercial age," the historian R. H. 
Tawney (1948, p.268) reported, "that relief might be so 
administered as not merely to relieve, but also to deter."
The underlying thinking, reports Pinker was based on 
the assumption the the poor law system was dealing mainly 
with able-bodied people who were capable of looking after 
themselves: "able-bodied pauperism had been diagnosed as
the social problem of the eighteen-thirties" (1971, p.61) . 
Their poverty was believed to be their own fault, due to 
moral weakness and fecklessness. A system of state relief 
which in any way rewarded such failings and sapped self- 
reliance was to be condemned. The apparent cruelty of the 
new Poor Law sprang from concern for the long-term welfare 
of those in dire straits. It was believed, says Pinker 
that :
a seemingly cruel procedure would result in the 
greatest kindness if able-bodied paupers could be 
driven back onto the labour market where, according to 
the laws of political economy, employment and the 
recovery of personal dignity were awaiting them 
(Pinker, 1971, p.59).
The new Poor Law ran on the principle of "lesser 
eligibility": the pauper's lot should be less favourable
than those who were self-reliant so that only the truly 
desperate would turn to the state for help. No help should 
be given to people at home; admission to a workhouse, with 
its attendant stigma and reduction in physical comfort, 
should be obligatory (though in practice many areas did not 
enforce this rule). Moreover, paupers could be placed in 
"Correction Houses", and, from 1867 to 1918, men receiving 
Poor Law relief could in some circumstances lose the right
15
to vote.
There were of course some poor who were not able- 
bodied, the sick and the elderly for example. Although in 
principle they should not have received a deterrent 
service, difficulties in defining who was not able-bodied 
and the expense of running separate services meant that in 
practice many suffered from the punitive measures aimed at 
the workshy (Pinker, 1971, p.61).
While state help was reduced to a minimum, community 
concern for the plight of the destitute grew, expressed in 
the form of charity aid. Private philanthropy, since it 
was not received by right, was thought to run less risk of 
encouraging idleness and dependency. Some philanthropists 
were motivated by distress at the conditions of the poor 
while others were more worried about the risk of social 
unrest or revolution posed by a large, deprived working 
class.
Whatever the motivation, charitable works proliferated 
in the nineteenth century. A survey in London in 1861 by 
Sampson Low (1861) estimated that there were 640 charity 
institutions, 279 founded between 1800 and 1850 and 144 
between 1850 and 1860. He also reported that the total 
income of charities was two and a half million pounds while 
the total Poor Law expenditure was only one and a half 
million (1861, p26). The charitable scene in London became 
chaotic: the numerous organisations were unco-ordinated and 
competitive. The most serious defect, to some, was that 
they distributed aid indiscriminately, not properly 
checking the recipient's circumstances or, in particular,
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if he was already receiving help from another charity. The 
fear grew that, in spite of the good intentions of the 
philanthropists, charity was creating and encouraging 
dependency among the poor.
With the aim of co-ordinating charities and assessing 
need more accurately, the Society for Organising Charitable 
Relief and Repressing Mendicity was formed in 1870. Soon 
changing its name to the briefer "Charity Organisation 
Society", this body had as its central tenet, reports 
Pinker (1971, p.30) that "overgenerous provision of any 
kind of statutory or voluntary aid damaged rather than 
mended the moral fabric of society". To ensure that 
charity was dispensed in beneficial rather than harmful 
ways, the C.O.S. created the "caseworker", recognisably 
the predecessor of today's social worker (Woodroofe, 1962).
The caseworker's task was to interview applicants for 
alms and assess their needs, circumstances, and character. 
Most importantly she (it was usually a woman) had to judge 
whether assistance was likely to be beneficial, helping the 
person to return to self-sufficiency, or harmful, re­
inforcing their laziness or moral depravity. The 
"deserving" poor could get support and money to assist 
their efforts but the "undeserving", which included 
"persons of drunken, immoral or idle habits" (C.O.S., 
1890), were turned away, with Poor Law Relief their only 
source of aid.
Woodroofe , in her history of social work, sums up the 
thinking at the time:
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charity, administered according to certain principles, 
could encourage independence, strengthen character, 
and help to preserve the family as the fundamental 
unit of society (Woodroofe, 1962, p.28).
Case examples illustrate the work of the C.O.S. 
Successful applicants were those like the single woman, a 
dressmaker, unemployed for a year because of illness, who 
was granted a loan of one pound towards the cost of a 
sewing machine, or a widow given training as an ironer so 
that she could do laundry work to support herself and her 
four young children. Case 1,123 was considered undeserving 
and refused help however. The Brixton Committee of the 
C.O.S. in 1834 censured this 36 year old man as an 
illustration of "how inclined many are to run to charity 
for help, instead of themselves 'putting by for a rainy 
day'" (C.O.S., 1884, p.149). With an income of 34s a week, 
rent of 4s 6d, and a wife and child to support, he could 
not afford to pay for convalescence for his child because 
he was in debt; this, it was judged, was the result of 
fecklessness rather than hardship
Both the C.O.S. and the new Poor Law worked on the 
assumption that the causes of poverty lay mainly within the 
pauper's control and avoiding destitution was essentially 
an individual's responsibility. But these beliefs came 
under increasing attack as the nineteenth century came to 
an end leading to calls for substantial changes in the 
state's role in relation to individuals' welfare.
Many factors contributed to the change in attitude to 
the poor and needy. For example, empirical research 
studies by Charles Booth (1889) in London and Seebohm 
Rowntree (1901) in York fuelled public concern by
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revealing the extent of poverty. Booth reported that 30.7% 
of the population of London, that is 1,292,737 people, were 
living at or below the subsistence level. Rowntree 
distinguished between “primary poverty", caused by the 
utter insufficiency of the family income, and “secondary 
poverty", caused by misspending what could, given a 
rigidly disciplined pattern of expenditure, be an adequate 
income for subsistence. He found that 9.91% of York's 
population were in primary poverty and another 17.93% were 
in secondary poverty (source: Rose, 1971, p.246).
Moreover, analysis of the factors associated with poverty 
suggested that it was not caused solely or even mainly by 
individual improvidence but by a lack of jobs, low wages, 
illness, and old age (Byrne and Padfield, 1990, p.38).
The economic depression of the 1880s which led to 
widespread industrial unemployment also helped to undermine 
the belief that the unemployed were mainly workshy (Byrne 
and Padfield, 1990, p.38).
Furthermore, the case for increased state intervention 
became more compelling when the Boer and the First World 
Wars revealed the poor health of the working class, many of 
whom were unfit for military service. Even if this was 
deemed their own fault, it was bad for the country and 
warranted state measures to improve matters.
Another, fundamental, shift in attitudes to the Poor 
Law arose from changes in political and economic theories. 
Pinker (1971, Chapter Two) reports that the Poor Law was 
based on laissez-faire doctrines of competition and self- 
help; it was “the necessary social complement to the free
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play of competitive market forces" (p.84). As it was 
increasingly criticised however for being unable to solve 
the social problems of an industrialised society, rival 
theories were proposed: "between 1900 and 1914
collectivist doctrines of social welfare were gaining 
popularity and influence, and reached the dimensions of a 
counter-attack upon the principles of 1834" Pinker (1971, 
p.85).
For reasons such as these, the Victorian opposition to 
state intervention in social problems has been gradually 
replaced by an acceptance that it is necessary in a modern 
society.
The Poor Law was not completely repealed until 1948. 
In spite of a Royal Commission (1905-09) into its workings 
which produced a Majority and a Minority Report, both 
advocating change, it was not directly altered but "by­
passed in the making of social policy" (Pinker, 1971,
p.83). Its scope was gradually eroded by a succession of
laws dealing with specific social needs, all of which 
diminished people's reliance on the Poor Law. Thus for 
example the 1905 Unemployed Workmen Act provided for public 
works employment and the 1911 National Insurance Act
enabled workers to insure against the risk of unemployment 
or illness, so substantially reducing the potential clients 
of the Poor Law.
In this century there has been extensive legislation 
on the major social problems: on employment conditions,
income maintenance, housing, health, and education. Within 
these laws, social workers have been given an
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administrative and therapeutic role. The majority of 
social workers now operate through local authority social 
services departments and the probation service where their 
remit is prescribed by Acts of Parliament. A substantial
minority (estimated by Byrne and Padfield, 1990, p.403, as 
about a third) are still employed in voluntary welfare 
agencies such as the N.S.P.C.C. and the C.O.S.' successor, 
the Family Welfare Association, but even these are often 
linked through funding to the state provision of welfare. 
Therefore the later history of social work is closely 
linked to changing legislation and is best presented in 
relation to the major client groups.
THE SICK AND DISABLED.
Nowadays, people who suffer from illness or 
disability, either physical or mental, form the largest 
group receiving assistance from the personal social 
services. Health problems figured frequently in referrals 
to the C.O.S. but a specifically medical role for social 
workers can be traced to the "almoners" or medical social 
workers, the first of whom, Mary Stewart, was appointed in 
1895 at the Royal Free Hospital in London. Her task, 
originally, was to check how much patients could afford to 
pay for medical treatment but, in assessing their 
circumstances and needs, she soon became interested in 
extending her role to dealing with the practical and 
psychological problems caused by illness. Although her 
first task became obsolete with the introduction of the
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National Health Service in 1948, almoning had by then 
established itself as a useful social service. In 1951 the 
Cope Report, reviewing the work of medical auxiliaries 
which included almoners, judged that “the work of the 
almoner should be regarded as one of the essential elements 
of a complete hospital service, and indeed of a complete 
health service" (1951, para. 115.)
The hospital-based service of the almoner has today 
been greatly extended by the policy of “community care" for 
people with chronic mental or physical disabilities. The 
aim of this policy is to avoid or minimise hospital 
admissions; people should be helped either to live in their 
own homes or in hostels/homes within the community. Local 
authorities are vested with the legal responsibility to 
provide practical assistance and support services, running 
day and residential units and employing many staff besides 
social workers in this major enterprise. The main piece of 
legislation on this subject until 1990 was the Chronically 
Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 which spelt out the 
duties of local authorities more precisely than earlier 
legislation.
Local authority duties are however set to increase 
substantially under the 1990 National Health Service and 
Community Care Act. Based on the Griffiths Report (1988) 
it ends the current division of responsibility between the 
National Health Service, Social Security, and local 
authorities because this arrangement has proved to be 
inefficient; the prime responsibility for providing 
community care will be given to local authorities. The Act
22
will be implemented in 1993.
Social workers have particular duties in relation to 
the mentally ill. About 90% of admissions for psychiatric 
care are now voluntary but the remaining 10% are admitted 
against their wishes. Compulsory orders are based on 
medical recommendations but the application for admission 
is made by "Approved Social Workers". Their predecessors 
in the nineteenth century, the Poor Law Receiving Officers, 
were involved with doctors and magistrates in the process 
of certifying people as lunatics and arranging for their 
detention in asylums. While the magistrate's role in 
compulsory admissions has since disappeared, the Receiving 
Officer's part has gradually become more important and more 
clearly identified as the work of a skilled social worker. 
The "duly authorised officer" of the first half of this 
century was replaced in 1959 by the "mental welfare 
officer" who in turn was superseded in 1983 by the Approved 
Social Worker. The Receiving Officers of the Poor Law had 
only an administrative function in organising admissions, 
implementing the decisions of doctors and magistrates. 
Social workers now are expected to have some independent
expertise. The Mental Health Act 1983 specifies that,
/
before making an application, the social worker has a duty
to:
interview the patient in a suitable manner and satisfy 
himself that detention in hospital is in all the 
circumstances of the case the most appropriate way of 
providing the care and medical treatment of which the 
patient stands in need.
The hospital-based psychiatric social work service has 
an unusual history. Other social work specialisms
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developed in response to the recognition of a social 
problem. While the needs of the mentally ill had long been 
seen, psychiatric social work was started because of a new 
therapeutic method. In the 1920s, American social workers, 
like many others, had been most impressed by the work of 
Freud. Psychoanalytic theories seemed to many to provide 
both a compelling explanation of clients' problems and a 
therapy for alleviating them. British observers were 
impressed by the American developments and the Commonwealth 
Fund provided money to send some social workers to America 
to learn about the new theories. These social workers 
subsequently set up the first university-based social work 
training course at the London School of Economics in 1929. 
Only after completing the training did the first 
psychiatric social workers start work in mental hospitals 
and child guidance clinics. With the current community 
care policy, their functions have subsequently widened 
considerably and they now play a significant part in the 
after-care of patients.
CHILDREN
Children's welfare is the area in which social work 
gets the most public attention (and criticism) . The well­
being of children has long been a major concern of social 
policy makers, the first Children's Act being passed in 
1908, the most recent in 1989. The 1948 Children Act was a 
landmark, setting up local authority Children's 
Departments, staffed by Child Care Officers, taking over 
the duties previously divided among several different local
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authority departments. These departments have since been
incorporated into the general social services departments.
They have a duty to monitor children's care, try to prevent
family breakdown, and to provide alternative care if
necessary. The first concern of social workers according to
current legislation is to prevent the break-up of families.
The primary duty of local authorities, set out in Section 1
of the Child Care Act of 1980 is to:
make available advice, guidance and assistance as may 
promote the welfare of children by diminishing the 
need to receive children into or keep them in care or 
to bring them before the Juvenile Court.
If efforts to keep the children safely at home fail,
they may be taken into care on either a voluntary or
compulsory basis. The local authority has a duty to
receive into care any child who is orphaned, without a
guardian, abandoned, or whose parents are prevented from
caring for him properly and who request his reception into
care (section 2 of the Child Care Act 1980).
Local Authorities also have powers to apply to a
Magistrate's Court for a "care order", which transfers
parental rights to them, when it is considered that a child
is "in need of care or control" because of ill-treatment,
neglect, delinquency, moral danger, inefficient education,
or being beyond the control of his parents (section 1(2) of
the Children and Young Person's Act, 1969).
Another major duty is to supervise the welfare of
children whom the Juvenile Court has placed on a
"Supervision Order". These orders may be made for many
reasons, the main ones being because of delinquency or
25
divorce proceedings.
OFFENDERS
The roots of the Probation Service are found in the 
nineteenth century practice of some magistrates who, 
fearing the corrupting effects of prison on young men, 
preferred to release first-time offenders on the condition 
that they "kept the peace"; sometimes they attached a 
condition of supervision by a parent or guardian.
Organised supervision began in 1876 when the Church of 
England Temperance Society appointed a "missionary" to some 
London police courts. The courts would release the 
convicted offender on the condition that he would see the 
missionary who would "advise, assist and befriend" him and 
help him lead an honest life. The success of this
innovation led to the Probation and Offenders Act 1907
which enabled all magistrates' courts to appoint probation 
officers.
The major duties of today's Probation service, set out 
in the Probation Rules (H.M.S.O. 1984), are still to
supervise offenders and "to advise, assist and befriend" 
them. Their clients may be placed on a Probation or 
Supervision Order instead of being given a custodial 
sentence or they may be referred for supervision as a 
condition of a release on parole from prison. Some clients 
are voluntary. For instance, those on bail awaiting trial 
and people released from prison may ask the probation 
service for help.
Probation Officers' expertise in social and
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Interpersonal matters is now more widely used In the legal 
system. It is generally recognised that the circumstances 
of the offender are relevant in deciding what sentence will 
have the most reforming or deterrent effect. The courts 
may ask the Probation Officer to provide a Social Enquiry 
Report to help them reach a decision. The Probation 
Service also plays a major role in divorce and custody 
proceedings, and provides marriage counselling and 
conciliation services.
RE-ORGANISATION
The re-organisation of the personal social services in 
1968 in Scotland and in 1970 in England and Wales is a 
major landmark in the expansion of social work, creating 
large local authority departments with political influence 
and uniting the various specialisms into a single social 
work profession.
Social work responsibilities and services developed in 
a piecemeal way, responding to the needs of particular 
client groups. This was seen increasingly to lead to 
problems of duplication, poor co-ordination, and gaps in 
services. At the same time, there was growing recognition 
of the similarity in the work of the various helping 
agencies, irrespective of their client group. Pressure 
grew for a re-organisation and integration of social 
services.
In Scotland, the Kilbrandon Report (1964) reviewed the 
personal social services and recommended the setting up of 
Social Work Departments which would have responsibility for
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all social work, including probation. The Social Work
(Scotland) Act of 1968 put these proposals into practice.
The Seebohm committee, facing the same task in England and
Wales, reported in 1965 and its recommendations were
enacted in the Local Authority Social Services Act of 1970.
They reached similar conclusions to the Scottish enquiry,
recommending the establishment of Social Services
Departments which would bring together: the child care
service, the welfare services, education welfare and child
guidance services, the home help service, mental health
social work services, adult training centres, day
nurseries, and the supervision of childminders. Unlike
the Scottish system, probation remained as a separate
service. Medical and psychiatric social work stayed under
hospital management until the re-organisation of local
government in 1974 when they too came under the management
of the local authority.
The Seebohm reforms integrated not only the
administration of the different social work services but
also the fieldwork of the different specialist social
workers. The Seebohm Committee, in line with the
developing consensus in the profession, judged that:
the common elements in the practice of social workers 
in different settings are much more important than the 
elements which distinguish them (1968, 
para.520).
Consequently it thought that the new departments 
should be staffed not by specialists but by “generic" 
social workers able to deal with a wide range of problems:
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a family or Individual in need of social care should, 
as far as possible, be served by a single worker... 
with a comprehensive approach to the social problems 
of his clients" (1968, para. 516) .
The new social services departments have expanded 
rapidly to meet their ever-growing statutory 
responsibilities. Between 1970 and 1980, the percentage of 
public expenditure allocated to the personal social 
services rose from 0.9% to 1.9% (Goldberg and Hatch 1982). 
During this time, the number of social workers employed by 
local authority social services departments more than 
doubled. By 1985, approximately 19,800 social workers were 
employed in direct work with clients while another 9,500 
worked in senior administration and management positions 
(H.M.S.O. 1987). Although detailed implementation is still 
only at the planning stage, the increased responsibility 
for community care given to local authorities by the 1990 
National Health Service and Community Care Act means that 
the number of social workers needed by the statutory 
services will not decrease in the foreseeable future.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter has been to clarify the modern 
role of social work. This historical review shows it has 
expanded dramatically in the past hundred years. Having 
begun as a mainly voluntary enterprise, it has increasingly 
become a statutory service with an extensive mandate to 
help people in difficulty.
Goldberg and Warburton give a vivid illustration of 
the range of potential clients of a modern social services
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department :
the terrified mother who has hit her nine-month-old 
baby; the boy who has run away from a tight,
overprotective home ; the adolescent drug user who
lands on his relatives on returning from Morocco; the 
marital complexities in a family where one partner is 
mentally ill; the unpaid bills and eviction order of a 
problem family; the guilt and doubt of parents who are 
at the end of their tether coping with a severely 
mentally handicapped child at home; the wife who
refuses to have her husband home again after a severe
stroke; the lonely, old, frail lady whose only son has 
married and who has nothing left to live for in her 
large empty house (1979, p.7).
Moreover, the increasing statutory role has not just 
increased social workers' duties but also their power. They 
play a significant role in many cases where people's civil 
liberties are removed. They may be involved in arranging a 
compulsory admission to a psychiatric hospital, or in 
removing a child from the care of his parents. Many people
are placed by law in the care of or under the supervision
of social workers. Besides these cases where social 
workers have overt authority, their power is in fact more 
extensive. Even for most apparently voluntary clients 
there is no choice about receiving social work help since 
there is no alternative source of assistance. Few parents
of children with learning difficulties, for example, are
rich enough to buy all the social services they need in the 
private sector.
Another development shown in the legislation is an 
growing belief that social workers have particular skills 
in helping. While society may be vague about what social 
workers do, it has shown itself ready to give them 
increasing responsibility and power. As Richard Titmuss,
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a leading authority on social policy, commented during a
lecture In 1965:
It Is an Interesting and often overlooked fact that 
during the past twenty years whenever the British 
people have Investigated a social problem, there has 
always followed a call for more trained social 
workers" (reported In Randall, 1981, p.222).
This willingness to Increase the role of social
workers suggests some trust In their ability to carry out
their duties, possibly even some over-optimlsm as Butyrm
suggests :
the granting of such power and responsibility by 
society to social work Implies a degree of confidence 
In Its knowledge and capabilities which even many
social workers would consider excessive (1976, p.x) .
The growing Importance of social work in modern
society strengthens the need to examine its knowledge base. 
Philosophical questions about how Its knowledge can be 
evaluated and Its capabilities measured are of urgent
practical and public significance.
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CHAPTER THREE
SOCIAL WORK EXPERTISE
INTRODUCTION
Ninety percent of fieldworkers nowadays are 
professionally qualified. The Central Council for 
Education and Training in Social Work (CCETSW), the 
organisation responsible for approving training courses, 
asserts in a statement on training that social workers 
“share a common core of knowledge, skills, and values" 
(1989, p.3). These two facts suggest, misleadingly as I 
shall argue, a high degree of uniformity within social work 
in understanding clients' problems and a similar level of 
unanimity about how to approach them. In fact there are 
many conflicting views, the one of most interest in this 
thesis being on the possible role of scientific methods in 
developing knowledge and expertise in social work.
Social work is seen by some as potentially scientific. 
The social sciences are considered a source of 
explanatory theories and therapeutic ideas; social work 
methods should be evaluated according to the standard 
procedures of science, and the profession should aim to 
develop a public and tested set of theories on which to 
base fieldwork. This point of view is championed mainly by 
academics and is apparent in the guidelines on social work 
education produced by CCETSW.
The majority of social workers, particularly of
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fieldworkers, on the other hand, are opposed to this view. 
They consider understanding and helping people depends 
mainly on the empathie skills and intuitive understanding 
of the individual worker. Such skills, it is claimed, are 
essentially personal, refined through experience rather 
than by formal tuition. The social sciences are seen as a 
useful source of ideas but such ideas or theories are to be 
judged by the individual in the light of experience and 
intuition rather than by scientific methods.
This chapter traces the impact of these rival views on 
social work education and fieldwork. I begin by examining 
the history and content of training courses before 
appraising the dominant, non-scientific, methods of 
practice.
HISTORY OF SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION
It is not self-evident that social workers need formal 
training. We all have to solve problems in daily living 
and most people are called upon to help friends and 
relatives at times of crisis. Social work is closely 
linked to these ordinary activities which we manage without 
training and, in its early days, many considered that 
social work also needed no special expertise. Social 
workers, it was thought, needed to be kind, experienced 
people with common sense and some practical knowledge: 
nothing else.
This view persisted in some branches of social work 
until fairly recently and perhaps is still held by some. 
Before the re-organisation of social services in Britain in
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1972, for example, few workers in the local authority 
welfare and mental health departments held formal 
qualifications nor did they seem to regret this state of 
affairs. Rodgers and Dixon (1960), in a study of a county 
borough in the mid-fifties, found that only 5 of the 72 
social workers were professionally trained and they 
confirmed that this was not seen by the staff as a problem. 
They reported that workers thought it was more important to 
be "good with clients", "not allowing people to get away 
with it", to have a wide practical experience, and to know 
the statutory regulations. Casework was common sense 
"requiring no special skill or methods so that any worker 
feels himself equal to it" (1960, p.158.)
These characteristics are still highly valued in 
social work today and this is reflected in the fact that 
training courses prefer older students with more experience 
of life and its difficulties, and that most social workers 
start their careers by working as unqualified staff before 
undertaking any special training. Indeed common sense and 
practical knowledge are probably sufficient to deal with
many of the referrals to a modern social services
department. Goldberg (1979, p.125), for example, in her 
study of such a department, reported that the large
majority of new referrals just wanted practical assistance, 
such as a home help, advice on statutory rights and on 
available services, or someone to help them deal with
another statutory department, particularly the D.H.S.S. or 
the Housing Department.
Ordinary helping skills are useful in social work but 
they have come to be seen as insufficient. Formal training
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schemes developed from the belief that social workers could 
offer more than kindness and common sense advice. By 
turning to the scientific study of human behaviour, it was 
hoped that social workers could develop a greater 
understanding and more effective ways of solving people's 
problems. As the following historical review shows however 
there has not been consensus on how social workers can be 
scientif ic.
Charities offered the first training for social 
workers, the main pioneer being the Charity Organisation 
Society (C.O.S.). Their caseworkers received formal tuition 
and supervised practice - a combination of teaching methods 
still used in modern courses. The formal teaching covered 
financial and practical information and record-keeping. In 
1917, Mary Richmond, a leading member of the American 
C.G.S. which taught a similar course, formalised their 
methods in Social Diagnosis, the first textbook for 
social workers.
The book advocates an explicitly scientific approach 
but, for Richmond, this means that social workers should 
use scientific methods of investigation rather than draw on 
social science theories. She stresses the importance of a 
thorough investigation of claimants' social circumstances 
before "diagnosing" their problems and deciding on 
"treatments". She discusses the reliability of different 
types of evidence - direct observation, testimony, and 
circumstantial - and the validity of different forms of 
inference. The book also encourages caseworkers to keep 
clear and consistent records of work so that they can 
monitor their efforts and formulate general principles. In
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1921, Mary Richmond was awarded an honorary master's degree
by Smith College for "establishing the scientific basis of
a new profession".
Other pioneers of social work education turned to the
emerging social sciences for a greater understanding of
the social and psychological causes of personal problems,
initially concentrating on social and economic theories,
rather than psychology. In 1904, Urwick, the first
principal of the School of Sociology in London (later
incorporated into the London School of Economics), set out
the aims of their social work course, stating that social
work should be based on the "science of sociology" which;
finds its place waiting for it as the director of the 
new social interests and as the interpreter of the 
complex social life which now for the first time has 
become an almost universal object of thought.
Simply understanding socio-economic causes of problems
however offered little direct therapeutic guidance to those
helping individuals and families. Social theories
suggested ways of alleviating problems by intervening at
the level of social policy. Though some social workers
were ready to put their efforts irtto social reform, for the
majority who continued to work with individuals the
practical value of these theories was disputed. Richmond,
although also advocating a scientific approach, criticised
the social science teaching and defended her individual
approach in the C.O.S.:
if I could choose a friend for a family fallen into 
misfortune and asking for relief, I would rather 
choose for them one who had this practical
resourcefulness than one who had a perfect equipment 
of advanced social theories.... The former would find 
the most natural and effective way out... the other 
would say that the whole social order was wrong and
must pay a ransom for its wrongness by generous
material help for its victims (Richmond, 1899, p.137).
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The "treatment" prescribed in her textbook consists 
mainly of arranging financial help and encouraging the 
clients through a friendly relationship: "the tonic
influence which an understanding spirit always exerts" 
Richmond (1917, p.200). Yellolly (1980, p.36) describes 
the social work of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century as characterised by a moral and evangelistic 
outlook. Caseworkers tried to help the Individual or 
family "through moral influence exercised within an 
authentic and personal relationship".
Despite Richmond's criticisms, a grounding in the
social sciences came to be considered an essential element
in social work training but, because of its limited utility
in direct work with clients, it gradually came to be seen
as a preparatory stage, so that by the 1960s students also
took further training of a more vocational and practical
kind. In 1959, a Government working party on social work
education accepted the view that:
they (the social science courses) do not adequately 
equip the student to take a responsible social work 
post... To be recognised as fully trained, the present 
day social worker should both have successfully 
completed a general course in social studies and also 
have taken a social work training, usually lasting 
approximately a year, leading to a professional 
qualification (Younghusband Report, 1959, para. 816).
Psychological rather than socio-economic theories
proved to have a more direct influence on work with
clients. From around 1910, in what has been termed "the
psychiatric deluge" (Woodroofe, 1962), social workers
showed a growing interest in psychiatry and psychology.
Although initially the interest was not specifically
Freudian, psychoanalytic theories soon became dominant.
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particularly in America. Like so many others, social 
workers were greatly impressed not only by the deep 
understanding these theories seemed to offer of human 
problems but also by their therapeutic promise. Unlike the 
social theories, Freud's focus on the individual blended 
easily with the social work tradition of individual and 
family work and his theories apparently offered guidance on 
how to help those in psychological trouble. They were 
hailed by many as providing a scientifically-based 
therapeutic method for social work.
Freudian theories became a major component of social 
work education and had a substantial impact on fieldwork in 
America where training courses had proliferated. In Britain 
their influence on fieldwork, and indeed the impact of any 
type of training, was much less because the British were 
slower to accept the view that social workers could improve 
their competence through formal tuition.
Social work began as a set of specialist services for 
particular client groups and, initially, training courses 
were also specialised. The value of training was accepted 
at very different rates in the various specialties. 
Psychiatric social workers are at one extreme, with a 
university-based training always having been required since 
their creation in 1929. Almoners, now called medical 
social workers, who had existed since 1895, soon followed 
their example, making qualification a prerequisite for 
using the title "almoner". Few welfare workers and mental 
welfare officers however were qualified. Child Care 
Officers, a category only created by the Children's Act of 
1948, and Probation Officers fall between these two
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extremes in terms of training, with increasing numbers 
being professionally qualified.
The 1960s was the time of the fastest expansion in 
social work education. The following table, taken from 
Younghusband (1959, p.296), shows the growth in the 
different specialties.
PSYCHIATRIC SOCIAL 
WORKERS :
MEDICAL SOCIAL 
WORKERS :
CHILD CARE 
OFFICERS:
WELFARE WORKERS :
PROBATION
OFFICERS:
1960 
% TRAINED
100%
100%
26%
5%
65%
1970 
% TRAINED
100%
100%
47%
(approx.)27% 
74%
Since 1970, the figure has grown steadily so that now
90% of all fieldworkers are professionally qualified.
The 1960s however saw not only a proliferation of
courses but also of theories taught on them. The dominance
of psychoanalytic ideas was reduced by a resurging interest
in social theories and several new methods of intervention.
The analytic approach had tended to reduce the
emphasis placed on social factors as possible sources of
clients' problems. Younghusband reports:
in the casework writing at the time it was not 
contested that housing and other environmental factors 
were important but they were held to be secondary, 
i.e. that the client would be able to surmount them 
but for his inner conflicts (1959, p.109).
While Freudian theories were not rejected entirely, 
there was a growing interest in studying the client's
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social context. Goldberg, a leading academic social
worker, summed up the view;
having by now securely incorporated into the theory 
and practice of social casework the tenets of dynamic 
psychology, we might usefully re-discover the social 
environment in which our clients move, not as a static
framework but as a dynamic process continually
interacting with inner personal forces (1961, p.104).
The practical consequences of this greater Interest in
the social circumstances was that more emphasis was put on
providing practical help or financial assistance.
Supporting this development, Younghusband criticises
analytic casework because it had: "a tendency to denigrate
practical services and to regard 'material needs' as
distracting attention from the 'real problem'" (1959,
p.108). Improving social circumstances as well as
personal growth were seen as legitimate goals of social
work (untrained social workers had never lost this
practical element).
Several new methods of helping were introduced during
the 1960s. Behaviourism, the great rival of psychoanalysis
in psychology, was espoused by Jehu (1967) who argued in
favour of behavioural modification therapies in social
work, and introduced them into the training course at
Leicester University. Despite a mainly hostile reception,
teaching in behavioural techniques have subsequently been
added to all courses.
Analytic casework was generally considered to need
long-term involvement but the brief, focussed work
characteristic of behavioural methods was also a feature of
other new approaches, for example task-centred casework and
crisis intervention.
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With the expanding input from the social sciences and 
the number of helping techniques it is not surprising that 
by the 1970s many social workers were feeling bewildered by 
the array of competing ideas they were offered. Social 
Systems Theory looked a possible solution. This offered a 
comprehensive conceptual framework for the wide range of 
subjects on a training course - the individual, the 
family, group dynamics, economic and political systems, and 
social policies. Pincus and Minahan (1973) and Goldstein
(1973) all produced practice theories using systems theory 
to "integrate" social work theories and methods.
This brief survey of the content of social work 
training, though not comprehensive, covers the major 
theoretical changes. The other significant development in 
social work education is the move from specialist to 
general or "generic" training. As training courses 
developed, it was realised that, though each branch of 
social work had some areas of specialised knowledge, much 
of the teaching was common to all. Medical social workers 
for example needed a particularly detailed understanding of 
illness and Probation Officers required an extensive legal 
knowledge but, in other respects, their needs were similar. 
The case for a generic training was first put in 1947 in a 
Carnegie report (Younghusband, 1947). It was endorsed by 
the Joint University Council for Social and Public 
Administration (JUC) in 1951 which argued that the generic 
course was:
based on the assumption that the basic skill of the 
social worker is the same in all situations though it 
has of course to be adapted to the setting in which it 
is exercised. The social worker has in fact to be 
trained first and foremost to understand human beings 
who are the same people wherever they are.
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The first generic course In social work was started at 
the London School of Economics in 1954 and "genericism" 
became the norm in the 1960s, though two specialist courses 
survived into the early 1970s.
CURRENT TEACHING
All training courses for social workers have to be 
approved by the Central Council for Education and Training 
in Social Work (CCETSW), a body which was set up by the 
1970 Local Authority Social Services Act and incorporated a 
number of earlier training and advisory services.
At present, there are two qualifications in social 
work, the Certificate of Qualification in Social Work 
(C.Q.S.W.), mainly taken by fieldworkers, and the 
Certificate in Social Service (C.S.S.) usually taken by 
workers in residential, day-care, and domiciliary services. 
Because of dissatisfaction with this split, they will be 
replaced by a single qualification, a Diploma in Social 
Work, in 1994.
The following discussion deals only with the C.Q.S.W., 
the qualification most fieldworkers take at the moment. 
Most courses run for two years though, after a major
review, CCETSW (1987) concluded that this was not long 
enough. It wanted to see courses extended to three years
because of the amount of material to be covered, but the
government refused to fund this change.
The courses provide both academic teaching and
practical work experience. Students spend about half their 
time in a fieldwork agency working with clients under the
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close supervision of a more experienced social worker. The
rest of their time is spent in college in academic study.
As my historical review showed, social workers have
continually found new areas of study relevant, and rarely
discarded any, so that now in considering what social
workers need to know, as one commentator said: "the total
individual in relation to the whole of his environment may
be relevant" (Lee in Bailey and Lee, 1982, p.18).
Consequently CCETSWs national guidelines on course content
prescribe an immense area, requiring:
that students are able to demonstrate to the
satisfaction of examiners, knowledge and understanding 
within each of the following areas of study:
(a) social work theories including their relevance to 
practice in work with individuals, groups, and 
communities and in field, residential, and day
services ;
(b) the formulation, processes, functions and purposes 
of social policies and their manifestations in social 
services, both public and voluntary; current issues 
and problems of social policy, social work as a 
component of social service provision;
(c) the institutions of central and local government, 
including their political and administrative 
dimensions; methods of financing local authority 
services, relationships between local and central 
government;
(d) the social functions of law and the structure and 
processes of the courts; the legal context of social 
work, and the role of social workers in the
administration of specific laws;
(e) processes of human development, socialisation and
functioning, both normal and deviant, throughout the
age cycle, within a multi-cultural society; the nature 
of moral behaviour; social institutions, systems and 
organisations and their effects on human functioning 
and expectations; processes and theories of social 
change (CCETSW, 1981, para. 5.8).
These guidelines cover vast subject areas. Indeed, 
the topics are so broad that it is difficult to think of
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any part of social science which definitely falls outside 
them. Selection is essential, but how do teachers decide 
what to include and what to leave out?
Modern generic training courses have the particular 
problem of balancing general theories against specialist 
knowledge relating to particular client groups. The danger 
is that they will produce social workers who know a little 
of everything but lack necessary specialist knowledge. 
Qualified fieldworkers have in fact been severely 
criticised on this score. For example, in mental health 
work, it was reported that many social workers involved in 
compulsory admissions of patients to psychiatric hospitals 
did not have adequate knowledge and skill. To remedy this, 
the Mental Health Act of 1983 prescribed extra training for 
social workers who operate under the Act. Similar 
criticisms have been made concerning child care. The 
Beckford Report (1985), enquiring into the death of an 
abused child under the supervision of the Social Services, 
censured the fieldworker and her senior social worker for 
having little understanding of the legislation under which 
they were acting and practically no knowledge of the 
relevant literature on child abuse.
Deciding on course content is further complicated by 
the range of complementary theories of human behaviour. 
Our actions are generally thought to have a complex 
causation. Theories citing social pressures, genetic 
inheritance, economic factors, or psychological causes can 
all be consistent, each providing a partial explanation of 
behaviour. Each theory would suggest different ways a 
social worker could intervene. In this case, social work
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teachers can quite consistently accept several theories 
but, through pressure of time, selection is essential, and 
in discarding some dimensions, there is a danger of giving 
a skewed picture of human behaviour. The courses run in 
the 1960s are now criticised for concentrating on 
psychological explanations, minimising the importance of 
social factors. Today's courses pay little attention to 
genetic or other physical explanations of behaviour, 
possibly giving students an unbalanced view of the power of 
social and psychological factors.
The most vital questions though in deciding what 
theories to teach social workers would seem to be about the 
truth or probability of the theories and the effectiveness 
of the various therapeutic methods. The social sciences 
however present course planners with difficult 
decisions. The social work teacher is in a very different 
position from the engineer or technician who looks to the 
natural sciences for his theoretical knowledge and finds a 
general consensus about which theories to accept. The 
social sciences offer a range of conflicting theories, many 
of which are highly speculative, untested, and 
controversial.
How are social workers to appraise these theories?
On this issue, the practical consequences of differing 
attitudes to science become apparent. To some, scientific 
methods provide the most reliable way of evaluating the 
many rival ideas and identifying the most productive ways 
of helping clients. Empirical evidence, derived from 
standard kinds of scientific tests, is a major factor in 
the natural scientist's evaluation of a theory. But such
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evidence is rare in social work and there is no strong 
research tradition trying to make good this deficiency. In 
contrast to those who advocate a scientific appraisal of 
theories, the majority believe the individual social 
worker is the best judge of which theories or methods are 
most appropriate to him or her.
The way theories are usually presented to students 
shows the prevalence of the latter point of view. Courses 
generally teach a range of conflicting and complementary 
theories but do not come down in favour of any particular 
one (Sheldon, 1978). Students are left to choose the 
theories that most appeal to them or perhaps to reject them 
all.
Lack of empirical evidence is one factor which makes 
it difficult for students themselves to make scientific 
evaluations, but they are also hampered by a lack of 
relevant teaching. Cassons made an extensive survey of 
social work course curricula and criticised the little help 
given to students about how to judge theories. He
complains :
unless the principles by which knowledge is 
constructed and tested are made explicit, the student 
is left with no clear way of comprehending why
explanations should conflict and can develop no
criteria upon which he can make choices between
explanations. A second implication is that the 
student may attribute a status to knowledge 
transmitted to him that is not justified by the way it 
was constructed and tested (Cassons, 1982, p.126).
Students are given a wide choice in their theoretical 
teaching. Social work methods are usually divided into 
three main categories; casework (with individuals and 
families), groupwork, and community work. Each one of 
these incorporates a number of different theoretical
46
approaches. The parent who abuses his child may be said to
do so because of psychological problems, interpersonal
difficulties, material problems of poverty or bad housing,
inadequate social support from his local community, or
because of the prevailing, oppressive, capitalist system.
For each of these causal factors there are several rival
theories. For example, in psychology, students are faced
first with the major rivalry between psychoanalytic and
behavioural approaches and then with the internal disputes
of Freud and his many successors.
These various theories suggest different ways for
social workers to intervene: to provide counselling, family
or marital therapy, to give material aid, to develop social
support networks, or to raise clients' political
consciousness. This list is by no means comprehensive.
Sheldon describes this type of curriculum as the
"supermarket" style of teaching:
the incoming student takes his "basket" to each of the 
various subject displays, selects the goods which take 
his fancy, and obtains his C.Q.S.W. at the check-out: 
his choice is virtually unconstrained (1978, p.9).
Sheldon goes on to illustrate the choice available on
a typical course with a lighthearted but only slightly
caricatured account of the student's experience:
theories are often taught alongside each other, the 
ultimate choice being left to the student. Here, the 
failure of an individual to develop an adequately 
functioning conscience may be discussed on Mondays in 
terms of his early feeding experiences (Klein), on 
Tuesdays, as resulting from a failure to resolve a 
competitive relationship with his father at four 
(Freud); on Wednesdays a disturbance in the discrete 
stages of intellectual development which exert 
influence over the next decade may be indicted 
(Piaget); and on Thursdays the lifelong process of 
operant conditioning is emphasized (Skinner). Friday 
is for fieldwork, of course (Sheldon, 1978, p.10).
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Writers commenting on social work training in the
U.S.A. have also spoken critically of the way that students
are left to make a personal choice from an array of
conflicting ideas. For instance, Goldstein, like Sheldon,
illustrates the complex range of ideas confronting
students, asking us to;
consider the plight of the typical recent graduate of 
a social work program whose head is cluttered with 
this diversity of constructs and theories. Where does 
one begin in the attempt merely to assess the client? 
Should the focus be on the client's ego strengths, 
social role, psychosocial patterns, personality
traits, or status in his or her system? Or, should
the focus be on the family's interactions, 
communication patterns, selected external re-inforce- 
ments, or what? (Goldstein, 1986, p.354).
Loewenberg is another American social worker who
expresses sympathy for the student: "there are those who
wonder whether this unrestrained freedom to choose from a
large number of different theories does not put too large a
burden on the individual social worker" (1984, p.310).
Clients also deserve our sympathy. The help they
receive will be dependent on the choices made by their
particular fieldworker.
Despite CCETSW's oft-repeated claim that social
workers have "a common core of knowledge, skills, and
values" (1989, p.3), training provides not a common body
of knowledge but a range of conflicting, and for the most
part highly speculative theories whose evaluation is
generally not based on scientific methods but left to the
individual student.
CURRENT FIELDWORK
CCETSW's prescriptions for fieldwork (e.g. CCETSW, 
1989) have a strong scientific element, portraying the
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social worker acting in a reflective manner, drawing 
systematically on a body of knowledge, evaluating his own 
work, and turning to research reports for extra evidence on 
the effectiveness of different strategies. However, as the 
following examination shows, few fieldworkers follow this 
mode 1.
In striking contrast to CCETSW's frequent reference to
a common body of knowledge, the strong element of personal
choice apparent in training courses continues In later
practice as a qualified worker. A review of research
studies of fieldwork carried out by the Department of
Health and Social Security commented that:
there is no way of knowing, from present research, 
what affects the choice of strategy adopted for 
particular clients, but it does appear to be left 
largely to the discretion of individual social 
workers (1981, p.65).
Parsloe and Stevenson, in their extensive study of 31
social service teams, reported a similar finding:
a feature of all the studies was the wide ranging 
freedom which social workers had to choose the style 
and content of their direct work with clients (1978, 
p.134).
The same degree of personal choice appears to be 
enjoyed by the Probation service according to Boswell (in 
an unpublished study reported in Davies, 1982).
CCETSW stresses the importance of reflective practice, 
of the need for social workers "to analyse, clarify, and 
conceptualise issues" (1989, p.11). They also specify 
that: "qualifying social workers must be able to understand 
the need for reflection on process and outcomes of social 
work intervention" (1989, p.16). But most fieldworkers do 
not work like this and, when questioned by researchers.
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have great difficulty in articulating what they do or why
they are doing it.
Goldberg and Warburton (1979) found this when they
started to develop a record and review system for use in
social services departments. Their aim was to collect
standardised information on clients, the problems being
tackled, and the methods and goals of social work
intervention. The researchers began by discussing some
cases, chosen more or less at random, with each of the 20
social workers involved in the study, hoping to get some
general ideas of how the workers saw their jobs in order to
to form the basis of a recording system. They reviewed 113
cases in this way but they found that the fieldworkers had
great difficulty in describing precisely either their goals
or how they hoped to achieve those goals. Aims were
expressed in indeterminate terms such as "improving social
functioning". When asked their plans, most social
workers described the client's present circumstances and
difficulties but could not specify what they themselves
proposed to do to help.
Parsloe and Stevenson ran into the same difficulties
in their study of fieldwork:
several social workers indicated that they were 
unaccustomed to conceptualising or reflecting upon 
their practice (Parsloe and Stevenson, 1978).
Sainsbury also found that social workers did not have
precise goals:
the casework we studied started with some kind of 
agreed (or at least compatible) task-orientation, but 
then sometimes drifted into a travesty of the 
diagnostic model, in which service continues 
indefinitely and on the assumption that warm 
relationships are all that are required to bring about 
improved social functioning (1980, p.10).
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Theoretical knowledge is highly valued in social work 
training and judging students' ability to apply theories in 
practice is an important element in assessing their 
competence. But again, fieldworkers do not follow the 
model set down by CCETSW and taught to them. Studies 
trying to find out which theories, if any, are used by 
social workers have consistently found that, while social 
workers report that theories are influential, they are 
rarely used in an explicit and systematic way.
Parsloe and Stevenson's extensive study is again a 
good source of evidence. It concluded that social workers 
did not, in the main, adopt a specific theoretical 
approach:
on the whole, our respondents' descriptions of their 
work with clients did not suggest that practice was 
drawn from specific theoretical perspectives. It may 
be that they had so internalised theory that they put 
it into practice without being conscious of it or able 
to talk about it. One experienced worker commented: 
"If you ask me to state a theory here and now, I 
wouldn't have a clue but my thinking and approach have 
been formed by it". There was some evidence that many 
of the experienced workers were accustomed to working 
mainly on the intuitive level - in the sense of 
responding to the immediate situation without 
conscious reliance on a theoretical framework (1978).
Carew's study supports the finding that theories, if
used at all by social workers, are employed in a piecemeal
and mainly unconscious way. He employed only a small
sample of 20 but the study is interesting in its detail and
methodology. His aim was to discover whether social
workers applied theoretical reasoning in their work and
whether they took account of research results. His methods
were not only direct questioning (as used by Parsloe and
Stevenson) but also studying the transcripts of interviews
between social workers and their clients. The smallness of
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Carew's sample is perhaps evidence of social work hostility
to research because he had approached another 41 workers in
the department but they had refused to join in. Most of
them claimed that they refused because they believed that
participation would breach confidentiality but Carew
suspected that this was not the true reason because he had
taken strict precautions to protect privacy. All who
took part answered a questionnaire about their use of
theories and their views on its importance. Each also
provided a transcript of an interview with a client, chosen
by themselves, which was then analysed using a modified
version of Hollis' Typology of Casework Treatment. This
typology classifies the purpose of statements made by
social workers. 91% of the social workers' comments showed
the use of techniques and procedures which encouraged the
client to talk and reflect. 8% of their responses appeared
to indicate the use of theory or that they were aware of
research findings. Carew then interviewed the participants
to check whether these 8% of comments had actually been
related to theory or research. After analysing the data,
Carew concluded:
few of the responses reflected the use of theory and 
research findings. The situation never occurred where 
respondents clearly indicated that a response was 
based upon theoretical knowledge or generalizations 
from research; for example, no-one made such remarks 
as "I asked that question because Steele has 
indicated that a significant proportion of abusive 
parents were abused by their parents in childhood." 
They tended to suggest instead that the primary base 
for their activities was either their own experience 
or advice from their more experienced colleagues. 
However when the researcher finally suggested an 
author, a theory, or a piece of research that might be 
related to what they had done, then the respondents 
would sometimes be able to link their activities to a 
theoretical framework (Carew, 1979).
Besides making little use of the standard theories,
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social workers tend not to theorise about their own work. 
Compton and Galway's (1975) research showed that, in 
journals, social workers usually discuss only individual 
cases without generalising from them. In relation to a 
particular client, they will explain what help they gave 
and why they think they achieved results, but they refrain 
from considering the relevance of their experience for 
other clients.
Carew's finding on social workers' Indifference to 
research is supported by several other studies both in 
Britain and the U.S.A. While CCETSW asserts that "social 
workers must be able to apply research findings to 
practice" (1989, p.11), Rosenblatt (1968) and Kirk et al 
(1976) both found that few American social workers read 
research reports, used their results in practice or rated 
research as helpful.
Similar conclusions were reached in Britain by Davies
(1974) and Shaw and Walton (1978). As Davies commented: 
"it cannot truly be argued that empirical studies have made 
much positive impact on the traditional pattern of 
diagnosis and treatment in casework."
Despite the avowed aim of their training, it seems 
that most fieldworkers do not adopt a scientific approach 
to their work. Indeed it seems that many are positively 
hostile to science. Writers with considerable experience of 
fieldworkers have reached a similar conclusion about the 
prevalence of anti-scientific attitudes among them. Timms 
and Timms report:
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there is detectable in social work a considerable 
scepticism concerning the place of generalisations and 
the validity of knowledge that does not proceed from 
direct practical experience in helping individual 
people (1977, p.118).
Goldberg and Warburton make a comparable judgement
after their extensive study of a social services team;
putting people into categories and quantifying 
phenomena, which in part consist of subjective 
experiences, is at variance with the social worker's 
belief in the uniqueness of each individual experience 
and the need to individualise problems in order to 
help people in their difficulties. Some social 
workers feel that social work is an art based on 
intuition and feelings and the ever-changing dynamics 
of a therapeutic relationship which are not amenable 
to scientific analysis (1979).
Sheldon also found social workers hostile to science,
describing the group as :
increasingly anti-intellectual in its approach to the 
problems and issues of social work, suspicious of 
outside research and preferring still to rely largely 
on personal impression as a way of monitoring its 
objectives (1979).
For most social workers, helping is seen as a personal
skill, relying on the empathie skills and intuitive
understanding of the fieldworker. Theoretical knowledge
from the social sciences can be useful in enriching that
intuitive understanding but, where academics talk of "a
body of knowledge", fieldworkers prefer to talk of
"practice wisdom": the insights and understanding each
worker acquires through experience with clients.
Sheldon who has had many years experience as both a
practitioner and teacher of social work describes the
typical style of social work:
(a) time and energy is devoted to providing friendly, 
supportive, and confidential relationships with 
clients, in which context personal problems can be 
discussed freely, and where an attempt is made to 
understand behaviour - whatever its shortcomings in 
the eyes of the community at large;
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(b) an attempt is made to analyse problems and their 
antecedents, and clients are encouraged to reflect on 
possible lessons and solutions - the medium of change 
is verbal influence;
(c) there is an intention that an individual's
attitudes and behaviour will change as a result of
this process, and that he or she will feel better, and
more able to cope as a result of it;
(d) implicitly or explicitly some use will be made of
psychological concepts, both to provide explanations
of problems, and to guide the social worker's actions 
in trying to overcome them (Sheldon, (1982, p.10).
Carew, whose study involved discussing cases with
social workers, came to a similar conclusion about the main
method of working:
they (the social workers) would get their clients to 
state their problems, discuss their feelings about 
them, reflect on the causes and on how the problems
could be overcome, and verbalize their reflections. 
If the problem could be overcome through the provision 
of resources, the workers would use their knowledge of 
the availability of resources, and the procedures and 
legislation related to these, to help the client to 
obtain them. If the problem could not be overcome in 
this way, the client would be encouraged to ventilate
and reflect further (Carew, 1979).
These accounts of social work practice show a strong 
resemblance to ordinary ways of helping. For most social 
workers, there is only a tenuous link between their 
theoretical studies and subsequent work and between formal 
knowledge and practice. The dominant way of working relies 
heavily on personal factors, on the worker's intuitive 
skills and a body of implicit knowledge derived partly from 
experience and partly from training. Little effort is made 
to formulate the aims of practice and the principles on 
which they are working, or to share the insights they have 
gained from their experience.
This approach to social work resembles an art more 
closely than a science or craft. The artist is taught a
55
variety of techniques for painting and studies a number of 
styles. He then selects the techniques that most appeal to 
him and develops his own personal style. In a similar way, 
social workers often describe themselves as selecting "what 
works for them", or "what suits their personal style of 
work".
Yet whatever similarities there may be, there Is one 
crucial difference between art and social work. The 
artist's task is the relatively harmless one of putting 
paint on canvas or writing poetry or prose; if he produces 
an unpleasing picture he can clean the canvas or throw away 
the paper. Social workers on the other hand affect other 
people's lives, being the only source of help for many. 
They now have immense responsibilities and powers, and, in 
some cases, are instrumental in depriving people of their 
liberty or parents of their children. Clients can choose 
between Elgar and Eastenders but they are hostages to 
fortune when they need social work help.
Scientific evaluations of this type of social work, 
however, throw serious doubt on its effectiveness.
For a time, social workers, especially in America, 
seem to have been willing to use scientific methods to 
evaluate their interventions, in the 1950s and 60s, there 
were several large-scale trials of social work, mainly in 
the U.S.A. It was a time of great expansion of social work 
and of a strong belief in the power of social workers to 
help their clients, fuelled by confidence in the 
psychoanalytic theories which underpinned their practice. 
The various trials were not carried out by hostile 
outsiders who wanted to check on social work but with the
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support and co-operation of the fieldworkers who were
evaluated. Mullen and Dumpson describe the mood in which
this research was conducted:
social work emerged from the 50s with confidence 
concerning its effectiveness. As a profession, it 
sought expanded opportunities and resources to 
demonstrate its competence. The 60s witnessed a 
marked increase in those opportunities, and social 
work set about to demonstrate its relevance. Out of 
this confidence social workers boldly exposed their 
practice to the critical scrutiny of scientific 
evaluation and assumed that such evaluations would 
assist them as they refined their technologies and 
expanded their knowledge. They assumed, too, that 
these evaluations would clearly demonstrate the 
effectiveness of their interventive efforts (1972).
Unfortunately, as Mullen and Dumpson then go on to
show in reviewing these studies,"the researchers, for many
reasons, were rarely able to conclude that a program had
even modest success in achieving its major goals."
These studies have been examined, analysed, and
debated by many authors e.g. Segal (1972), Fischer (1973
and 1976), Wood (1978) and Sheldon (1986). While some have
tried to put the point in a gentler manner, none has
disagreed with the negative conclusion reported above.
Fischer, for instance, concludes that:
lack of effectiveness appears to be the rule rather 
than the exception across several categories of 
clients, problems, situations, and types of 
casework (1973).
These controlled trials have failed to endorse 
fieldworkers* confidence in the value of their help. They 
raise acute doubts about the quality of help clients are 
receiving. But they have met a mixed reaction in social 
work.
Some academics have taken them seriously and argued 
strongly for the need to search for more effective methods 
of social work. The best-known advocate of this view in
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Britain is Brian Sheldon (1979, 1982, 1986) and in the
U.S.A. Joel Fischer (1973, 1978, and, with K. Corcoran,
1987).
The majority of fieldworkers however seem to have paid 
as little attention to these results as to any other, 
appearing to consider them invalid measures of their work. 
Sheldon, highly critical of his colleagues' "ostrich-like" 
response, describes how, at a lecture in 1968, he and the 
rest of the audience first heard of the negative results of 
a famous American evaluative study "Girls at Vocational 
High." He reports that, while he was disturbed by this 
unexpected failure: "I was much more worried (and still am) 
by the complacent smiles of colleagues all around me" 
(1979, p.27).
The majority of social workers' rejection of the 
results of scientific appraisal of their work applies 
consistently to positive as well as negative results. 
Those academics who have looked for helping methods with 
greater evidence of effectiveness have settled on 
behavioural therapies (e.g. Fisher 1978 and Sheldon 1982). 
The behavioural approach in psychology has always had a 
strong scientific commitment. Empirical research is a 
central feature in developing the behaviour modification 
techniques. Though the aims of behavioural therapies are 
usually more limited than their analytic counterparts, 
controlled trials have produced impressive evidence of 
success especially in treating phobias and obsessions (see 
for example the reviews by Agras et al, 1979, and Rachman 
and Wilson, 1980). Social work using behavioural methods 
has also produced positive results (see Reid and Hanrahan
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in Goldberg and Connelly, 1981, and Fischer, 1981.)
And yet, most social workers are no more impressed by 
these successful trials than they are deterred by the 
reported failure of analytic therapies. As all writers 
supporting a behavioural approach in social work recognise, 
they are addressing a very hostile audience.
By ignoring the results of evaluative studies, social 
workers are demonstrating the strength of their hostility 
to science and their preference for individual, intuitive 
appraisal. These results however cannot be simply 
dismissed as irrelevant or inaccurate and they provide 
strong grounds for questioning the effectiveness of current 
styles of social work practice.
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this chapter has been to describe the kind 
of expertise used in social work but this has proved to be 
a difficult task. Knowledge of the law and relevant 
services are certainly elements in this expertise but there 
is no uniformity in the remaining part. Rather, it varies 
from one individual to another, consisting mainly of each 
person's empathie and intuitive skills, and the ideas from 
the social sciences which he or she has deemed plausible 
and useful.
It has long been debated whether this personal style 
of working could or should be replaced by a more scientific 
approach.
The pioneers of formal training programmes proceeded
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on the assumption that helping in social work could be more 
than just common sense and practical knowledge. They 
believed that the developing social sciences offered a more 
accurate understanding of personal and social problems and 
so had the potential for providing more effective ways of 
solving them.
Current training, prescribed by CCETSW, the 
professional body responsible for validating training 
courses, still has this commitment to a scientific 
approach. According to CCETSW's guidelines, students are 
to be encouraged to work in a reflective, goal-oriented 
way, drawing on theories from the social sciences to 
understand their clients, using therapeutic methods in a 
systematic manner, and turning to research for empirical 
evidence about the accuracy of theories and the 
effectiveness of therapies.
CCETSW clearly believes that social work can and should 
develop empirically supported, publicly available theories 
to guide fieldwork but its claim that social work already 
has a "common body of knowledge" seems unfounded. The 
theoretical knowledge offered to students is vast, 
conflicting, and little tested. It is neither common nor 
well enough supported to claim the title of "knowledge", at 
least according to the cannons of science favoured by 
CCETSW.
There is however a serious split between this 
scientific approach and the view of social work held by 
most fieldworkers. As Sheldon expresses it, "two 
different sub-cultures are developing within the social 
work movement" (1978, p.20). Most practitioners adopt a
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very different approach from the scientific model, making a
personal selection from the theories they have been taught
and developing an Individual and private style of working
which they have trouble articulating. Expertise Is thought
to develop more through experience with clients than from
reading social science books. Moreover, many see their
Intuitive and empathie approach as directly in conflict
with the scientific tradition they hear about on their
training courses.
Controlled trials cast doubt on the effectiveness of
social work. From the research evidence currently
available we have no grounds for complacency about the
quality of help clients are receiving. Summarising the
Impact of the social work research of the the 1950s and
60s, Sheldon comments:
this body of research, when combined with British 
findings and with similar material from psychotherapy 
and psychiatry (Clare, 1976) marks the end of half a 
century of optimism about the ease with which 
behavioural changes can be Induced by verbal 
counselling methods (1982, p.21).
Equally Importantly, the results of the empirical 
studies question the reliability of fieldworkers' appraisal 
of their own work. It appears that American social 
workers, over many decades, developed and refined methods 
of work which they mistakenly judged to be very effective. 
And yet, current practice relies almost entirely on 
Individual appraisal, both in judging the truth or 
credibility of theories and monitoring the service clients 
receive.
The debate about science Is not just an Internal social 
work Issue. As the previous chapter Illustrated, social
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work has an important role in our society. The increase in 
duties and powers is due at least partly to social work's 
claim to have particular expertise. Social workers have 
turned to science for theories but science has also 
provided the means of testing their expertise, producing 
serious doubts about its quality. Research evidence though 
appears to have little impact on the dominant non- 
scientific culture of fieldworkers. They continue to rely 
on monitoring their own efforts and continue to be 
optimistic about the power of verbal counselling. Their 
hostility to science also leads them to belittle the 
apparently damning evidence about their work. Since their 
rejection of scientific methods has such far-reaching 
consequences, their reasons for doing so need to be 
critically examined.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FORMULATING “PRACTICE WISDOM"
INTRODUCTION
My appraisal of social workers' objections to adopting 
a scientific approach begins by examining claims that, when 
studying human behaviour, one cannot formulate theories 
akin to those found in the natural sciences.
Certainly, current social work practices present a 
strong contrast with the sciences. In place of the explicit 
and publicly testable theories of science, most social 
workers rely mainly on their personal skills, of empathy 
and intuition, and what is generally called “practice 
wisdom", a body of implicit ideas each worker acquires 
partly through experience and partly from their formal 
social work education. Because of the tacit, vague, and 
unarticulated nature of this form of reasoning, the 
standard scientific methods cannot be applied. Critics of 
science, however, maintain that this state of affairs is 
appropriate and unchangeable, claiming that practice wisdom 
cannot be articulated and examined in the form of 
scientific theories.
A central allegation in their argument is that 
scientific methods cannot be applied to the study of the 
human mind. “The self cannot be observed ... nor can it be
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measured, so it must be ignored" - this Wilkes (1981, p.75) 
claims is the only possible attitude scientists can take to 
the human mind. Therefore, she argues, since social workers 
are very interested in the mental world of individuals 
seeking help, there is an unbridgeable gap between science 
and the traditional methods of reasoning in social work. 
Fieldworkers are concerned with "the self", with people's 
hopes, thoughts, and feelings. Scientists on the other 
hand, Wilkes claims, can only apply their methods to 
observable behaviour.
Many others in social work echo her view. Both Ragg 
(1977) and Raynor (1984), for example, assume that 
there can be no scientific explanations of actions in terms 
of reasons. Jordan (1979) and Goldstein (1986) also depict 
a scientific approach as necessarily limited to the study 
of behaviour and contrast this with the typical social work 
interest in the client's inner experiences.
These writers are assuming a view of science which, I 
shall argue, is mistaken. As a paradigm example of 
science, they cite the extreme form of behaviourism 
associated with J.B. Watson who deemed that psychologists 
should not study the mind but only observable behaviour. 
His exclusion of mental phenomena, however, is not demanded 
by scientific methodology. In the natural sciences 
scientists do speculate beyond the simply observable and 
indeed do so very profitably. Contemporary theoretical 
physics, for example, is very largely concerned with the 
study of unobservable phenomena such as quarks and 
electrons. If such strange entities can be the topic of 
scientific enquiry, our thoughts and feelings cannot be
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excluded on the grounds that they are not directly 
observed.
Moreover, I shall argue that the account of scientific 
theorising which I report is not only compatible with but 
also closely resembles social workers' reasoning. There 
are many similarities in the way that social workers and 
scientists speculate about the phenomena they are trying to 
understand, whether it is the delinquent activities of a 
teenage boy or the movements of the planets. Therefore, I 
shall contend, formulating practice wisdom, though a 
difficult task, cannot be said to be impossible.
To reach this conclusion, I first examine the kind of 
understanding so valued in social work at present - the 
way we typically explain people's intentional actions in 
everyday life.
A central issue in the philosophy of the social 
sciences has been the relationship between this form of 
understanding and a scientific study of mankind. Humanists 
and some behaviourists have claimed the two are 
incompatible. The former then reject a scientific approach 
and the latter adopt a radically different framework which 
does, as social workers complain, focus on behaviour not 
mental phenomena. The third position in this debate 
however, and the one I defend in this chapter, is that our 
ordinary understanding can be scientifically developed.
I shall examine the rationale behind the development of 
behaviourism and show how it uses a more restrictive 
methodology than most natural sciences. The way theories 
are developed in the natural sciences will then be
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discussed and the ideas applied to social work issues, 
first analysing the ways social workers reason and 
highlighting their resemblance to scientists, and then 
examining studies which have tried to formulate what social 
workers do.
INTENTIONAL BEHAVIOUR
If a branch taps at the window, we wonder what caused 
it to happen; if a man taps at the window, we ask why he 
did it. In everyday life, we think of each other's actions 
as intentional, as done for a purpose. Unlike the movement 
of a branch, we try to understand human actions in terms 
of reasons. We want to know people's thoughts, feelings, 
and their goals which, we presume, led them to do a 
particular thing. Social sciences have only a recent 
history but mankind has, from ancient times, been 
interested in understanding his own and others' actions. 
The "folk psychology" that is characteristic of ordinary 
life is extensive and, for many everyday purposes, very 
successful.
The following discussion of this everyday way of 
understanding people is intended to clarify the type of 
skills and understanding the majority of social workers 
consider are needed in helping clients.
First, our explanations purport to tell us what is 
going on in someone's mind. We claim we can know their 
feelings, their beliefs and their intentions and so we can 
understand their reasons for deciding on a particular 
action. When judging whether particular reasons provide an
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adequate explanation, we assume some kind of rationality
principle. Philosophers have found it difficult to
formulate this in an uncontentious way but, to use
Rosenberg's example, a simple version of it is :
given any person X, if X wants D and X believes that A 
is a means to attain D, under the circumstances, then 
X does A (Rosenberg, 1988, p.25).
The principle is, I think, made clearer if we look at 
an example of an unsatisfactory explanation. Let us 
suppose that we are given the explanation that X went to 
shop B because he wanted to buy a book and he knew it was 
only stocked at shop A. This is not an adequate 
explanation of X's action and, indeed, make us more not 
less curious. On these facts alone, his action is not 
intelligible but puzzling. We would want more information, 
perhaps of another goal which X rated more highly and which 
could be met by going to shop B, before his action seemed 
intelligible to us.
Within folk psychology, people accumulate a fund of 
background knowledge about individuals' motivation to help 
them understand each other. As we grow up, we gradually 
learn elementary psychology, patterns of behaviour, and 
social rules. Social workers share this kind of 
understanding and, in addition, say that they develop 
"practice wisdom", that is, insights they acquire because 
of their special contact with people in trouble and their 
theoretical training. The ideas are however for the most 
part implicit and the methods of reasoning intuitive; we 
produce an "interpretation" of an action, an explanation 
which makes it intelligible to us.
67
A social worker might, for instance, be initially 
puzzled by a parent's refusal to accept what seems to him 
to be much-needed services for his recently handicapped 
child. Then however, remembering how other clients had 
reacted, he might speculate that, despite a clear message 
from the doctors, the parent is not accepting their 
diagnosis and still expects the child to recover. He might 
link this to an hypothesis from psychoanalytic theory about 
the psychological mechanism of "denial", not believing 
something which seems too painful to accept. On this 
interpretation of the parent's reasoning, his action now 
looks "intelligible"; if you believe your child is going to 
recover, services suitable for the long-term handicapped 
will seem inappropriate.
Much ordinary psychology relies on empathy. To help us 
work out other people's reasons, we can draw on our own 
experience and "empathise" with them, that is, imagine what 
it would be like to be in their circumstances and think how 
it would feel. So sometimes, when we say we understand 
someone, we mean that we know what it feels like to be in 
their position; we, in a sense, share their experience. 
Equally we may say that we cannot understand somebody; 
however detailed an account we may be given of Hitler's 
motivation for example, we may claim that we could never 
understand, i.e. empathise with, his deciding to kill 
millions of Jews.
Some social workers argue that empathie understanding 
is essential in social work not just as a means of 
understanding the client but as a therapy. Jordan (1979) 
for example makes this claim*.
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empathy implies that the helper "feels with" the 
person in trouble; that by imaginatively entering the 
other's situation, he engages his own emotions in such 
a way as to share the other's responses. I am 
suggesting that this is an essential part of helping.
The majority of social workers at present view helping 
as predominantly a personal aptitude. Empathie and 
intuitive skills are highly prized; "understanding" is 
based on each worker's individual fund of background ideas; 
testing the accuracy of that understanding is also done 
mainly by the individual. But in social work, as in the 
social sciences, there has been a long-standing debate 
about whether we can improve on the understanding embodied 
in this folk psychology.
While commonsense understanding may be reasonably 
successful in everyday circumstances, in areas such as 
social work where correctness of interpretation affects the 
life and happiness of others, it is particularly important 
that understanding should be accurate but, on this score, 
our commonsense wisdom is limited. Our understanding is 
often only partial or later seen to be inaccurate. 
Disagreements are common and difficult to resolve. Our 
ability to predict is poor. And, importantly for social 
workers, the implicit nature of our intuitive reasoning 
makes it difficult to share understanding, to teach others 
the insights we have gained. The natural sciences, on the 
other hand, have made impressive progress, producing public 
theories which enable people to explain and control many 
aspects of the natural world. Influenced by this contrast, 
many have argued that the social sciences need to copy the 
natural sciences to achieve a comparable success in the
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social realm. In social work, those who argue for using 
scientific methods hope that the methods which helped to 
eradicate smallpox from the world will also help to end the 
human suffering caused by social and psychological 
problems.
But what is entailed by adopting the methods of the 
natural sciences? The relationship between our everyday 
type of understanding, which is couched in terms of reasons 
and intentions, and a scientific study of people has long 
been a key issue in the philosophy of the social sciences. 
There are three main positions:
The first is that scientific explanations and our 
ordinary understanding are incompatible. From this it is 
concluded that scientific methods cannot be used in social 
studies. This is the humanist view which is the dominant 
one in social work.
The second position again considers that scientific 
explanations and our ordinary understanding are 
incompatible but it is then inferred that social scientists 
must reject the common sense view and adopt a different 
framework for studying people. This is the position taken 
by behaviourists such as J.B. Watson and which many social 
workers consider is the only alternative to humanism.
The third view is that our ordinary understanding is 
compatible with scientific explanations; social scientists 
can revise and test rather than wholly reject the ideas in 
folk psychology. On this view the practice wisdom in 
social work can form the basis for scientific theories.
In arguing for this final position, I first examine
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the rationale behind behaviourism and show how its 
rejection of ordinary explanations of human actions is not 
demanded by scientific methodology.
BEHAVIOURISM AND THE EXCLUSION OF MIND
J.B. Watson was the first behaviourist, and indeed 
coined the name. Writing and lecturing at the beginning of 
this century, he argued that the proper subject matter of 
psychology was not the mind but human behaviour. His view 
was a reaction to the problems he saw in the prevailing 
orthodoxy of Introspectionism. According to that school, 
mental phenomena both could and should be studied and the 
main way of doing so was through observing one's own mental 
processes - "introspection". Plausible though this idea 
is, it ran into difficulties.
First, introspection proved to be of very limited use 
as a method of investigation since, as was soon recognised, 
many important aspects of our mental processes are 
unconscious. Nor does it seem that these unconscious 
operations can they be made conscious even by careful inner 
observation. Marbe's study in 1901, (reported in Handler 
and Handler, 1964, p.143) was an influential illustration 
of this shortcoming of the method of introspection. He 
asked his subjects to compare different weights and to 
report their mental processes as they did so. But their 
efforts at introspection did not directly reveal the 
process that led to their judgments about the relative 
weights. Instead, they reported experiencing hesitation, 
doubt, waiting for an answer, and feeling that the answer
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had arrived. They concluded that the process of judging 
was not carried out at a conscious level and introspection 
alone seemed unable to reveal how it was done.
Behaviourists however argued against introspection 
even as a method with limited use. They claimed that the 
whole method was essentially unscientific. The problem 
they saw was that, since introspective reports were of 
private experiences, they could not be verified by others. 
An early behaviourist, de Laguna, asserted that conscious 
processes *.
can not by the very nature of the case be objects of 
scientific study. For it is an essential condition of 
scientific investigation of any phenomenon that 
observations made by one individual shall be 
verifiable by others (de Laguna, 1919, p.297).
Finally, behaviourists also criticised the failure of
introspectionists to achieve intersubjective agreement. If
people exposed to the same stimuli described different
perceptions disagreements were common but there was no way
of settling the issue. One unresolved dispute between two
introspectionists at a meeting of the Society of
Experimental Psychologists has become famous as an
illustration of how rational debate came to a halt when
subjective accounts conflicted. One eminent psychologist,
Titchener, after a heated debate with Holt, a colleague,
exclaimed;
'You can see that green is neither yellowish nor 
bluish!' and Holt replied: 'On the contrary, it is
obvious that a green is that yellow-blue which is 
exactly as blue as it is yellow' (reported in Boring, 
1970).
Because of such perceived problems, behaviourists 
concluded that introspection was not an acceptable
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procedure in a scientific discipline. Zurriff, after an 
extensive analysis of behaviourism, concludes that: "the
central behaviourist position is the rejection of 
introspection as a method of scientific observation" (1985,
p.28).
Watson's solution to the problems of introspectionism 
was radical. Having decided that it was difficult to study 
mental phenomena, he took the decision not to study them at 
all but to concentrate on phenomena which were more readily 
accessible to reliable and inter-subjactively verifiable 
observations, namely behaviour. He not only decided that 
subjective reports of inner experiences could not provide 
the empirical evidence needed to test theories 
scientifically, he also excluded from theories the concept 
of the mind entirely.
Watson turned to the natural sciences for guidance on 
methodology. However he looked not at the more esoteric 
realms of theoretical physics but the study of animal 
behaviour. He was impressed by research such as that being 
carried out at the time by Edward Thorndike who made 
considerable progress in understanding animal learning 
without reference to any mental experiences they might 
have. Apparently adequate explanations of their learning 
behaviour could be given referring only to observable 
features of the animals' behaviour and environment. 
Extending this behavioural approach to the study of people 
was, Watson decided, the way to develop a successful 
science of psychology. He argued that people too could be 
adequately understood just in terms of behaviour and 
environment. The behaviourism he advocated aimed, he said:
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to apply to the experimental study of man the same 
kind of procedure and the same language of description 
that many research men had found useful for so many 
years in the study of animals lower than man. We 
believed then, as we do now, that man is an animal 
different from other animals only in the types of 
behaviour he displays (Watson, 1930).
Watson went further than this. He held not just that,
first, one could not investigate the mind scientifically,
and, secondly, one did not need to in order to understand
human behaviour, but he also doubted the very existence of
the mind: "the behaviourist holds that belief in the
existence of consciousness goes back to the ancient days of
superstition and magic" (Watson, 1924, p.2). To make
scientific progress, his advice to psychologists was:
let us limit ourselves to things that can be observed, 
and formulate laws concerning only those things. Now 
what can we observe? We can observe behaviour. (1924,
P .6. )
Watson was, for a long time, very influential, and 
psychologists, following his prescriptions, kept to 
observable facts, of behaviour and the environment. They 
did not speculate about hidden processes in the possibly 
non-existent mind but tried instead to establish causal 
connections between different types of behaviour and events 
in the environment. The two central theories that grew out 
of this research were of those classical and operant 
conditioning, which specify conditions under which 
new behaviour is learned or existing patterns tend to fade 
away in response to the stimuli and re-inforcements the 
individual experiences.
Behavioural theories are radically different from the 
type of understanding present-day social workers typically 
value for they omit people's thoughts, feelings, and
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intentions. Skinner, another leading behaviourist, is
emphatic that such mental phenomena need not figure in
investigations of behaviour:
we do not need to try to discover what personalities, 
states of mind, feelings, traits of character, plans, 
purposes, intentions, or any other perquisites of man 
really are in order to get on with a scientific 
analysis of behaviour (1973).
However, behaviourism is not the only way to use 
scientific methods in studying people. The central 
argument in the behaviourists' position is that assertions 
about mental phenomena cannot be verified and are therefore 
unscientific. But this inference is invalid. Scientific 
theories that are widely accepted have not merely recorded 
correlations but often go beyond the facts, explaining 
those observed regularities by postlulating underlying 
processes which are not directly observable. Natural 
scientists talk of imperceptible entities such as sub­
atomic particles. Therefore, mental phenomena cannot be 
banned from scientific explanations of behaviour just on 
the grounds that they are not directly observable.
Indeed within the behavioural movement itself, 
Watson's radical exclusion of unobservable entities was 
soon challenged. As early as 1932, Tolman argued that to 
provide a satisfactory explanation it was necessary to 
introduce the concept of the 'intervening variable', 
something which occurred in the individual between the 
observed stimulus and the behavioural response. This, 
Tolman said, did not need to be directly perceptible - and 
so could be a mental process - as long as hypotheses 
containing it implied observable results. Most
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behaviourists would now take the same view. According to 
this modified version of behaviourism, it is perfectly 
acceptable to have theories referring to unobservables such 
as mental processes but behaviour still remains important 
to them as the observable test of theories.
Developments in cognitive psychology undermine even 
further the claims of social workers hostile to a 
scientific approach that mental phenomena cannot be the 
subject of scientific study. Explanations in terms only of 
people's behavioural or physiological responses were found 
to be inadequate in many areas of behaviour. Psychologists 
therefore have turned their attention to studying the role 
people's thoughts and feelings play in determining their 
reactions to stimuli. Their responses are seen as active 
interpretations of what they perceive. The importance of 
cognitive factors is also acknowledged within the related 
therapeutic techniques. Cognitive-behavioural treatments 
are as concerned with people's beliefs and emotions as with 
their behavioural and physiological responses.
The advocates of a scientific approach in social work 
do not equate it with Watson's type of behaviourism. The 
picture is somewhat confused though by the fact that many 
of the most vociferous champions of scientific methods also 
urge the adoption of the therapeutic methods developed by 
behaviourists. Their reason for this however is the weight 
of evidence about their therapeutic success not because 
they are considered to be the only scientific option. 
Sheldon makes this clear in his book on behaviour 
modification (1982). In other publications where he is 
arguing for using scientific methods, he sees them as
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compatible with non-behavicurai approaches (e.g. 1979 and
1983).
Hudson and Macdonald also argue that social workers
should use behavioural modification therapies but again it
is on the grounds of their effectiveness. They say that in
dealing with clients the crucial criterion in selecting a
therapeutic method is "effectiveness":
being a "social worker" is different from being a 
"friend", and it is important to locate the additional 
ethical constraints imposed by the social work role. 
And in our view the central such constraint is 
"effectiveness" (Hudson and Macdonald, 1986, p.9).
On the available evidence, behavioural modification
therapies, they argue, meet this ethical criterion more
than any competing approach.
The evidence in favour of behavioural modification
techniques has so impressed some that they doubt the
competence of social workers who prefer other approaches.
Brewer and Lait comment :
we do wonder, however, whether those teachers of 
social work who have resisted the introduction of 
behavioural methods should be considered as fit 
members of academic communities which are supposed to 
adhere to certain basic standards of scientific 
debate (Brewer and Lait, 1980, p.101).
Again their reason is the evidence on effectiveness
not any unique claim to scientific status: "we would
welcome any other approach which can be shown to be
effective" (1980, p.190).
Social work critics of science are wrong then to
equate science with Watson's extreme form of behaviourism.
They are not alone however in making this mistake.
Giedymin, reviewing the debate between humanists and
naturalists in the social sciences generally, reports a
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similar tendency for humanists to attack Watsonian
behaviourism although this is not the view of science their
opponents are proposing*.
contrary to the claims of anti-naturalists (Winch, 
Wright, for example) none of the naturalists in my 
survey claims that descriptions in the social sciences 
(and humanities) are or ought to be purely 
phenomenalistic, i.e. in behaviouristic terms, that 
explanations of human actions are or ought to be 
mechanistic, without reference to human aims, beliefs, 
etc. Just the opposite is the case: they all insist
that social sciences and humanities are concerned 
primarily with studying men as rational beings 
they all agree that typical explanations of individual 
actions in history (and humanities generally) are in 
terms of aims, intentions, beliefs, available means, 
existing obstacles, institutional set-ups, etc 
(Giedymin, 1975, p.290).
Why do so many opponents of science make this mistake? 
Social work critics do not spell out exactly what they 
think scientific methods are but they seem to be assuming a 
simple inductivist view which is now generally discredited.
Francis Bacon is the philosopher best known for this 
view, though it has recently been shown that this is an 
inaccurate reading of his work (Urbach, 1987). The 
standard interpretation of his writings however is that he 
thought that scientists began by amassing a set of facts, 
either by casual observation or deliberate experiment. They 
then employed a set of inductive rules so simple that 
practically anybody could use them to develop a body of 
certain knowledge. Scientific method, on this view, is 
both mechanical and infallible.
What is wrong with this view of science?
First, it assumes that there is a foundation of 
infallible facts. On closer examination, the distinction 
between observation statements and theoretical statements
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breaks down. All statements, except tautologies, are 
fallible. (This has implications for the reliability of 
observations in testing theories. This point will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.)
Secondly, it ignores the creative element in theory
development both in gathering information and in theorising 
about it.
Although observing the phenomena they are trying to 
explain is a necessary step, scientists cannot be merely 
passive fact-collecters and processors. They need
imagination and intelligence to organise and theorise about 
the facts. In practical terms, collecting ALL the facts is 
impossible; scientists have to decide which facts are 
worth gathering. And when faced with a set of facts, there 
are an infinite number of patterns and correlations which 
could be identified; scientists have to determine which 
patterns that they observe are significant.
The creative element is also overlooked in that it 
fails to recognise the hypothetical status of theories. It 
assumes that there is some infallible process by which
theories are built up from the facts and hence are
justified by those facts. But theories go beyond the known 
facts in two ways. First they generalise from the observed 
instances to all cases, observed and unobserved, future and 
past. More importantly, given the subject of this chapter, 
theories often explain their observations by reference to 
unobservable processes.
In rejecting the claim that scientific theories are 
mechanically generated, philosophers have the task of
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providing an alternative account. They distinguish between
the "context of discovery" (the process of forming
theories) and the "context of justification"
(substantiating them.) The discovery of theories is seen
as a somewhat mysterious, creative process. Most
philosophical attention is given to the context of
justification because we are interested in how "good" the
theory is (how probable, or well confirmed) and this is
considered to be independent of how the theory was
invented. Hempel expresses a typical view:
although no restrictions are imposed upon the 
invention of theories, scientific objectivity is 
safeguarded by making their acceptance dependent on 
the outcome of careful tests (Hempel, 1966,p.116).
This view of science does not support the claim that
science can learn nothing about the mind. Rather,
philosophers such as Nagel (1961, chap. 13) and Papineau
(1978, chap.4) have pointed to the similarity between the
conjectures of a scientist and our commonsense explanations
of actions in which we speculate about the reasons for
them. They also argue that empathy, the form of
understanding valued by the humanist, should be seen not as
a rival to scientific explanations but as an aid in
developing them. In understanding human actions, as the
humanist has always claimed, we are greatly helped by the
fact that we are human ourselves and have access to at
least some of our own mental processes. In explaining
other people, we can draw on our experience and imagine how
it feels to be in the other's position to give us ideas to
explain their actions.
Most social scientists accept the need to study
SO
people's thinking in order to explain their behaviour. In 
the 1930s and 40s, the German sociologist Weber was a 
famous and influential advocate of the idea that mental 
phenomena must figure in any explanation of behaviour. He 
argued (reprinted in Brodbeck (1968, Chap. 1)) that social 
scientists need to start with an understanding of 
intentional actions and this involves some reference to 
what was going on in the person's mind.
Social sciences study people's actions, social 
organisations, and belief systems; a central feature of all 
of these is that what they are depends in part on the 
beliefs and intentions of the people involved. To say that 
a man is "voting for Smith" is not just to describe his 
physical movements of putting a cross in the relevant place 
on the ballot paper but assumes that he has the appropriate 
knowledge about the voting system and the intention of 
showing his support for Smith. A child, playing around, 
might put a cross next to the name Smith but he would not 
be voting. A description of behaviour alone is 
insufficient to tell us what action is being performed.
To all except Watsonian behaviourists it has therefore 
seemed that the basic phenomena of the social sciences must 
include human mental processes. Consequently in the social 
sciences two layers of understanding are involved. The 
agent often has an explanation of what he is doing and this 
is an essential part of describing what his action is but 
his action can then be explained by the social scientist.
In summary, once Watson's type of behaviourism is seen 
to be only one example of science and an extremely narrow 
one at that, social workers' rejection of scientific
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methods on the grounds that they cannot be used when 
studying the client's mind is untenable. The frequently- 
heard belief among social workers that the client's 
subjective experience is a key factor in understanding and 
helping him need not be abandoned in order to adopt a 
scientific approach.
THEORIES IMPLICIT IN "PRACTICE WISDOM"
Most social workers think that their ways of 
understanding clients is quite different from scientific 
reasoning. If scientific theorising is a mechanical 
process applied to observable facts it is very different 
from the social worker's imaginative conjectures about the 
client's mental experience. But scientists do not work in 
this mechanical way. They theorise in a way very like 
social workers' methods of reasoning. In this section I 
want to examine that similarity.
Most social workers deny using theories in the sense 
that they do not apply the theories they are taught on 
their training courses in an explicit and systematic way. 
They do claim to employ what is widely called "practice 
wisdom" however. If we examine their work, we can see 
that, despite their denials, they do use theories in that, 
like scientists, they generalise from their experience with 
individual clients, they try to establish causal 
explanations of how clients' problems arose, and they draw 
on such understanding to make predictions.
On the issue of generalising, most social workers
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would deny that they form general principles about people 
but would claim that their main interest is in
understanding the "unique individual". In case studies and 
discussions they tend to focus on particular clients and 
not to generalise about the people they have helped
(Compton and Galway, 1975).
However while generalisations are avoided at an 
explicit level, they must implicitly be used. It is 
accepted within the humanist tradition that social workers 
can learn from experience, that insights gained from one 
client can be applied to others. Indeed such hypotheses are 
an essential element in practice wisdom. The history of 
the profession shows a growing acceptance that there are 
common principles in helping in social work. Beginning as 
diverse specialist services, it became unified as people 
recognised that similar skills and knowledge were 
applicable to a range of problems.
Moreover, social workers are in general not just 
concerned with noting correlations but, like scientists, 
with causal explanations. They do not just want to 
catalogue their clients' experience but to do something to 
help and so, in any account of social work practice, there
are some assumptions about how to bring about change.
The only humanist writer who avoids any reference to 
causes is Wilkes (1981) but she does so at the cost of 
producing a view of social work which most would think 
quite inappropriate. She is hostile to what she deems the 
"technological" approach of science which emphasises the 
importance of changing clients and, she claims, tries to 
impose impersonal and inhuman causal explanations on our
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subjective experiences. Equating science with Watson's 
type of behaviourism, she maintains that the humane 
approach for social workers involves nothing more than 
empathising with the client's experience. But she does 
not construe this advice as a therapeutic principle; it is 
not proposed as the means to achieving the technical end of 
changing the client but as the end in itself, a morally 
valuable enterprise. She believes that all change must be 
instigated by the client himself and she is so opposed to 
any efforts by social workers to alter people that she 
concludes her book with the advice*, "do not explain, do not 
try to change, but just look" (1981). Bearing in mind the 
statutory responsibilities and powers of social workers 
today, few can find this advice workable. Social workers 
have to take an active approach to helping.
Other humanist accounts of social work, however, 
contain causal explanations. England, for example, provides 
the following general principle of how change should be 
brought about in social work: "the social worker
consistently strives to understand the client's detailed 
experience and so to help the client clarify, accept and 
then act upon this experience" (1986, p.195). Further 
evidence of the role of causal hypotheses is apparent in 
the case studies which he offers as good examples of 
humanist work. In his final case study, for example, the 
social worker, who is counselling a woman with a chronic 
physical illness and marital problems, decides to support 
the client's decision to consult a homeopathic specialist. 
This support is not offered because of a belief in the
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efficacy of homeopathy but because of the psychological
effect she expects it to have:
if a person subjects himself to a medical procedure 
which is difficult - expensive, painful or 
disreputable - the best justification for undergoing 
it is the fact of a cure: "I'm glad I did It because
now I'm better." The act of justification activates 
the person's unconscious into affecting the treatment 
( England, 1986, p.192).
Jordan, another leading humanist, also advances
general theories about how people can be helped, for
example: "if the client feels that the worker is seeing him
in terms of a pre-set theoretical framework, or imposing
something alien on him or experimenting with him, or using
him for some other purpose, he is unlikely to co-operate or
benefit" (1979, p.129).
Some of Jordans' principles, though plausible to him,
are highly controversial. For instance, he warns social
workers that: "trying to define and limit problems is self-
protective and unhelpful" (1979, p.72). This contradicts
the accepted view in behavioural psychology which holds, as
Kirk's manual on cognitive-behavioural therapy states:
as the therapist helps to clarify and differentiate 
between problems, so the difficulties are frequently 
reduced to manageable proportions, and the patient 
begins to believe that change is possible (Kirk, 
1989, p.15).
There is also evidence from research that social 
workers often employ causal explanations in their implicit 
reasoning.
Curnock and Hardiker (1979) and Hardiker (1981) 
analysed reports social workers had written. Knowing that 
social workers deny using theories but have difficulty in 
saying what they actually do, the researchers decided to 
examine their written work for evidence of their reasoning
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and of any theoretical Influences. Social inquiry 
assessments prepared by Probation Officers were studied by 
Curnock and Hardiker while Hardiker (1981) looked at 25 
assessments made by social workers on child care referrals, 
analysing them in terms of their apparent theoretical 
slant.
Both studies found evidence of implicit theorising. 
In making their assessments, the social workers were not 
just describing the problem but also conjecturing its 
causes. A typical example Hardiker gives is of a family 
which was referred because the mother said she could not 
cope with her new baby. The social worker's assessment was 
of "a classic case of early bonding failure, possibly due 
to the physical circumstances of the child's birth, plus 
the mother's low self-esteem, social isolation and 
stressful marriage" (1981,p.95). Another example,
assessing a case of child abuse, cited many contributory 
factors such as: a difficult birth, a stepfather with
little experience or knowledge of child rearing, depression 
and social isolation in the mother, and the mother having 
been physically abused herself.
In the social enquiry reports prepared by Probation 
Officers too there is evidence that the Officers are trying 
to identify the causes of the criminal behaviour. The 
researchers found that the common areas that were examined 
were: the offender's personality; his health; family
dynamics; social relationships (friends and at work); the 
neighbourhood; and economic circumstances. One Probation 
Officer, for example, thought that the particular family
86
dynamics of a thirteen year old boy contributed to his 
delinquency:
I think this (marital problem) has some direct bearing 
on the boy's behaviour because the family situation is
one in which conflict is quite apparent; it does not
help him feel secure in his family and again he has 
this problem of finding out his own identity. The 
parents have unrealistic ambitions for their children. 
Therefore, he committed this offence along with his 
mates for reasons of status and group membership 
(Curnock and Hardiker 1979, p.43.).
Making predictions on the basis of their understanding 
of the problem behaviour is also an essential element in 
social work assessments.
The Probation Officers were involved in two types of 
prediction: the risk of further crime and the effects of
the different sentences the courts could make. If they 
believed that there was a serious risk of re-offending, 
then they were more inclined to recommend a custodial
sentence. Otherwise, their recommendations to the courts
were based on predictions about the likely beneficial 
effect of the various options. Where crimes were thought 
to be the result of specific factors which were considered 
amenable to social work help and where the client seem co­
operative, they advocated a Probation Order.
In child care work, predictions also figure 
prominently. Because of the statutory duty to protect the 
welfare of the child, social workers do not just try to 
understand the parents' problems but have to act; they have 
to use their insights to estimate the damage a child would 
suffer if left with his parents and to evaluate various 
ways of helping.
The resemblance then between social work practice
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wisdom and scientific theorising seems strong. Perhaps one 
feature of science which has persuaded social workers that 
their understanding is of a different nature is that so 
many famous scientific theories make universal claims, 
such as "all gases expand when heated." In contrast, when 
social workers cite something such as family disharmony as 
a cause of delinquency, they would not claim that "all 
unhappy families produce delinquents." Nor would they make 
the claim that "all delinquents come from unhappy 
families." The causes social workers cite are usually seen 
as stresses, risk factors, or precipitating variables which 
do not fully determine a specific outcome but only make it 
more or less probable. If we attempt to formulate the 
intuitive wisdom of fieIdworkers, we are unlikely to find 
many universal claims but hypotheses of the form "such and 
such a factor tends to increase the probability of "X" 
occurring" or "this often causes Y". While this 
differentiates social work wisdom from some of the most 
successful theories in science, it does not mark an 
absolute disparity. The language of probabilities is as 
much a feature of natural science as are universal laws. 
Indeed, in the field of quantum mechanics, it is debatable 
whether it could ever be possible to explain sub-atomic 
particles in any terms other than probabilities.
In summary, this review of social work 
reasoning indicates that, inasmuch as social workers are 
generalising about their clients, conjecturing about the 
causes of clients' problems, and using their explanations 
to make predictions, the preferred intuitive way of working 
looks not so much like an alternative to scientific
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theorising but like an early stage of it.
Sheldon has also made this point, 
suggesting that social workers should see their intuitive 
ideas as 'embryo attempts at formulation' of general 
principles :
within this model, art and science, intuition and 
formulation, practice and theory, are seen not as 
adversaries, but as related aspects of the same 
process of finding out and checking up on our beliefs 
(Sheldon, 1978, p.13).
FORMULATING SOCIAL WORK METHODS AND GOALS
The personal nature of current social work methods is 
recognised as a major problem by all who argue for a more 
scientific approach. It is particularly problematic in 
relation to evaluative research - studies have been 
criticised for giving inadequate detail of the social work 
intervention being evaluated so that others cannot 
implement the results. I have been arguing that it is 
possible to make social work reasoning explicit but this is 
not a simple task as the following appraisal of two 
research projects illustrates.
Two teams of researchers have devised data collection 
systems which are intended to elicit information about the 
methods and goals of social workers. The researchers had 
the same aim: to develop a way of recording what help
social workers gave. They intended the information to be 
used in evaluating the social work intervention:
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until we know what it is we are evaluating and can 
formulate relevant descriptive categories for types of 
clients, problems, social work/service inputs and 
desired objectives there is very little point in 
mounting such experimental studies (Goldberg 
1979,p.9).
Both teams began by spending time with social workers,
observing their work or discussing it with them. On the
basis of this experience, recording systems were designed
to cover what each team had judged to be the salient
details of the helping process. Raynes reports*.
the classification system we have developed enables 
one to look with ease at the component parts of the 
work carried out by social workers.... 11 will make it 
possible to identify the input of social workers so 
that the possibility of evaluating their work becomes 
greater (Raynes, 1982, p.359).
Goldberg makes a similar claim for the "case review
system" she produced :
as an information system it gives an on-going account 
of the size, nature and scope of social work
activities with different client groups...... As a
research tool it can explore possible associations 
between aims pursued in different problem situations, 
methods and skills used (1979,p.29).
Copies of these systems are attached in Appendix A. A 
look at them shows that there is a considerable difference 
in the information each team decided to record. These 
differences provide an illustration of the point made in 
discussing science that observation is far from being a 
mechanical, theory-free process. In recording what social 
workers are doing and with what aim, it is necessary to be 
selective, to decide what features are relevant and how 
they are to be classified. Raynes claims to "identify the 
input of social workers" and Goldberg says her system 
provides an "on-going account of the size, nature, and 
scope of social work activities" but if applied to the same
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social worker they would produce different accounts of his 
methods and goals.
Their work is also interesting in that the two teams 
seem to have had different notions of their own role in 
devising these systems. Goldberg et al (1979) acknowledge 
that they were actively involved, with the fieIdworkers, in 
deciding what information was significant and how it should 
be classified. Raynes et al (1982) however seem to have 
failed to recognise the active part they played in 
selecting and classifying the information. They portray 
themselves as passive collectors of data, the relevance or 
the classification of the data seeming to be decided by the 
data themselves rather than by the researchers active 
organisation of the material.
Let us examine the recording systems in more detail. 
To start with, the teams chose different ways of collecting 
data. The Goldberg system is completed by the social 
worker, and organises the data around each client, 
following their progress through contact with the social 
worker; Raynes' team, on the other hand, produced a form 
which focuses on the social worker, with an observer 
following him through his day recording his contact with 
several clients. Collecting the data in such different 
ways need not necessarily lead to the systems recording 
different facts but nevertheless it is not surprising that 
it did focus the attention on different aspects of 
practice.
The Raynes system is designed to collect three main 
kinds of information. These are described as individually
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"necessary" and jointly providing a "sufficient" and
"adequate" description of social work practice, adequate
that is, according to the authors, for evaluative research
purposes. The three categories are labelled "activities",
"purposes", and "issues arising". An activity is defined as
"an action that had a clear beginning and end." A few
examples are: talking to clients or others, making
phonecalls, travelling, and writing letters. This category
alone, Raynes says, gives only a partial account of social
work: "to identify and define the sum of activities which
constitute the work of a social worker is to provide a
necessary but not sufficient description of their work"
(1982, p.356.) It is also necessary, she says, to identify
the purpose of the activity and here 17 categories are
listed, each covering a fairly broad range of aims. This
set of categories seems a particularly good illustration of
the active part played by the researchers. They use the
neutral term of "identifying" the categories but produce a
set which is likely to be controversial in view of their
stated aim of developing a system for use in evaluative
research. For instance, the following purposes are all
put in one category:
giving/ receiving/ obtaining/ discussing information 
about client's history; practical situation; 
relationships with people; opinions; needs; feelings; 
resources; service use; future plans, with anyone 
other than a colleague (e.g. client, relative, 
friend).
This category roughly covers the area of counselling. 
To many social workers this is the key area in evaluative 
research where we want detailed information about different 
methods or styles of work but in this system all the
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diverse actions have been massed together, not even 
distinguishing between talking to the client who is being 
counselled and to his friend.
The final group of Information collected deals with 
"issues arising" - the problems or needs with which the 
social worker perceives himself to be dealing. For this, 
there are 16 categories.
If we turn now to the Goldberg "case review system", 
we get a very different picture of social work. Her 
categories were developed not by watching the social 
workers and "Identifying" the salient features as Raynes 
did but by talking to them and helping them to formulate 
what they thought were the significant aspects of their 
work.
Information Is collected about a particular client 
over time rather than recording the day of the social 
worker. There Is most resemblance In listing clients' 
problems, a category which Raynes calls "Issues arising" 
and Goldberg terms "problems" Both for example have 
similar categories for physical Illness, employment 
difficulties, delinquency, problems In home management, and 
housing, but Raynes has one category for 'family' while 
Goldberg distinguishes between "child behaviour problems," 
"child neglect," "family relations problems" and "family 
break-up". Goldberg also further distinguishes between the 
problems which social workers have Identified and those 
with which they are actively dealing.
Both systems list social workers' activities. The 
Raynes' form tells us about the physical action of the
93
social worker - seeing a client face-to face or telephoning 
for example; the separate category of "purpose of activity" 
gives more detail of why that action was carried out.
Goldberg however tells us only of the social worker's 
purpose (e.g. exploratory, information/advice, or 
sustaining/nurturing) but not how this was actually 
performed. Their use of the term "purpose" is dissimilar. 
Raynes tells us of the immediate reason for the action - 
giving or receiving information, for example - whereas 
Goldberg seems to refer more to the social worker's 
therapeutic goal, such as "facilitating problem solving" or 
"review visiting". This difference is further highlighted 
by Goldberg asking the social worker to state what changes 
he/she is aiming for while Raynes has no category for
collecting comparable data. This disparity may be due to 
the way the categories were formulated, in Raynes' case by 
watching the social workers and in Goldberg' by asking them 
what they were doing.
The variations in these two systems shows that there
is no single set of facts or obvious categories of
information to collect in specifying what social workers 
are doing and detailing their goals. There were differences 
in that one system collected data the other ignored; there 
were also variations in how it was categorised. Items 
which one team saw as similar and placed under one heading, 
the other considered significantly different and covered in 
two or more categories.
If we judge these data collection schemes in terms of 
their stated aim of facilitating evaluative research, we 
can see strengths and weaknesses in each. Their function is
94
to give a detailed account of the social work input which 
can then be judged by some measure of outcome. With Raynes' 
information, we can work out the comparative time and cost 
of different social work interventions. Goldberg gives us 
more idea of what the social workers were hoping to achieve 
and therefore allows a better evaluation of their 
intentions. Neither would be adequate in many areas of 
research. If, for instance, the research wanted to compare 
two methods of counselling, neither provides sufficient 
data to differentiate for example between behavioural and 
Rogerian therapies. Nor does either of them tell us of the 
ethnicity of the worker or client, information which is 
essential in investigating claims that racism adversely 
affects work with black clients.
No system however could meet all possible research 
needs. Although Raynes claims to provide a "sufficient" 
description of social work, this can only be adequate for 
some research purposes. To ask "what do social workers 
do?" may look a simple question but it is misleading. 
People who ask it do not want to be told all the minutiae 
of social workers' activities but only those details which 
are or are thought to be causally significant in their 
clients' responses. Saying what social workers are doing 
involves deciding which actions are relevant and how they 
are to be classified. And people differ in their views 
about what is causally significant. For some perhaps, it 
might be important to know the precise wording in what was 
said to the client, others might think the way it was said 
was more important.
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The simple inductivist view of science mistakenly sees 
scientists as neutral observers, collecting data in an 
unbiassed manner. These two research projects in social 
work illustrate the variations in what observers notice 
when looking at the same area. They also show that the task 
of formulating social work methods and goals is far from 
simple.
CONCLUSION
At present, social workers rely mainly on practice 
wisdom which, because of its individual and private nature, 
cannot be evaluated in detail by the standard procedures of 
science. Critics of a scientific approach maintain that 
this state of affairs cannot be altered; practice wisdom, 
they say, cannot be articulated as scientific theories.
The argument for this view that I have examined in this 
chapter is the claim that scientific theories must be about 
observable behaviour whereas social workers' practice 
wisdom is largely concerned with understanding the client's 
subjective experience. The humanist writers in social 
work suggest there is a striking contrast between social 
work and scientific reasoning. On the one hand, social 
workers regard their clients as rational, purposive people 
and want to understand what is going on in their minds. 
Such understanding, they claim, is achieved by a creative, 
imaginative process, drawing on their personal experience, 
empathie skills, and intuitive wisdom. On the other hand, 
scientists are depicted as strict behaviourists who focus 
exclusively on behaviour, ignoring mental processes. For
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these writers, adopting a scientific approach would entail 
not just a modification but a total transformation of 
social work.
Saying that a scientific approach to human behaviour 
must take the extreme form of behaviourism however is 
wrong. The view of scientific method which would endorse 
this claim Is faulty, overlooking the creative element in 
science and the conjectural nature of theories. Adopting a 
scientific approach In social work would not involve social 
workers' giving up their Interest In the hopes and feelings 
of their clients.
Moreover the account of scientific methods I presented 
does not look strikingly different from humanist methods at 
least In the area of developing theories. I have argued 
that there are similarities in the way a scientist 
theorises and how social workers reason about their clients 
as they build up "practice wisdom". Both are making a 
conjecture about the causal processes behind the phenomena 
they want to explain. Science however offers no mechanical 
process for formulating theories; the task of articulating 
practice wisdom, though possible, is not simple.
The crucial difference between scientists and social 
workers lies not in how they theorise but in how they 
subsequently test their conjectures. Science provides 
methods for testing theories, for deciding whether social 
workers' practice wisdom is wise or not.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FREE WILL AND CAUSALITY
INTRODUCTION
People are generally thought to have free will: an
ability to choose what to do and to initiate a course of 
action. Indeed, the distinction between actions and events 
mentioned earlier presupposes this assumption: a bodily
movement is an action if the person intended it to happen; 
otherwise it is just an event such as the muscle tremors 
caused by Parkinson's disease. But some social workers 
claim the idea of freedom of action conflicts with the 
determinism of science and so creates another obstacle to a 
scientific approach in social work.
There is no particular difficulty in thinking of our 
bodies as part of a causally determined physical world; we 
can accept that our liver and kidneys function according to 
natural laws. Problems arise though when we consider our 
thoughts and intentional actions. We generally feel that 
we have some freedom in choosing how to act; we can 
deliberate and it is up to us to follow one path rather 
than another. But if all our actions are fully determined 
by antecedent conditions they are the only ones we could 
have taken. In this case, our claim to act freely seems 
problematic.
Many fieIdworkers seem to accept both that people have
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free will and that their behaviour is caused. The dominant 
humanist tradition considers intentional actions are free. 
Most fieldworkers however also accept some deterministic 
theories, as the discussion in the previous chapter about 
their use of theories reported; they look for the causes of 
child abuse, for example, or of juvenile delinquency.
The social work literature though presents a different 
picture, with many humanists arguing that the beliefs in 
free will and determinism are incompatible; the issue thus 
becomes another aspect of the humanist versus scientific 
debate.
Those who defend the belief in free will cite the 
incompatibility of determinism as another reason for 
rejecting a scientific approach or only allowing it a 
partial role. Free human actions, say Downie and Telfer, 
are "beyond the reach of complete scientific explanation" 
(1980,p.125). Determinism, it is also claimed, radically 
conflicts with the humanist view of people, implying that 
people are "puppets" (Downie and Telfer, 1980, p.129), 
"slaves" and "victims" (Perlman, 1965), and "plastic" 
(Howe, 1987, p.29). In addition, it is claimed that 
determinism conflicts with current views on ethics: "if we
are not free then our belief in moral responsibility will 
require radical revision" (Downie and Telfer 1980, p.129). 
Another moral problem is that determinism is said to be at 
variance with the basic social work principle of "client 
self-determination", i.e. "the practical recognition of the 
right and need of clients to freedom in making their
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choices and decisions in the casework process (Biestek, 
1961, p.100). Acceptance of this principle, it is argued, 
commits social workers to a belief in free will and 
therefore to a rejection of determinism, e.g. Hollis 
(1964), Perlman (1965), Whittington, and Stalley (both in 
McDermott, 1975).
The other side of the dispute is mainly occupied by 
behaviourists who support a determinist view and maintain 
that our sense of free will is illusory. Human behaviour, 
says Sheldon is a phenomenon in the physical world and 
"must obey the same laws of cause and effect" (1982, p.26). 
Behaviourism therefore challenges views of human 
consciousness "which represent it as some sort of 
disconnected entity, impervious, when it chooses, to 
environmental influence" (Sheldon, 1982, p.27).
In fact the other main psychological approach in 
social work - psychoanalysis - also takes a deterministic 
view of human actions but many of its supporters seem to 
ignore this aspect. Hollis (1964) for example, a leading 
advocate of psychoanalytic social work, argues against 
determinism on the grounds that it is incompatible with 
free will while not acknowledging that it is a feature of 
the theory that she champions. Because of this, the 
art/science debate in social work is again in practice 
mainly conducted between humanists and behaviourists.
The free wi11/determinism debate is one of the classic 
problems of philosophy. There are three main positions on 
the issue: (a) libertarianism: we have free will in a sense 
that implies that our actions are not determined; (b) hard
100
determinism: all actions are determined and our familiar
sense of freedom is illusory; and (c), a view which 
receives little support in social work writings but which I 
think offers the most convincing answer, compatibilism: our 
notions of freedom and determinism can be reconci­
led.
My aim in this chapter is to present the case for 
compatibilism and show that using scientific methods does 
not preclude people acting freely.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES
The problem of free will and determinism has a long 
history. The belief that we are free agents seems to be 
challenged by any thesis which implies that our actions are 
pre-ordained.
The problem arose in ancient Greek culture which had 
the concept of "Moira" or "fate" - the idea that all our 
behaviour was the inexorable working our of our destiny. 
This seemed to leave no scope for people to shape their own 
histories, leading the Stoic philosophers to the gloomy 
conclusion that "each of us is assigned a role to play in 
the tragedy of life ... and there is nothing for us to do 
but say our prescribed lines as best we can" (quoted in 
Dennett, 1984, p.2).
Christian theologians have also been troubled by the 
problem. They argued that if God, being omniscient, knows 
everything that has or will ever happen, then all our 
future actions are already fixed; the results of our
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apparently free deliberations are already known to God.
Like some social workers today, they were worried about the
moral implications of this. They believed that people
could only be held morally responsible for their actions if
they had free will but had difficulty reconciling this with
their belief that God knew in advance what actions people
would (freely) take, (see e.g. St. Augustine, reprinted in
Berofsky, 1966, p.269).
Nowadays the success of the natural sciences in
developing deterministic explanations is the major source
of doubt over the existence of free will.
The determinist thesis, in brief, is that every event
has a cause. Indeterminism is however now widely
accepted at the subatomic level in quantum mechanics so the
thesis is usually modified to apply only to macroscopic
events. The thesis that all events are caused is not
empirically refutable but its plausibility has been greatly
increased by the progress scientists have made in
discovering causal laws. As O'Connor argues:
the evidence that all events have causes is simply the 
spectacular success of modern science. Science is 
based on the belief that natural events fall into 
causally ordered patterns, a belief that in the early 
stages of science was something of an assumption 
without a great deal of evidence to support it. But 
the assumption has been amply justified by the history 
of science. Where scientists have looked for causes, 
they have found them ... Determinism is both suggested 
and confirmed by the scientific picture of the world 
(1971, p.48).
Some have shared the dominant social work view that 
free will and determinism are inconsistent. The general 
form of their argument is set out by O'Connor:
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(A) Every macroscopic physical event has a cause.
(B) All human actions are macroscopic physical events.
(C) Therefore: All human actions are caused.
(D) Any event that is determined could not have
happened otherwise than it did.
(E) Therefore: No human action could have happened
otherwise than it did (O'Connor, 1971, p.61).
It is then claimed that an action is free if and only 
if the agent could have done something else in exactly the 
same circumstances. Given premises A,B, and C above, this 
implies that, since no human action could have been 
different, no human action can be free. Therefore either 
determinism or our belief that we have free will is false. 
Some then accept determinism (hard determinists) while 
others keep their belief in free will (libertarians).
This stark choice has however been challenged by many 
philosophers who argue that the two concepts can be 
reconciled. This "compatibilist" view has a long history. 
David Hume (1739) provided an early and detailed version of
it; other proponents have been T. Hobbes (1651, Chap.21),
J.S. Mill (1867), P.H. Nowell-Smith (1967), A.J.Ayer 
(1976) , and D.Dennett (1982) .
The basis of the compatibilist view is a repudiation 
of the claim that an action is free if and only if the 
agent could have done something else in identical 
circumstances. We feel free, they suggest, when our own 
wishes and decisions influence what we do as opposed to the 
times when our movements are wholly caused by outside 
factors. An action is free insofar as at least some of the 
causes which determine it are the agent's own beliefs, 
desires and intentions. Free actions are not wholly
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determined by events external to our thoughts. If our hand 
moves because we intend to wave goodbye, we are acting 
freely, whereas the sufferer from Parkinson's disease finds 
that his hand moves whether he wills it or not.
However this account leaves no ' place for 
indeterminism, rejecting the claim that a free agent could 
have chosen either option In precisely the same situation. 
To the compatibilist any action is fully determined by the 
combination of external factors and our own desires and 
choices. For a free agent to choose A rather then B, some 
factor, perhaps a feeling or a wish, must be different to 
tip the balance and lead to a different action. An agent 
could not have done something else in identical 
circumstances.
A more detailed account of this position is provided 
in the following sections which critically examine the 
alternatives.
FREE WILL
Let us begin by looking at the arguments for free 
will. Libertarians claim that people are free in the sense 
that more than one option is possible and they can choose 
which action to take. Downie and Telfer, expressing a 
libertarian view in social work, put the main point 
clearly, describing the type of freedom they believe exists 
as: "the possibility that the choice might be different,
not merely IF the circumstances were also different, but 
different in the same circumstances" (1980, p.134).
Libertarians sometimes appeal to personal experience
104
to support their view. Perlman, for instance, (in 
McDermott, 1975, p.68) cites our sense of having a free
choice as evidence for free will. When we are deliberating 
about what to do, we commonly have the feeling that we are 
free to choose and, even when we have fixed on one course, 
we feel that we "might have" chosen an alternative. Dr. 
Johnson offered a famous though poorly developed version of 
this argument: "Sir, we KNOW our will is free, and THERE'S
an end on't" (in Boswell, 1740).
The value of our experience as evidence of freedom is 
however debatable. First, many critics have pointed out 
that our experience is fallible. O'Connor (1971, p.18) for 
instance comments that our feeling of being free is, 
sometimes at least, illusory. Someone acting under 
hypnosis, for instance, will follow the hypnotist's
instructions believing that he is acting of his own free 
will but those who have watched the whole performance will 
be convinced that it is a case of post-hypnotic suggestion, 
a clear instance of not acting freely. The weight of this 
criticism has been questioned. Some libertarians point out 
that this scepticism applies to all our beliefs. Our
knowledge of the physical world relies on our sensory 
experience which may at times be false but we still
consider the evidence of our senses to be generally 
trustworthy. Cornman, defending the libertarian's appeal 
to experience of freedom, says:
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even If we conclude that the evidence we have in all 
these cases does not give us knowledge, as the skeptic 
avers, we may still fairly maintain that the evidence 
makes it reasonable for us to accept the hypothesis in 
question (1987, p.106).
Another criticism of individual experience as evidence 
for free will is that although introspection may tell us we 
feel AS IF we could have chosen another course of action, 
we never actually experience taking any alternative. We 
take one option and, however convinced we are that we could 
have chosen another, we cannot check this belief by seeing 
if we take a different course on a future occasion. A key 
feature of the libertarian's account of free will is we 
could have done something else in exactly the same 
circumstances and two different occasions can never be 
identical in every respect. At the very least their timing 
is different.
Libertarians are criticised for failing to give a 
detailed account of "free" actions. They accept that our 
reasoning is a crucial element in exercising free will but 
to them it is not the full story. Our free actions, they 
claim, are influenced but not determined by our thoughts. 
Even after weighing up the pros and cons of the 
alternatives facing us, we have an element of freedom in 
deciding which action to take and the choice we finally 
make is not determined by our beliefs, wishes, and 
intentions. But this notion of an "undetermined" free act 
has proved hard to analyse clearly.
An undetermined choice implies, according to the 
libertarian, that even if all our reasoning had been the
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same, we might at the end of our deliberations have made a 
different decision. Why then do we take one choice and not 
another? It seems from this account that we cannot have a 
REASON for it, so it looks as if our choices are only a 
matter of whim or chance; we "just happen" to come down on 
one side. But free, responsible actions are meant to be a 
matter of choice not chance.
Simple indeterminism - the claim that insofar as our 
actions are free they are not caused - is, on its own, 
inadequate. The indeterminism the libertarians want to 
claim is very different from that found in science. In 
quantum mechanics the undetermined movements of subatomic 
particles are a random matter of chance. There are times 
when our decisions are also like this. For example, we may 
find such compelling reasons for two options that we 
cannot make up our minds. We may finally resolve the 
debate by tossing a coin to decide which course to take, 
but this kind of random outcome is not what libertarians, 
or anyone else, mean by "exercising our free will." Indeed 
it is a case of abdicating our freedom, of saying "I find 
it hard to decide so I shall let chance decide for me." We 
would not hold a man responsible for an action if it were 
determined by the haphazard fall of a coin. In this 
example though, we might consider him responsible for 
deciding to settle the issue by tossing a coin since this 
decision was a free action. The man who freely decides to 
toss a coin, or to take any action, does not "just happen " 
to do SO; he CHOOSES to do so. Taylor, a believer in free 
will, notes the difficulty:
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behaviour that Is mine must be behaviour that is
within my control, but motions that occur from no
causes are beyond the control of anyone (1983, p.45).
The libertarian, Taylor says, needs the concept of an
agent who is in control of his actions and who is capable
of initiating actions:
in the case of an action that is free, it must be such 
that it is caused by the agent who performs it, but 
such that no antecedent conditions were sufficient for 
his performing just that action (Taylor, 1983, p.48).
But efforts to define this concept of agency have met
with criticism. The claim that a free agent could have done
something else even though all the circumstances were
identical implies that "I" am more than the sum total of my
thoughts, feelings, memories, etc. There is an "I" who can
stand back from my reasoning and make a free decision. "I"
am responsible for my actions. But what kind of entity is
this? It is hard to describe this agent who is separate
from our thoughts, feelings, etc. Hume, writing in the
eighteenth century, commented on its elusiveness:
for my part, when I enter most intimately into what I 
call MYSELF, I always stumble on some particular 
perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch 
MYSELF at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe anything but the perception (Hume, 1739).
Nowell-Smith (1967, p.282) also finds fault with
accounts of a self who is apart from our general character
and wishes. Libertarians typically describe a free act as
"self-determined" and then talk of the "self" as a subject
who does the determining. Nowell-Smith points out that
this differs from our general use of "self" compounds, such
as self-adjusting, self-regulating, self-controlled, and
self-governing. In these cases, we do not assume that
108
there is a part of the object or body called the "self" 
which adjusts, controls, etc. We may say that a central 
heating system is self-regulating but we do not picture it 
as having a self which does the regulating. We mean it is 
capable of monitoring the temperature and switching on or 
off as required without any outside interference. People 
are self-determining in this way to the compatibilist. 
Someone's free choices are self-determined because they are 
"determined by HIS motives and character, as opposed to 
forced on him by circumstances or other people" (Nowell- 
Smith, 1967, p.283.) The libertarian, rejecting this 
analysis of self is left, Nowell-Smith claims, with a vague 
idea of a self which "is neither an empirical object nor 
displayed in characteristic action."
If we accept determinism however we can avoid the 
libertarian's problems. The self is equated with the mind 
and the agent's final choice of action is fully determined 
by his deliberations and external factors. Moreover, while 
libertarians use our familiar sense of freedom as evidence 
for their case, compatibilists can also draw support from 
our ordinary views of behaviour. If we examine an example 
of what we would normally think of as exercising our free 
will, the compatibilist's account fits commonsense usage 
better than the libertarian one.
This can be illustrated by examining an instance of 
what is generally thought to be a free action. Imagine 
that someone has been offered a new job and is deciding 
whether or not to accept. He weighs up the pros and cons 
of the new opportunity. Perhaps they present a conflict
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between his short- and long-term career goals, or between 
personal commitments and job ambitions. After
deliberation, he comes to a decision and writes a letter 
accepting the post.
How has he exercised his free-will? The compatibilist 
would say that his decision was free because it was what he 
wanted, the decision was the outcome of his appraisal of 
the relative merits of the options in the light of his 
goals, values, etc. He would not have been free if, for 
instance, someone had forcibly made him write the letter of 
acceptance. This seems in keeping with our commonsense 
views where we expect people to have a reason for their 
choice. If they are exercising their free will, people do 
not "just happen" to drift in one direction rather than 
another. In everyday speech, we think people have reasons 
for their free actions and can generally explain why they 
reached a particular decision rather than one of its 
alternatives. This seems to fit the compatibilist account 
that choice is determined by our thinking and that some 
element of our thinking would have to be different for us 
to opt for another action.
In summary then, I have argued that libertarianism 
runs into difficulties in providing a detailed account of 
free actions and human agency. Compatibilism, I have 
claimed, avoids these problems but its account of human 
freedom is significantly different. The human agent is 
not, as the libertarians would claim, a "prime mover", able 
to initiate actions uninfluenced by preceding events but an 
element in a causal chain. How significant an element
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though is the issue in examining the claim that determinism 
implies that our ordinary view of human agency is radically 
at fault.
HARD DETERMINISM
A common concern among social work critics of 
determinism is that it threatens our sense of being an 
agent "in charge" of what we do; it implies that we are 
merely "puppets", "slaves", or "plastic" people, to use 
expressions commonly encountered in the social work 
literature. These fears cannot be dismissed as just scare- 
mongering since many behaviourists, taking a "hard" 
determinist position, endorse them though they themselves 
do not find them upsetting.
Skinner, for instance, asserts that, in moving from 
the libertarian to the determinist perspective "the 
direction of the controlling relation is reversed: a person 
does not act upon the world, the world acts upon him" 
(1971, p.206). Scientific determinism, according to 
Skinner, does radically alter our sense of self: "the man
thus portrayed is a stranger, and from the traditional 
point of view, he may not seem to be a man at all" (1971, 
p.195). He says of the free agent humanists believe we 
are :
his abolition has long been overdue. Autonomous man 
is a device used to explain what we cannot explain in 
any other way. He has been constructed from our 
ignorance, and as our understanding increases, the
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very stuff of which he is composed vanishes (1971, 
P.196).
Such views are common among behaviourists. Chien 
(1972, p.6) reviewing the behavioural movement reports that 
"the prevailing image among psychologists is that of Man as 
an impotent reactor ... He is implicitly viewed as a 
robot." Behaviourists claim that the "self" is causally 
insignificant: Sechenov (1935, p.334) maintains "the real
cause of every human activity lies outside man"; Skinner 
says that psychology "must abolish the conception of the 
individual as a doer" (1947, p.40). They argue that all 
our mental processes are ultimately determined by 
environmental factors and therefore can be fully explained 
in terms of them; hence mental processes can be ignored. 
Zurriff reports that a core assumption of behaviourism is 
that "behaviour is a function of environmental independent 
variables only" (1990, p.179).
Before addressing the philosophical issues in this 
view of behaviour, it should be noted that the 
behaviourists' view is in fact based more on methodological 
needs rather than philosophical arguments; external factors 
are more easily studied than mental processes. Zurriff 
in a philosophical critique of behaviourism describes how 
"the concept of the agent stands in the way of the 
objective behavioural science conceived by behaviourism" 
(1990, p.178). First, they have a commitment to developing 
a scientific study of behaviour and this implies an 
acceptance of determinism: "for the behavioural program to
succeed in establishing a science, lawfulness in behaviour
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is necessary" (Zurriff, 1990, p.178). Secondly, they have 
a commitment to studying observable phenomena and the 
deliberations of the human agent are thus problematic. 
Skinner, explaining his exclusion of mental terms, says: 
"the objection to Inner states Is not that they do not 
exist, but that they are not relevant In a functional 
analysis" (1953, p.35). Zurriff sums up the behaviourists' 
rejection of the Idea of the human agent: "lawfulness,
objectivity, observability, and scientific explanation 
can be achieved only If, as a working assumption, agency is 
abandoned." (1990, p.178).
If, as I have argued In Chapter Four, the mind can be 
studied scientifically, behaviourists' methodological 
argument for rejecting the concept of a human agent Is 
fundamentally weakened.
But what of the philosophical arguments for this 
view? The compatibi11st argues that even If we are 
determined this does not threaten our sense of autonomy. 
Of course we are affected In many ways by the world around 
us but even libertarians acknowledge that. Behaviourists 
such as Skinner though undervalue the Interaction we have 
with our surroundings. The world acts upon us but we In 
turn act upon the world and It Is this which gives us some 
control over what happens to us. We are free Insofar as 
some of the causes of our actions are our own volitions and 
preferences.
The main philosophical attack on compatibilism however 
Is that this account of freedom Is unsatisfactory. Critics 
claim that such a sense of being responsible for our
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actions is illusory. Actions may be caused by "our" 
volitions but since, according to determinism, these are 
themselves determined by external factors the individual 
could not have chosen any alternative course of action. 
Taylor , rejecting compatibilism, asserts that "far from 
solving any problem, it only camouflages it"(1983, p.42).
The compatibilist's defence is that these critics 
underestimate the significance of the contribution human 
mental processes make to the causal sequence. Dennett 
(1984, Chapters 2 and 4) for instance accepts that it is an 
implication of determinism that all our thoughts and wishes 
are ultimately fully determined by external factors but he 
questions the significance of this point, offering an 
interesting, evolutionary explanation of our ability to be 
in charge of what we do. To describe something as the 
ultimate cause generally suggests that it was prior to 
other causes. If we take a long enough view of the causal 
history of a man's action, then in a sense, it was 
ultimately determined by external factors. Indeed, if we 
go far enough back, mankind did not exist and there was 
only the environment. But things have changed a lot since 
then. Mankind has travelled through the evolutionary 
process, acquiring bodies, brains, and reasoning skills. 
At one time in the past, it might have been true to 
describe people as wholly determined by their environment 
but, as they have acquired rationality and language, they 
have become increasingly capable not just of reacting but 
of interacting with the world around them. Therefore we 
are now, even at birth, capable of a complex interaction
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with our environment. We are not completely self-made
selves, but we can claim a significant share of the
responsibility. The human agent is an element in a causal
chain but such a major one that he has a clear identity.
Let us examine the libertarians' criticisms (and
fears) of this account of human agency.
To begin with the most extreme view about our
helplessness, fatalists, such as the Stoic philosophers,
claim that determinism implies that everything is
inevitable, the inexorable working out of causality.
Butrym seems to be expressing this view when she claims
that determinism is incompatible with social work's goal of
trying to bring about change, implying that, if determinism
were true, social workers would be unable to save their
clients from their pre-destined fates. Without a belief in
free will, she says:
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a 
good enough rationale for the objectives of social 
work which are primarily concerned with change and 
thus are intrinsically antagonistic to a deterministic 
philosophy of life (Butrym, 1976, p.47).
Her conception of determinism seems to imply that, for
instance, some children are doomed from birth to become
delinquents while others are destined from the start to
become depressed: the interventions of social workers
cannot alter their fate.
Dennett takes issue with fatalists, arguing that a
closer analysis of their reasoning shows that their fears
are mistaken. Their argument is of the general form:
if determinism is true, then (since all our acts will 
have sufficient causal conditions) no act of ours is 
avoidable (Dennett, 1984, p.102).
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The fatalist thinks this implies that we are
powerless, we cannot avoid our predestined future. What
does it mean to say that something is unavoidable?
"Avoid", Dennett points out, belongs to the family of verbs
we use to describe human agency. We can avoid, prevent,
bring about, ensure, etc. All of these verbs describe us
"making a difference" to what happens and this, of course,
is one of the aspects of having free will that libertarians
are so anxious to protect. In what sense however do we
"make a difference"? We cannot alter the future, replacing
one event with another, because it has not happened yet.
As Dennett says:
the future consists, time lessly, of the sequence of 
events that will happen, whether determined to happen 
or not, and it makes no more sense to speak of 
avoiding these events than it does to speak of 
avoiding the events that have already happened (1984, 
p.124).
It is therefore a mistake to talk of avoiding a "real" 
future event, because if we avoided it, it did not happen 
and therefore is not a real future event. When we talk of 
making a difference to the course of events, we mean that 
we have altered what "would have happened" without our 
action. If we say, for example, that we prevented 
something, we mean that what we did led to a different 
outcome from the one we would have expected if we had done 
nothing. We do not change the actual future but our 
predicted future.
All the verbs of "making a difference" involve a tacit 
comparison between the way the world was APPARENTLY 
going to go, and the way it turned out to go 
(Dennett, 1984, p.126.).
According to this view, in a determined world, when
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human agents intervene, they do affect what occurs. So 
Butyrm is wrong in thinking that determinism implies that 
social workers cannot step in and improve the lot of 
people in distress.
A sense of coercion is common to the metaphors chosen 
by social work critics of determinism; they use emotional 
images of "slaves", "puppets", and "victims." But in what 
sense does determinism imply such duress?
O'Connor (1971) provides a possible source of this 
fear of being constrained. He suggests that a major cause 
of hostility to determinism arises from confusing causation 
and coercion and supposing that determined behaviour is 
coerced. But it is misleading to imagine a causal law as 
some kind of slavemaster, whipping us into line if we try 
to do anything on our own initiative. O'Connor argues that 
to suppose that causes "coerce" events is to confuse 
prescriptive with descriptive laws. The laws established 
by Parliament permit certain behaviour and forbid
deviations under pain of punishment. With respect to these
laws it is meaningful to talk of coercion, but not with the
laws of nature. The planets are not compelled to follow 
the orbits assigned to them by relativity theory while 
secretly yearning to deviate along different paths.
In ordinary usage, we say that we are coerced when we 
are made to do things by external factors despite our
wishes and, in such cases, our actions are not thought of 
as free. This distinction between forced and free action 
is preserved with determinism, as O'Connor indicates 
to say that my conduct is free is merely to say that
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it Is under my own control. And it is under my own 
control if it is guided by my own intentions, motives, 
and desires. But to say this is certainly not to say 
that my conduct is in any way UNCAUSED (1971, P.74).
Another possible source of the slave and victim
imagery is the fear that, if our actions are determined
then, in principle, they are predictable. This can create
a fear that we might be controlled, not by causal laws, but
by an intelligent being. And, from the metaphors chosen by
social workers, the fear seems to be that this could be an
evil rather than a loving being - an evil scientist
(probably a behaviourist) who uses his knowledge of causal
laws to control and manipulate us to his own ends. Dennett
(1984) notes how common this nightmare is in the literature
on free will. But, surprisingly, there is considerable
agreement on the question of predictability between
libertarians, compatibilists, AND determinists. Even the
libertarians typically agree that some prediction is
possible for they concede that human actions are often
subject to regularities. From a knowledge of someone's
general character, we can have a reasonably good idea of
what they are likely to do in future. It would be very
surprising, for example, if John Major voted for the Labour
Party at the next general election.
The complexity of human behaviour however is generally
thought to rule out precise prediction. Skinner (1974), a
determinist, says such prediction is impossible, likening
the complexity of human behaviour to that of a rainstorm.
While physicists could make some predictions about the
general pattern of its behaviour, they would be unable to
predict with confidence the exact trajectories of each
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droplet of water.
We tend to think of complexity being due to the sheer
number of independent and unpredictable factors involved,
as in the raindrops example, but Dennett stresses that our
rationality also adds to the difficulty. Through
evolution, we have become relatively intelligent and
reflective beings, so that causes do not have a simple,
consistent impact but are actively appraised by us:
when we think of causation, we tend to think of nicely 
isolated laboratory cases of causation, where a 
single, repeatable, salient effect is achieved under 
controlled circumstances. Or we think of particularly 
clear cases of everyday causation: Hume's billiard
balls, sparks causing explosions ... Thus when we 
think of someone CAUSED to believe this or that, we
tend to imagine them being SHOVED willy-nilly into
that state (Dennett, 1984, p.33).
Our reactions to incoming information, however, are 
different from a billiard ball's, being far more 
complicated since they involve so many factors. We can 
examine it rationally, judge its truth in the light of our 
past experiences, decide whether it suits our goals, etc. 
And to confound anyone trying to predict our reaction even 
further, we may, feeling stubborn, bored, or frivolous, act 
to alter our response from what was expected. We do not 
just receive information but process it in a highly 
personal way and it is this which makes the final use of 
the information "our choice".
In contrast to social workers' fears of being 
controlled by an omniscient scientist, the social sciences, 
at present, tend to produce only probable explanations but, 
as far as both libertarians and determinists can see, this 
is all that we can expect them to achieve, though we could
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expect to increase this probability.
To summarise, libertarians and hard determinists both 
claim that if determinism is true then our familiar sense 
of being in control of our actions is an illusion; we are 
merely organisms reacting according to deterministic laws 
to events in the world around us. But this imagery 
substantially underestimates the complexity of human 
rationality and of our responses to events. The "self" 
which they allege disappears in a deterministic world is a 
major factor in producing our actions so that it is still 
correct to claim that "I" am responsible for what I do.
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
Stalley (in McDermott, 1975) and Downie and Telfer 
(1980) both raise a frequently-made objection to
determinism, claiming that it undermines our concept of 
morality. Even if this were true, it would not be grounds 
for saying that determinism is false; deeming an
implication of a thesis unwelcome as opposed to
establishing that it is untrue does not challenge its 
truth. However compatibilists would dispute the claim that 
determinism has this implication.
Libertarians argue that the assumption of free will is 
an essential element in our views on moral responsibility. 
It is argued that we blame people for bad behaviour only 
when we think that they could have avoided it. If for 
instance it is shown that an apparently criminal act was in 
fact due to a brain tumour destroying the person's normal
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control over his conduct, we accept that the perpetrator 
was not "acting of his own free will" and refrain from 
blaming or punishing him. But, it is often argued, if all 
our actions were determined, we could never say that 
someone could have done other than he did and therefore we 
could not say he should have. Hence acceptance of 
determinism, the libertarian claims, implies rejection of 
our standard views of morality.
The compatibilist response is that this conclusion 
rests on a misunderstanding of what is meant by "could have 
done other" in a moral context. I have already discussed 
difficulties in the libertarian account of freedom; of 
differentiating an undetermined choice from a random 
chance, and of clarifying their concept of "self". 
Difficulties with these issues mean that their notion of 
"could have done other" is also far from clear.
Nowell-Smith (1967) gives a typical version of the 
compatibilist view. He argues that although the agent 
could not have done other than his actual deed in one 
sense, since it was determined, this is not the sense 
generally implicit in our moral language. He agrees that 
we assign moral responsibility only if we believe that the 
agent could have acted otherwise but an examination of how 
we judge whether he could have or not suggests that it is 
compatible with determinism.
Libertarians want to use "could have done other" in a 
categorical sense, that is to say without any conditions 
attached, but this, Nowell-Smith suggests, conflicts with 
common usage. Claims that I "could have" done something
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are generally hypothetical not categorical, implying I 
would have if something else had also been the case. In 
other words, they refer to a tendency or capacity in the 
agent. Consider how we establish the truth of a claim that 
"I could have" done something 1 did not actually do. We 
look at similar instances and the person's past behaviour 
to judge whether the action someone claims he "could have" 
done is something that he is generally capable of doing. 
Nowell-Smith gives the example of a man reading Jane 
Austen's novel "Persuasion". If he tells us that although 
he chose "Persuasion", he could have read "Emma", this 
claim seems plausible. In fact it would be odd if someone 
had the necessary skills to read one of Jane Austen's books 
but not another, since they are in the same language and of 
comparable complexity. If the man reading "Persuasion" 
claims though that he "could have" read and understood 
"Werther" in the original despite his ignorance of German, 
then we would reject the claim that he "could have" read 
it.
Nowell-Smith then considers whether this analysis of 
"could have" is consistent with our ordinary use of moral 
terms and judgements. If we think that someone could NOT 
have done something different, we excuse him from moral 
responsibility, but how do we judge whether this is so? 
One criterion often employed is that we do not expect 
people to do things which are completely outside what 
humans have generally managed to do. We would not, to take 
an extreme example, say that someone "should have" done 
something which would have required him to move faster than
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the speed of light. Another criterion is that external 
factors have not prevented someone from doing the right
thing. "I could not keep my promise to meet you because I
was held captive at the time" is a valid excuse which
releases you from your moral obligations. Some internal 
factors are also accepted: neurological illness for
instance can excuse "bad" behaviour.
In all these cases, the ordinary view is that the bad 
actions were not voluntary but in some way forced upon the 
agent, either in the literal sense of physical coercion or 
as the effects of causal laws outside his control. But if 
all human behaviour is determined, the libertarian argues, 
then all our actions are the effects of causal laws outside 
our control.
The answer, Nowell-Smith replies, lies in defining
what behaviour we say we can control. We do not punish the
man who was forced to do the wrong thing because "we know
that it will do no good to punish him" (1967, p.296). The
areas of behaviour which we censure are those where we know
from experience that the agent can be influenced by our
reaction and may consequently alter his behaviour or where
others, seeing him punished, may alter their actions.
A breach of a moral rule is only considered to be
culpable when it is attributable to the agent's 
character, his vice or moral weakness" and "moral 
traits of character are just those traits that are 
known to be amenable to praise or blame" (Nowell- 
Smith, 1967, p.304).
On this analysis, we say that someone "could have done 
something else" and is therefore morally responsible for 
what he actually did do, when the "something else" is an
action which, from previous experience, we think is
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generally within his competence, and which he would have 
done if he had shown the right moral trait, if he had tried 
harder, had been able to try harder, had been less selfish, 
etc.
Dennett (1984) also criticises the libertarian claim 
that, in ordinary usage, if we say someone "could have done 
other" we mean it in the categorical sense that a free 
agent is able to take either option in identical 
circumstances. This, Dennett says, is not the sense in 
which, in everyday life, we ask if someone could have acted 
otherwise. Questions about freedom in this categorical 
sense raise metaphysical issues about the state of the 
universe but when we want to judge whether someone could 
have acted differently we do not indulge in philosophical 
debate: "we never show any interest in trying to answer the 
question we have presumably [according to the libertarians] 
just asked" (1984, p. 135). Rather, if we are interested 
in whether or not someone "could have done other" we check 
whether the alternative is something we could reasonably 
expect the person to be able to do, in the way outlined by 
compatibi1ists like Nowe11-Smith. In deciding on moral 
responsibility, we need to distinguish between the actual 
(what the agent did), the possible (what he was capable of 
doing), and the impossible (what was beyond his ability.) 
If the only alternative act were impossible, then we would 
say that the person could not have done otherwise.
CLIENT SELF-DETERMINATION
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The other moral difficulty social workers have 
perceived in determinism is its alleged incompatibility 
with the important social work principle of client self- 
determination. Acceptance of “the right and need of 
clients to freedom in making their choices and decisions" 
(Biestek, 1961, p.100), it is argued, commits social 
workers to a belief in free will and therefore to a 
rejection of determinism.
My argument so far shows that I believe this worry is 
unfounded but not only does the compatibi1ist account 
reconcile determinism and this principle but also it helps 
to clarify what the principle means.
A client is self-determining to the degree that his 
actions are free, that is to say that they are the result 
of his own wishes, deliberations, and choices. Moreover, 
this degree can be significantly affected by the way social 
workers offer help.
For example, an elderly lady faced with the 
possibility of being admitted to residential care can be 
easily swept along by well-meaning officials, a doctor or a 
social worker who is convinced that it is “in her best 
interests" to go into a home and who simply tells her that 
this is best for her. Alternatively, social workers can 
try to increase the client's ability to make the decision 
for herself. They can make sure that she has all the 
relevant information, in particular all the information 
that the social workers themselves used in assessing her 
needs, for instance of what life is like in a residential 
home, or the alternative services she could receive if she
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stayed at home. They can encourage the client to reflect 
on the decision, to think out her priorities and consider 
how they would be satisfied in the alternative systems of 
care. Remembering her age and infirmity, they need to 
allow her reasonable time to make a choice. Above all, 
they can accept and act on her decision even when they 
think it is the wrong one. They may believe that she would 
be happier in a residential home but if the client values 
her independence and the familiarity of her home more than
the physical comforts of residential care then they should
accept her decision to stay at home.
The interpretation I have given of the principle of 
client self-determination is consistent with, in fact 
identical to, the interpretations found in social work 
textbooks, even in those written by people who claim that 
their interpretation conflicts with determinism. Hollis
for instance seems to have a very similar view of the
principle:
what we really mean by this concept is that self- 
direction, the right to make his own choices, is a 
highly valued attribute of the individual. The more 
he can make his own decisions and direct his own life 
the better, and the less the caseworker tries to take 
over these responsibilities the better (Hollis, 1964).
Stalley's account is essentially the same:
the function of the caseworker is not to direct the 
client but to assist his deliberation. This helps to 
ensure that the client acts on his own reflective 
desires rather than on impulse or in response to 
external pressures (in McDermott, 1975, p.115).
The main problem in relation to the principle of
client self-determination, it seems to me, is not in
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protecting it from determinists but in deciding how to 
implement it. While one can give a fairly straightforward 
account of what the principle means, putting it into 
practice is far from simple because, in many instances, it 
conflicts with other moral principles and legal duties so 
that social workers may have no alternative to overriding 
clients' wishes. The elderly lady described above is an 
example of an independent, responsible person but she is 
the exception rather than the rule in modern social work. 
Because of statutory responsibilities, much social work is 
either with people whose ability to make responsible 
decisions is limited to some degree, for example, children, 
the mentally ill, and the mentally handicapped, or with 
clients whose free actions are judged unacceptable in some 
way, for instance criminal offenders or families who are 
not caring for their children adequately. Respecting the 
client's right to self-determination while also taking into 
account his ability to make responsible decisions and the 
rights of others to protection from his actions is a 
complex moral calculation.
The principle of client self-determination is not, in 
practice, threatened by the thesis of determinism but by 
the realities of current social work responsibilities.
CONCLUSION
My purpose in this chapter was to challenge the 
widely-held view in social work that free will and 
determinism are incompatible since it is an element in many
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social workers' hostility to science. Those who accept 
this incompatibility fall into two groups, libertarians and 
hard determinists. I have argued that the former, 
rejecting determinism, have difficulty in providing an 
adequate account of a free undetermined action or a free 
undetermined self while the latter group, accepting
determinism, conclude that our commonsense view of
ourselves is fundamentally wrong and must be radically 
altered. The view that free will and determinism can be 
reconciled seems to me to provide the least problematic 
solution. Its analysis of a free action differs from that 
proposed by the libertarian but, it has been argued, it is 
consistent with the way freedom is talked about in everyday 
life. Determinism worries many people because it seems to 
threaten our familiar and valued sense of being responsible 
decision-makers, in control of our actions and our
destinies. It is only if you think of rational human
beings as, in fact, very simple reactive organisms that
these fears look plausible. Once you acknowledge the
complexity of our thinking, determinism does not threaten 
the belief that "I" make decisions about what "I" should 
do.
The people who need social work help suffer from many 
social disadvantages. Their freedom of action is 
threatened from many directions, by poverty, illness, or 
prejudice, but not by social workers' acceptance of
determinism.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE LIMITS OF EMPATHY AND INTUITION
INTRODUCTION
I concluded, in Chapter Four, that social workers and 
scientists have much in common in the way they develop 
explanations. The crucial differences lie in how they then
test their conjectures and decide on their plausibility or
probability. In this chapter, I examine the means of 
evaluating their understanding that most social workers 
seem to rely on: their individual intuitive and empathie
skills.
The concepts of empathy and intuition occur frequently 
in the social work literature; understanding clients is 
said to be achieved by using these personal skills. 
Although they appear together so often that they seem a 
single idea, the two concepts are significantly different.
Empathy refers to the ability to use our own 
experience to imaginatively “enter into" another's private, 
mental world. “Empathy puts one into the feelings and
experiences of the other" (Goldstein, 1986, p,.68). It
enables a social worker to “know the client's problem 
almost as if he were living it" (England, 1986, p.23). An
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example of such empathy is drawing upon one's own 
experience of loss when working with a client who has 
suffered a bereavement in order to put oneself, in a sense 
in his position and imagine what mental experiences he is 
having. One can conjecture not only that the client is sad 
but also how this feels.
The other skill said to be so important in social work 
is intuition. Intuitive reasoning and intuitive judgement 
are frequently used but rarely defined terms in social 
work. Intuition seems to have two distinctly different 
meanings. First, it is used to refer to a direct insight, 
not gained by reasoning but in some other non-specified 
way. It is most commonly used in claiming to sense 
directly the mental experiences of clients. Goldstein, for 
example, uses it in this way when he claims that social 
workers have the capacity " for 'knowing' in internal ways 
the inner state of others at times without the benefit of 
specific clues" (Goldstein, 1973, p.66). Brandon also uses 
it in this sense when he talks of social workers' ability 
to have "a direct awareness of life, direct communication, 
direct awakening, seeing people as they really are" 
(Brandon, 1979, p.19).
This type of intuition is private and somewhat 
mysterious. Goldstein, for example, does not explain how 
social workers can know "without the benefit of specific 
clues". The main question about this type of intuition 
concerns its reliability. Is the worker seeing people as 
they "really" are, as Brandon maintains. The person who
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has the intuition tends to feel confident that it is true, 
it is psychologically convincing. For others however its 
plausibility can only be judged by whether later events or 
behaviour support it, whether for instance a client said by 
intuition to be angry acts in a way which corroborates this 
claim.
In its second usage, intuition is taken to involve 
some form of reasoning but its distinctive feature is that 
such reasoning is implicit, not carried out in the 
conscious, explicit manner of science. It is this type of 
intuition which seems to play the main role in social work. 
When assessing a client and deciding how to intervene, 
social workers do deliberate. They may draw on the 
theories they have learned during their training or on the 
ideas acquired through experience but they do so in an
unsystematic, piecemeal way where they may not be fully
aware of what ideas have influenced their final decision. 
The acceptability of their conclusion is based on a 
personal judgement, an intuitive appraisal of its 
plausibility, whether it "makes sense" or "feels right" to 
them.
Let us turn now to a closer examination of these
skills and the claims made about them.
EMPATHIC UNDERSTANDING
The term "understanding" is ambiguous in relation to 
human actions because of the ability to empathise. 
Sometimes it is used as in the natural sciences; we
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"understand" something when we can explain why it happened. 
At other times, the claim to "understand" another person 
can mean that one empathises with them and thinks one knows 
what it feels like to be in their circumstances.
Many humanists argue that the goal of the social 
sciences is to understand other people in the sense of 
knowing how they feel. This, they maintain, renders the 
study of human actions methodologically different from the 
study of the natural world (Collingwood, 1946, is a famous 
advocate of this view).
Social work critics of science have an additional 
reason for supporting this argument: the humanist goal of
empathically understanding people, they claim, is also the 
way to help them. They propose a therapeutic as well as a 
methodological argument for rejecting science. The 
experience of being empathically understood by a fellow 
human being, it is claimed, provides the supportive setting 
in which a person in trouble can reflect on his 
difficulties and find a solution. Empathy is seen as 
therapeutically essential, not just the only means at our 
disposal for understanding other people.
England (1986, p.24) asserts that "it is experiencing
the empathie helper which is itself the principal therapy".
Jordan also claims empathie understanding is necessary for
therapeutic success*.
empathy implies that the helper "feels with" the 
person in trouble; that by imaginatively entering the 
other's situation, he engages his own emotions in such 
a way as to share the other's responses. I am 
suggesting that this is an essential part of helping 
(Jordan, 1979, p.20).
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The most influential advocate of this view is probably 
the psychotherapist Carl Rogers whose "client-centred 
therapy" (1957 and 1959) has been very well received by 
social workers. Similar views have been expressed by the 
main social work opponents of science, e..g. England 
(1986), Goldstein (1984), Jordan (1979), Ragg (1977), and 
Wilkes (1981), all of whom share the belief that people 
have a great capacity for solving their own problems. 
Therapists can help by providing the right setting in which 
our natural drive towards growth and development can be 
fully realised; therapists do not need any special 
knowledge or scientific expertise in order to promote 
change.
Rogers, for instance, believes that we are all
striving for "self-actualisation" and, given the right kind
of supportive relationship, can explore our thoughts and
feelings and work out new ways of resolving any
difficulties we face:
the individual has within himself the capacity and the 
tendency, latent if not evident, to move forward 
toward maturity. In a suitable psychological climate 
this tendency is released ... It is evident in the 
capacity of the individual to understand those aspects 
of himself which are causing him pain and 
dissatisfaction ... It shows itself in the tendency to 
reorganize his personality and his relationship to 
life in ways which are regarded as more mature. 
(Rogers, 1961, p.35).
After studying the types of "relationship" which 
promote improvement, Rogers concluded that there were four 
important factors: the therapist's empathy, unconditional
positive regard, and genuineness, and the client's
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recognition of these qualities in the therapist. The
therapist variables, which have become known as the "core 
conditions" of counselling, were amplified as follows:
"Empathy" refers to the ability of the therapist to 
sense accurately the client's feelings and thoughts and to 
appreciate their significance. "To sense the client's 
private world as if it were your own, but without ever 
losing the "as if" quality - this is empathy" (Rogers, 
1957, p.98).
In showing "unconditional positive regard", the
therapist communicates a positive, non-judgemental, 
acceptance of the client's experience. He is valued as a 
person regardless of any evaluation of his behaviour. "To 
the extent that the therapist finds himself experiencing a 
warm acceptance of each aspect of the client's experience 
as being a part of that client, he is experiencing 
unconditional positive regard" (Rogers, 1957, p.98).
The therapist who is "genuine" expresses only the 
thoughts and feelings which he really has; he does not 
adopt a "professional" manner which disguises his real 
reaction to the client. "The therapist should be, within 
the confines of this relationship, a congruent, genuine, 
integrated person ... within the relationship he is freely 
and deeply himself, with his actual experience accurately 
represented by his awareness of himself" (Rogers, 1957, 
p.97).
While Rogers lists three core conditions, most other 
writers single out empathy in particular as the main
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therapeutic element. Being empathically understood is "the 
principal therapy" (England, 1986, p.24) and "an essential 
part of helping" (Jordan, 1979, p.20).
Most writers who stress the importance of empathy 
claim that there is little or no place for theories from 
the social sciences in social work. Empathy, if accurate, 
gives the therapist an understanding of the client's view 
of his problems; social science theories however provide 
alternative accounts. To a behaviourist, for example, the 
client's feeling of fear is re-classified as a conditioned 
response. A psychoanalyst re-interprets the client's own 
version of his private experiences in the context of 
unconscious processes outside the client's direct 
awareness. Explanations which go beyond the client's own 
account are deemed unnecessary; instead it is claimed that 
the relationship is all-important. Rogers, for instance, 
claims that:
no approach which relies upon knowledge, upon 
training, upon the acceptance of something that is 
taught. is of any use ... If I can provide a certain 
type of relationship, the other person will discover 
within himself the capacity to use that relationship 
for growth, and change and personal development will 
occur. (Rogers, 1961, p.32).
Goldstein also subscribes to the self-healing power of 
people and their ability to find their own solutions. 
Given the right therapeutic relationship, he maintains, 
people "are capable of redefining and resolving the 
obstacles that block the path toward a more rewarding and 
confirming existence" (Goldstein, 1984, p.5).
Ragg (1977) argues that scientific theories are not
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just unnecessary but positively harmful because they 
reformulate the client's thoughts and experiences. They 
replace :
the client's everyday description of his situation. 
The social caseworker understands the client in terms 
of a conceptual framework, the logical structure of 
which is quite foreign to that in which the client 
conceives of himself and his situation, (Ragg, 1977, 
P.77).
Such re-interpretations are damaging, Ragg argues,
because they distract the client and therapist from the
client's own way of thinking of his experience and it is
within his framework, Ragg maintains, that the remedies are
to be found. Clients, he says, must not be re-classified
as "systems" or "sets of psychological forces" i.e. in
terms alien to them. The social worker must stay firmly
within clients' personal views of themselves and their
circumstances, helping them to describe and reflect upon
that experience so that they can possibly see it in a new
and less troublesome way. The client, not the social
sciences, is where to look for understanding:
at the heart of treating people as people is the 
necessity of recognising them as the only source of 
knowledge about what they are trying to do (Ragg, 
1977, p.60, emphasis added).
England also urges social workers to reject the expert 
role offered by their theoretical training in the social 
sciences. He stresses the similarity between ordinary, 
friendly helping and his view of helping in social work: it 
"becomes a matter of "common sense".... social workers 
"understand" others in the way that everyone understands 
the experience of others" (1986, p.33) and (p.38) "the help
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of the social worker is not in significant ways distinct 
from the help that people receive informally."
Jordan (1979) concedes that social workers may use 
other methods or techniques but then says that they must be 
employed within an empathie relationship or "all this 
technique will seem like so much gimmickry" because "if 
the client feels that the worker is simply seeing him in 
terms of a pre-set theoretical framework ... he is unlikely 
to co-operate or benefit" (1979, p.129).
To summarise, these writers claim that the ability to 
empathise is the main skill in social work and an approach 
which re-defines the client's experience is wrong. Our 
empathie skill, they say, offers a source of understanding 
not available to scientists studying the natural world. 
Furthermore, empathy is the therapy; social workers need 
personal skills in making therapeutic relationships, not 
scientific theories which explain human behaviour in 
concepts different from the client's own account.
To this group of writers, social workers may claim 
expertise inasmuch as their ordinary empathie skills are 
particularly well developed. They can also achieve 
understanding not shared by the general population because 
they work with people in unusual or extreme circumstances. 
They can therefore have particular awareness of, for 
example, the experience of coping in extremely deprived 
circumstances, or of how parents feel when they learn that 
their child is severely handicapped. They should not 
however aim at expertise based on theories couched in
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abstract and esoteric terms and tested according to the 
cannons of the natural sciences.
On analysis though, I shall argue, this account of 
social work makes it a very limited service. If empathy is 
indeed the foundation skill then the skills of workers are 
severely restricted, first in terms of the scope of their 
understanding and, secondly,in terms of the effectiveness 
of their help.
THE SCOPE OF EMPATHY
First, let us consider to what extent social workers 
can empathise with their clients. England claims that one 
person's understanding of another is only possible when we 
are able to make a "link" between the other's experience 
and our own:
he (the social worker) only knows the character of his 
client's meaning because he himself knows, in general, 
what it is to experience such mental or emotional 
states and can sensitively extrapolate from 
them (England, 1986, p.28).
But the people social workers try to help often have 
extreme or unusual experiences. Some clients report 
sensations which find no echo in the life of the typical 
social worker - the psychotic experiences of someone with 
schizophrenia for instance. Others may describe 
experiences which resonate with our own to only a limited
degree. Suppose we wish to understand a mother who has
assaulted her child. We may be able to empathise with the
anger and frustration she was feeling at the time. Social
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workers who are also parents may find this particularly 
easy. But can they then empathise with the experience of 
venting that rage on a child by physically attacking him? 
Their own experience would normally be restricted to 
feeling that fury and controlling it. Indeed, this example 
illustrates a pervasive feature of social work: people
often become clients because they are out of the ordinary; 
they are the parents who have lost control, or the 
teenagers who have given into the temptations of crime. 
Relying exclusively on experience shared by clients and 
social workers can only provide a partial understanding.
Another limitation of empathy is that it applies only 
to conscious motivation. Thomas (1979, p.87) points out 
that empathy applies only to mental processes that an 
individual is aware of. It provides no means of 
understanding unconscious processes. Since a belief in the 
influence of the unconscious has been widely accepted by 
social workers, this restriction on understanding cannot be 
acceptable to many.
The scope of empathie understanding has also been 
criticised by philosophers. Nagel (1961) argues that 
reaching an empathie understanding does not satisfy our 
curiosity about someone's actions. In fact Nagel (1961, 
p.484) suggests that empathising does little to answer our 
questions. Returning to the example of the mother who 
injured her child, empathy may help to make her actions 
seem familiar and intelligible to us because, from our own 
experience, we have noticed that anger and frustration go
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with at least a desire to hit out. But knowing that two 
experiences are often correlated does not in itself tell us 
why they tend to occur together; empathie understanding, 
Nagel contends, does not in itself explain anything. 
Suppose we could empathise with the mother, several 
questions would remain; why was she in that state; what 
were its causal antecedents; why could she not control her 
anger as most mothers do, is she likely to harm the child 
again, etc. And yet these seems crucial questions for 
social workers if they are to help her and to decide
whether it is safe for the child to stay at home.
Even if an empathie relationship has the therapeutic 
power that these writers claim and, through it, the woman 
will eventually be helped to resolve her own difficulties, 
empathy is not enough to meet the statutory 
responsibilities of social workers. First, the social
worker is involved because society condemns child abuse;
there is no guarantee that the client will share these 
standards or that her own resolution of her problems will 
include better care for her child. Secondly, the social
worker has to make a judgement about the safety of the
child at present. All therapies take time and it may be 
too dangerous to leave the child at home while they are 
carried out.
Understanding of any kind is only a means to an end in 
social work - the primary goal is to help people. As the 
foundation for making decisions and acting, empathy is
severely limited, leaving unanswered any questions about
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causal processes outside the conscious knowledge of the 
client.
Can a case be made for saying that empathy is at least
a necessary skill in social work?
At first sight this seems plausible because writers of
all theoretical persuasions emphasise beginning a social
work assessment by understanding the client's view of his
difficulties. Butrym, for instance who recommends a
psychodynamic approach, stresses:
the importance of personalised helping within which 
both proper understanding can be gained and due 
attention given to the subjective experiences of those 
who have a problem (Butrym, 1979, p.89).
Hudson and Mcdonald, in their textbook on behavioural
social work, also emphasise the point:
contrary to the impressions of some critics of our 
orientation, behavioural social workers begin by 
listening carefully to the client....the client should 
be encouraged to give as much detail about it (her 
problem) as she is able (Hudson and Mcdonald, 1986,
p.62) .
But the apparent unanimity of authors is questionable 
because of the ambiguity of the term "understand" when 
applied to human actions, leaving it unclear whether all or 
only some writers are saying that empathie understanding is 
necessary.
England (1986, p.28) explicitly states that this
understanding involves empathy; social workers can only
understand if they have had similar experiences:
he (the social worker) understands confusion not 
because he has experienced this confusion but because 
he has been confused; he understands loss, depression 
or love because of his own experience of loss, 
depression or love. This is a necessary condition of 
all human understanding.
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It is more plausible however to claim the reverse: 
that social workers can only empathise if they can 
understand. Winch is a philosopher famous for arguing that 
the social sciences need to understand people's own 
perception of their actions, a point similar to the 
consensus view in social work that helpers must begin by 
understanding the client's view of the problem. However, 
in analysing this understanding. Winch gives empathy a 
secondary role.
The argument rests on the issue of how social workers 
are to recognise that they have had a similar experience to 
the client's, that their loss, although not identical, is 
comparable to the inner sensations the client has. Winch 
contends (1958, p.119) that learning the language is the 
primary task. To make the comparison, we first have to be 
able to describe experiences, to identify what the client 
is experiencing before we can determine which, if any, of 
our own experiences are comparable. Thus, to return to 
England's example, to empathise with someone's loss, we 
first need to understand the meaning of the word loss and 
identify that this is what the client is feeling before we 
can turn to our own experience and decide whether we have 
had a similar sensation. Only then are we in a position to 
empathise.
On this analysis of understanding other people, 
empathy is not necessary nor indeed is it possible until we 
already have some understanding. To understand a client.
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social workers need to understand the language in which he 
reports his experience and this is possible even if they 
have not shared that experience. I can understand that a 
client is experiencing auditory hallucinations or feels 
that his thoughts are being controlled by some outside 
force without knowing how this feels.
Empathy then has very limited scope. If social 
workers could only understand and help clients with whom 
they can empathise, they would be able to provide only a 
narrow service but, I have argued, it is not an essential 
element in understanding the client.
The limitations of empathy become even more apparent 
when we consider the evidence on its effectiveness as a 
therapy.
THE POWER OF EMPATHIC THERAPY
Rogers claims that a relationship which contains his 
three core conditions is sufficient for effective helping. 
Empathy, non-judgemental warmth, and genuineness are, he 
says, the "necessary and sufficient conditions of 
therapeutic personality change" (Rogers, 1957). What 
evidence is there to support such claims about the power of 
empathy?
The main appeal from social work writers is to our own 
experience. "We can recognise this in our own experiences 
of seeking help" says Jordan (1979, p.21). "We know from 
our own experience that this is a necessary attribute of 
the helping person", claims England (1986, p.24). And,
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indeed, I expect that most people can think of occasions 
when such empathie understanding did seem to make it easier 
to cope with a problem or think of a way of tackling it.
The lesser claim that the therapeutic relationship is 
important though not sufficient receives widespread 
support.
Both behaviourists and psychoanalysts, for example, 
have accepted that the quality of the relationship 
influences the effectiveness of their particular 
techniques. Freud (1912) held that, for psychotherapy to 
work effectively, the therapist needed to form a "working 
alliance" with patients. This alliance, he thought, was 
based on patients recognising that the therapist was 
understanding and well disposed towards them. If patients 
experienced warm and positive feelings from the therapist, 
Freud suggested, they were more likely to respond well 
whatever therapy was being used. Similar views are found 
in behavioural textbooks where a positive relationship is 
seen as important in helping communication and motivating 
the patient in therapy (e.g. Hawton et al, 1989, p.5).
The claim that empathie understanding is sufficient 
however is far more controversial. An appeal to our own 
experience is less successful here when one considers the 
severity and complexity of clients' problems. But, 
unusually for a group who are mainly opposed to scientific 
research in social work, these writers appeal to research 
evidence to support their claims.
Rogers himself differs from most of his supporters in
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believing that empirical research is essential for 
developing effective therapeutic services and is therefore 
to be encouraged. Most of the research has studied his 
hypothesis that the relationship is therapeutically 
sufficient. If he is right, this has the implications that 
the long training required by other therapeutic approaches 
is unnecessary and that their often bitter rivalries are 
irrelevant in terms of outcome. This contentious claim 
has been investigated in several studies.
The first requirement was to find a way of measuring 
the three "core conditions", namely empathy, unconditional 
positive regard, and genuineness. Truax and Carkhuff 
(1967) developed rating scales which independent assessors 
could be trained to use in a consistent way. These are the 
scales most widely used.
The research studied people receiving psychotherapy, 
not social work clients. Most research has been not on 
client centred therapy itself but on the associated claim 
that, whatever method being used, therapists who score 
highly on the core conditions would be more successful than 
their low-scoring colleagues.
The first reports on the research indicated that the 
hypothesis was supported. In a review of 14 studies, Truax 
and Mitchell (1971) concluded that Rogers' hypothesis had 
been strongly corroborated. Moreover, therapists who 
scored badly on the core conditions seemed to harm their 
patients, having a higher rate of deterioration. These 
results seemed to offer strong support to the claim that
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the core conditions were of major therapeutic importance.
These positive conclusions are often cited by social 
workers as evidence for their preferred way of working 
(e.g. Goldstein (1973, p.67), England, (1986, p.24), and 
Howe (1987, p.5)) . But they do not take account of the 
fact that these apparent confirmations were quickly 
disputed and serious doubt cast on their reliability.
On closer analysis, it was argued, the studies did 
not provide the strong corroboration that Truax and 
Mitchell had claimed. As Garfield and Bergin (1978, 
p.245) tactfully expressed it, Truax and Mitchell 
“de-emphasized findings that did not coincide with those 
predicted by Rogers' hypothesis." For example, Rogers 
claims that all 3 conditions are necessary but the studies 
did not bear this out. Indeed in some cases, low levels of 
one condition were associated with improved outcome. A 
study of 40 hospitalised people with schizophrenia found 
that those whose therapist showed low levels of genuineness 
improved more than those who exhibited high levels (Truax, 
Carkhuff, and Kodman, 1965).
In 1973, Mitchell published a reanalysis of the 14 
studies concluding that the evidence in favour of Rogers' 
hypothesis was much weaker than he had first judged. His 
original claim that Rogers' theory was strongly supported 
by the results is unwarranted in the light of the following 
statistics. In measuring the correlation between each core 
condition and patient outcome, he reported that of 109 
correlations between empathy and outcome, only 24
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correlations were significantly positive, of 108 
correlations between warmth and success, 34 were 
significantly positive, and, in relation to genuineness, 26 
out of 88 correlations were found to be positive. Moreover 
in 6 cases, genuineness was found to be negatively 
correlated with success.
Later research continued to produce conflicting 
results. Some studies provided some support for Rogers' 
theory; others found a correlation between only one of the
core conditions and therapeutic success; some found no
correlation. In a further review in 1977, Mitchell reaches 
an even more subdued conclusion:
the recent evidence, although equivocal, does seem to 
suggest that empathy, warmth, and genuineness are 
related in some way to client change but that their 
potency and generalizabi1ity are not as great as once 
thought. (Mitchell, 1977, p.481.)
Research interest in Roger' hypotheses has waned as 
the evidence seems to be against them. Some conclusions 
though are generally agreed to have been demonstrated by 
the evidence. The strong claim that a relationship
containing the three core conditions is sufficient for
therapeutic success is disconfirmed by the evidence. Even 
the claim that they are a necessary condition is not 
corroborated but it does seem plausible to claim that their 
presence may increase the chances of improvement, whatever 
the theoretical orientation of the therapist.
In view of this evidence, one can conclude that social 
workers' empathie skill may be valuable in increasing their
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therapeutic effectiveness but, on its own, it offers a very 
limited way of helping people.
INTUITION
Although many humanist writers in social work stress 
the central importance of empathie understanding, it does 
not carry such weight in practice. As my review of current 
social work methods showed, most fieldworkers do more than 
empathise with clients' experiences; they try to explain 
the problems in terms of factors outside the conscious 
awareness of clients. But, for the most part, their 
reasoning is intuitive; their "practice wisdom" is rarely 
explicitly stated. Curnock and Hardiker's (1979) analysis 
of social work assessments and social enquiry reports 
found that social workers generally report the client's 
point of view but go beyond it in their explanations. 
Social science theories, although not used in an explicit, 
systematic way, are influential as evidenced by reports in 
which social forces or unconscious processes are cited as 
significant causes of the client's current plight.
In the discussion of training, it was noted that 
students make a personal choice of which elements of their 
training to accept. This freedom continues in
fieldwork. Individual workers are in general responsible 
for judging the accuracy of their assessments of clients, 
deciding how to help, and evaluating their efforts.
Most social workers approve of the present state of 
affairs. They consider that social work should be based on
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the personal, subjective form of understanding contained In 
practice wisdom. "It feels right," "It makes sense to me," 
"It works for me" are the type of comments fleldworkers use 
to describe their reasons for accepting an explanation.
This Individual approach has been criticised on several 
counts. For Instance, It offers no way of building up a 
public knowledge base In social work and enabling one 
social worker's Insights to be shared with others. But the 
most serious criticisms concern Its reliability and the 
quality of the social work service It produces. Is the 
practice wisdom of fleldworkers really wise or only the 
embodiment of their personal values, prejudices, and 
misguided beliefs?
The poor reliability of Individual social work 
judgement was demonstrated In Chapter Two In examining the 
results of evaluative studies mainly carried out In the 
U.S.A. Social workers In the 1950s and 60s had used and 
refined methods of working which they confidently believed 
were very effective. Their personal evaluations of their 
work were very positive but controlled trials failed to 
corroborate their optimism.
More detailed Information about the defects In the 
current style of working can be obtained from the public 
Inquiries Into child abuse tragedies. Before looking at 
these, some points need to be made about their 
significance.
First, social workers do not carry all the 
responsibility for protecting children nor are they solely
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to blame for these tragedies. Several other professions 
are involved and the most important decisions are made by 
the courts. However, as Blom-Cooper commented in the 
Beckford Report, of which he was Chairman, (1985, p.14), 
social workers are very influential: they make assessments
and recommendations and "research suggests that such 
recommendations are likely to be acted upon".
Secondly, no-one should expect social workers to be 
infallible; whether or not they use scientific methods, 
there will be occasions when the decision which looks best 
on the available evidence turns out to be wrong. However, 
these inquiries were held because it was thought that 
social workers, and others involved, made unreasonable 
decisions given the evidence that was available and that 
they should have considered. The Beckford Report (1985, 
p.287) concludes that Jasmine Beckford's death was "both a 
predictable and a preventible homicide". The Carlile 
inquiry reached a similar judgement: "we conclude that
Kimberley Carlile's death was avoidable through the 
intervention of welfare agencies" (1987, p.216).
An examination of the inquiry reports, I shall argue, 
reveals that the recurrent criticisms of fieldworkers made 
in them can be linked to the dominant non-scientific 
approach; the mistakes and oversights are not instances of 
unusually bad practice but of unusually tragic consequences 
flowing from the standard style of working.
For example, the difficulty fieldworkers generally 
have in being explicit about their work caused problems at
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all stages. A D.H.S.S. (1982) review of the 19 child abuse 
inquiry reports published between 1973 and 1981 found
several common criticisms relating to this. Fieldworkers 
were criticised because of the frequent absence of 
sufficiently comprehensive written assessments (1982, 
p.39), making it difficult for others to know on what they 
were basing their subsequent work, or to check the accuracy 
of their judgements. The lack of clear plans and goals was 
also a recurrent criticism leading to problems in 
supervising and evaluating their interventions and to 
difficulties in co-operating with the many other 
professions involved with the families. The Beckford 
Report (1985) also found fault on this issue, particularly 
commenting on the failure of the social worker involved to 
formulate her goals. If she had done so, the report
considered, her seniors might have been able to see that
she was focusing entirely on the parents' welfare and that
she did not have the goal of protecting Jasmine.
Testing their intuitive judgements was another area 
where social workers were criticised by the inquiry 
reports. The standard scientific concerns for the range of 
evidence and its reliability were overlooked, producing 
judgements which were wrong and which would have been 
challenged by easily available evidence. Fieldworkers 
placed undue reliance on the judgements they reached in 
interviews with the families without subjecting them to 
further test.
The 1987 inquiry into the death of Kimberley Carlile
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provides a clear example of this fault. The family had
recently moved into Greenwich and the Social Services
Department had been informed by the previous local
authority that there were concerns about the children's
welfare. In visits to the family, social workers had not
been allowed to see Kimberley. After receiving allegations
of child abuse from neighbours, the Team Manager, Mr.
Ruddock, wrote to the parents stressing the need for the
children to be seen and examined. The whole family then
came, unexpectedly, to the social services department where
Mr. Ruddock interviewed them. As a result of this
interview, Mr. Ruddock's concerns, though not removed
entirely, were reduced to the extent that he did not call a
case conference or treat further investigation and
intervention as urgent. He told the inquiry of his
assessment of the family's behaviour:
it was almost an archetype for a happy family scene 
... I therefore could not have been more reassured by 
the family dynamics than I was by this overall display 
on this occasion" (Carlile, 1987, p.111).
Three months later, without having been seen again by
a social worker, Kimberley was killed by her stepfather.
The medical examination revealed that she had been tortured
and starved for several weeks.
The social worker acknowledged how wrong his
assessment of the family had been, telling the inquiry:
the huge disparity between these very powerful and 
compelling presentations of positive behaviour and 
what we now know to have been the underlying reality 
is difficult to explain or analyse, and my experience 
here may be a useful lesson to others faced with this 
type of problem (Carlile, 1987, p.112).
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But the inaccuracy of his judgement is not only 
apparent with hindsight; there was plenty of evidence at 
the time to undermine such an optimistic assessment. If 
the social worker had checked his judgement by looking for 
a wider range of evidence, he would have learned several 
worrying details: the fact that this was a newly formed
family, the mother had been in prison, the children in 
foster homes outside London, the stepfather was a new 
boyfriend, all previous ones having been violent. In these 
circumstances, the inquiry report commented, even the most 
mature people would have difficulty in establishing a happy 
family so quickly. Moreover, the parents had failed to take 
Kimberley to medical appointments and refused the offer of 
a nursery place for her; keeping the child out of public 
view is a known danger sign. A medical examination would 
have found signs of the ill-treatment Kimberley was 
receiving at this time. A less complacent attitude to the 
impression the family made in one interview would have led 
Mr. Ruddock to make further inquiries and he would have 
quickly found evidence challenging that first favourable 
impression.
Besides being satisfied by a narrow range of evidence, 
social workers were criticised for failing to judge the 
reliability of the evidence. Bias is a major concern in 
scientific research and, in child abuse, two common sources 
of bias are the family and social workers themselves. 
Parents who are abusing their children have strong motives 
for concealing the truth from social workers. And yet
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inquiries have found social workers trusting parents
to an excessive degree. The Beckford Report (1985, p.116)
criticises the social worker on this score:
this expression of trust in what she was told by 
Beverley Lorrington (the child's mother) both about 
herself and the children permeated every aspect of Ms. 
WahlStrom'S work. She was, fatally, much too willing 
to believe everything "her clients" (the Beckford 
parents) told her.
The D.H.S.S. (1982, p.36) review of 19 inquiry reports 
offers several other examples where social workers showed 
undue confidence in information from families to the extent 
that they failed to check it by considering other evidence 
that was available, and so produced quite erroneous 
assessments.
Social workers themselves are also a source of bias; 
their emotional reactions to clients and their hopes that 
their efforts are being successful can significantly alter 
their judgements. In evidence to the Beckford Inquiry, this 
point was made. Professor Greenland commented that "the 
loss of objectivity is a common factor in the management of 
high risk cases" (Beckford, 1985, p.217). It was apparent 
in the care of Jasmine Beckford: "as soon as the social
workers thought they saw the first signs of improved 
conduct on the part of Morris Beckford and Beverley 
Lorrington, an overweening optimism took hold" 
(Beckford,1985, p.127). The Malcolm Page Report (1981, 
3.63) also criticised the social workers for not noticing 
evidence of failure:
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there were strong indications that the treatment plan 
was failing ... the signs were there ... to read but
they were not interpreted and did not lead to a
critical examination of the treatment plan and of the 
options available.
The widespread indifference among social workers to
empirical research was also apparent in these inquiries. 
Failure to know or use research on the risk factors of 
child abuse was noted in several reports, adversely 
affecting their outcome. Social workers failed to 
recognise the significance of evidence which research had 
shown to be associated with child abuse. The repeated minor 
injuries of Maria Mehmedagi, associated with poor
development and a poor parent/child relationship, should 
have alerted her social worker to the strong possibility 
that she was being abused (D.H.S.S., 1982, p.29).
The Beckford Report (1985) criticised both the 
fieldworker and her senior for not knowing the research 
literature on child abuse. For example. Jasmine's weight 
chart provided a textbook example of the association 
between children's growth and their exposure to persistent 
abuse; she was underweight while cared for by her parents, 
growing towards the normal range while in foster care, and 
returning again to an abnormally low weight when returned 
to her parents. Her social workers, not appreciating the 
significance of her weight, thought that she was being 
adequately cared for.
The criticisms of social work practice that are so 
clearly highlighted in the child abuse cases but which are 
also more generally applicable are not directed at
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intuitive reasoning tout court. I am not suggesting that 
social workers should stop making intuitive judgements. 
The criticisms are of the way these judgements are used. 
Social workers show too much confidence in their immediate, 
intuitive appraisals based often only on personal 
interviews. They fail to treat them as tentative 
hypotheses which need to be formulated clearly and then 
subjected to testing.
This is a lesson that has been learned to some extent 
in one area: the accusation that they may be racist and
that racist prejudices may be distorting work with black 
clients has caused social workers to feel doubtful about 
their intuitive knowledge and to subject it to critical 
appraisal. Few social workers consciously hold racist 
views but, it is claimed, their intuitive reasoning can be 
distorted by false beliefs about other cultures. Their 
reasoning draws on the background knowledge acquired 
through their life but they have mainly been brought up in 
Britain, a pre-dominantly white society with an imperial 
history and a strong tradition of feeling superior to black 
people. Their "folk psychology" therefore will probably 
contain many assumptions which reflect these racist 
prejudices.
To support this claim, critics cite statistics about 
the treatment of black people by the social services. 
Black offenders have been found to be under-represented 
among people on Probation Orders but over-represented in 
the prison population (Whitehouse, 1978), leading the
157
author to question what assumptions were being made by the 
Probation Officers who wrote the relevant social enquiry 
reports. Others have noted the unusually large number of 
black children who are taken into care (Cheetham, 1982,
17), suggesting that social work assessments may be 
distorted by racist judgements of the inadequacy of black 
parents.
On the issue of racism at least many social workers 
have been led to question the accuracy of their immediate 
intuition. The evidence of the statistical data suggests 
that the accusations of racism may have some truth but this 
is very unsettling and difficult to deal with for social 
workers who place such high value on their implicit wisdom. 
It implies that their folk psychology, instead of being a 
reservoir of sound commonsense wisdom, is tainted by false 
beliefs and prejudices. However the evidence I have
presented here shows that it is not only in relation to 
racism that their intuitive reasoning can be faulty.
SOCIAL WORK AS ART
Among humanist writers, only England (1986) gives much 
attention to the question of the reliability of empathy and 
intuition. He shares the naturalists' concerns about the 
effectiveness current social work methods, saying that 
social work:
should try harder to be precise; social workers have 
not developed any adequate tradition of intellectual 
scrutiny and criticism, and their thinking - in the
job and in writing - is often lazy (England, 1986,
P .6) .
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Again like the advocates of science, England argues 
that the first step in rectifying this fault is to 
encourage social workers to make their reasoning explicit 
so that it is open to criticism and evaluation by others. 
He would like to see them writing up detailed case studies 
explaining the understanding they reached and why.
But for England scientific methods have no role in 
appraising these case studies. Social work training, he 
claims, must teach students: "why scientific credentials
are both impossible and inappropriate for their [social 
workers'] task" (England, 1986, p.132). Instead, he
maintains, social workers should look to the arts not the 
sciences for their exemplar; literary criticism rather than 
experimental research is the model for evaluating social 
work. In the way that literary critics evaluate the 
coherence and plausibility of a novel, fellow social 
workers can examine case studies and judge the adequacy of 
fieldworkers' understanding of their clients. Drawing on 
their own experience, other social workers may notice 
biasses or omissions in the intuitive reasoning.
England's proposals are not new. Such peer review is 
valued by most social workers to a degree, as is evidenced 
by the established practices of supervision and case 
discussions. It has also been respected in publications. 
For instance, the Almoner, a journal for hospital social 
workers, in the 1940s and 50s carried a regular column 
for social workers to send accounts of their work and, in 
subsequent weeks, others sent in critical comments.
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But why does England regard the only useful forms of 
criticism and evaluation to be the opinions of other social 
workers, ruling out so emphatically the standard testing 
procedures of science? His claim appears to have some 
plausibility at first glance because he presents the reader 
with a choice between behaviourism as the scientific 
approach and empathie understanding as the way social 
workers understand the feelings and thoughts of clients. I 
argued earlier that equating science with behaviourism in 
the social realm is a fallacy. And England shows awareness 
and indeed acceptance of this conclusion. He proceeds to 
argue that the social sciences resemble social work in that 
they need to study people's subjective experiences 
(England, 1986, p.78). However he does not then reexamine 
his reasons for rejecting science although his initial 
arguments are only directed against behaviourism. But once 
science is not equated with behaviourism the initial 
plausibility of his position is destroyed.
"INTELLIGIBILITY" NOT "TRUTH"
Another defence of social workers' rejection of 
scientific methods has recently been offered in the context 
of advocating psychoanalytic theories (e.g. Yellolly, 1980, 
and Pearson et al, 1988).
When American social workers first proposed 
psychoanalytic theories as an appropriate base for social 
work in the 1920s, they did so because they agreed with
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Freud's own view that psychoanalysis was a science and
moreover a successful one. In the light of the poor
results of experimental evaluations of psychoanalysis,
these assumptions now look dubious, creating a serious
problem for analysts and their supporters. One response
has been to argue that psychoanalysis Is not a science and
therefore should not be judged by the criteria against
which It has fared so badly. Instead, It Is suggested,
psychoanalysis should be seen as a "hermeneutic" discipline
In the humanist tradition, blending Into our folk
psychology. When analysts offer an Interpretation of
patients' experiences, their aim Is not to "explain" them
In a scientific sense but to present a new way of looking
at them which analysands may find leads to a new, richer,
and more satisfactory understanding. If analysis helps. It
Is not that It provides patients with a true understanding
but a more comfortable one. According to this view,
analytic theories should not be judged as true or false but
as helpful or unhelpful. Yellolly, drawing on this new
account of psychoanalysis, explains:
from this point of view, psychoanalytic 
Interpretations are neither true nor false; their 
justification lies entirely In their subjective 
significance for the patient, and whether for him they 
make sense. In that they present his experience to him 
In a new and revealing light (Yellolly, 1980, p.160).
This re-classlficatlon contradicts Freud's own view
that his work was scientific but Habermas, a leading
exponent, claims that Freud's judgement was excessively
Influenced by the dominant, positivist culture of his time.
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leading him to claim mistakenly that his theories met the
prevailing standards of scientific knowledge:
because Freud was caught from the very beginning in a 
scientistic self-understanding, he succumbed to an 
objectivism that regresses immediately from the level 
of self-reflection to contemporary positivism in the 
manner of Mach [Ernest Mach, the philosopher) and that 
therefore takes on a particularly crude form. 
(Habermas, 1971, p.252).
The "hermeneutic” defence of psychoanalysis replaces 
the scientific concepts of truth and probability with that
of "intelligibility". Interpretations are judged by
whether they "make sense", whether they are "helpful". 
This approach will look very familiar to social workers who 
already use these criteria. But who is to make the 
judgement of helpfulness and how can we settle disputes if 
judgements about interpretations differ?
Habermas' solution is to assert that it is the 
analysand not the analyst who is the ultimate arbiter: 
"analytic insights possess validity for the analyst only 
after they have been accepted by the analysand himself" 
(Habermas, 1971, p.261).
This answer however poses a problem for social 
workers. Unlike analysts they are not usually urged to 
adopt analytic theories in order to provide therapy; 
analysis is a lengthy process and it is not generally 
considered feasible to provide it within the work demands 
of a social work agency. Analytic theories are mainly 
recommended as a source of explanation for social workers 
to use in understanding clients. Yellolly (1980, p.162) 
makes a typical claim:
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Freud's theories are a rich source of hypotheses In 
regard to the dynamics of behaviour and the 
development of personality.... As an action theory for 
social work, however. It has less value.
Pearson et al. also make this distinction:
"psychoanalytic understanding has a relevance to social
work practice which should not be confused with therapy"
(Pearson, 1988, p.45). Its value, they say, lies In
offering social workers an understanding of their clients'
experiences, when working with: "Individuals and families
who are facing periods of painful transition In their
lives, through Illness, handicapping conditions or old age;
both children and adults who are experiencing loss, either
through bereavement or separation; and families who are
suffering severe Interpersonal conflict or disruption In
family life.
It Is precisely in these areas of difficulty that 
social workers need to draw upon the understanding 
which can be derived from psychoanalytic thinking 
(Pearson, 1988, p.44).
How though are social workers to judge the accuracy of 
their understanding If they are not offering their 
Interpretations to the clients for their verdict? Unlike 
the analysts In the hermeneutic school, social workers 
cannot depend on the client's judgement about whether It Is 
helpful but must. It seems, rely on their own judgement. 
Their conjectures about the experience of the client would 
then be accepted If they were helpful to the social worker; 
their justification would H e  In their "subjective 
significance" to the fieldworker rather than to the person 
whose experience Is being understood. Studies of current
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practice, cited in the last chapter, suggest that this is 
the way that social workers have been using psychoanalytic 
theories and indeed all other theories anyway.
These recent advocates of Freudian theories seem to 
give most weight to social workers' feeling that they 
understand their clients; questions about the validity of 
that understanding or the benefits to clients are not 
raised or regarded as irrelevant. Indeed Pearson et al. 
concede that psychoanalysis has not been supported by the 
research evidence: "Whenever psychoanalytical theory and
therapy has been put to the test of experimental scrutiny 
it tends not to fare very well" (1988, p.18). But these 
empirical results do not deter them from recommending 
analytic theories to social workers. They do so not 
because they think the theories are true or the therapy 
effective but because they think social workers will find 
them helpful in the sense that they enable workers to fee 1 
that they understand the complex world of the client.
Pearson quotes Freud (1927, p.253) approvingly for 
saying that his ambition in developing his theories was not 
so much "to help suffering humanity" but "to understand 
something of the riddles of the world in which we live." 
Leaving aside the point that, unlike Pearson, Freud wanted 
to "understand" in a scientific sense, his aim looks 
inappropriate for social work. For social workers surely 
the priorities must be the other way around; their
professional duty is undoubtedly "to help suffering 
humanity."
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Moreover, as these authors accept, social workers' 
understanding does not just lead to a personal sense of 
comprehension but influences the decisions they make about 
clients. They are not private psychotherapists; most are 
employees in statutory services with extensive duties and 
legal powers. If social workers use psychoanalytic 
theories - as, for example, Pearson recommends - to help 
them understand "families who are suffering interpersonal 
conflict", they may then use that understanding in their 
statutory role perhaps to make decisions about the welfare 
of the children. A Freudian rather than an Adlerian 
interpretation of a mother's behaviour may tip the balance 
in deciding whether a child returns home or stays with 
foster parents. The criterion of "subjective significance" 
looks inadequate in this context when an interpretation 
influences decisions and actions which can have such major 
impact on others.
Social workers' understanding has public consequences 
and therefore the accuracy of their understanding is also 
of public significance.
CONCLUSION
Social workers at present rely heavily on their 
empathie and intuitive skills to understand and help 
clients. Some claim that empathy should be the central 
skill of social work, essential both as a means of 
understanding and as a therapy. I have criticised this 
point of view for leading to a very impoverished account of
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social work. Our ability to empathise with clients Is 
markedly limited and research evidence Indicates the 
weakness of empathy as the sole therapy.
Most social workers use more than empathy; they use 
"practice wisdom", an Implicit set of Ideas incorporating 
folk psychology, insights gained from experience, and 
elements of their theoretical training. This wisdom is 
used intuitively, that is, their reasoning is largely 
Informal. The plausibility of explanations Is judged by 
the Individual, using criteria such as "it feels right" or 
"it makes sense to me." Since this practice wisdom Is 
rarely made explicit. It is difficult to criticise and 
evaluate in detail. Its results though, the decisions and 
actions of social workers, can be evaluated; research and 
the public inquiries Into child abuse tragedies demonstrate 
Its poor reliability while the Inquiry reports Illustrate 
the tragic consequences of social workers' mistakes.
In this chapter, I have not challenged the use of 
Intuitive reasoning In Itself but rather the confidence 
social workers place in it. They rely heavily on their 
personal and immediate judgements of people, not 
recognising how limited and possibly biassed is the 
evidence on which they are reasoning, nor appreciating the 
need to check their judgements.
If social workers are to develop more reliable and 
effective ways of helping their clients, they must give up
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their present contentment with empathy and intuition based 
on a narrow and biassed range of evidence. They need to 
make their intuitive wisdom explicit and subject it to 
independent tests; they need to use scientific methods.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
WHAT COUNTS AS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE?
INTRODUCTION
Having criticised the non-scientific methods of 
appraisal preferred by most social workers at present, let 
me now consider their arguments against using the standard 
means of testing employed in the natural sciences.
Scientists test theories against the empirical 
evidence. They deduce observation statements from a theory 
and then, through experiment, ascertain whether those 
statements are true or false, whether the world conforms to 
the picture predicted by the theory. In the debate about 
using such methods of testing in the social sciences, the 
dominant issue has been what counts as empirical evidence 
in the social and psychological realms.
In social work, the long-standing debate has been 
between humanists and behaviourists. Both sides have 
accepted a positivist philosophy of science which leads to 
the conclusion that only reports about behaviour not mental 
phenomena constitute empirical evidence. Humanists have 
then argued that such evidence does not provide an adequate 
test of psychological theories. Satisfactory evidence, 
they claim, must be psychological and, to collect this, we 
need to use our empathie and intuitive skills, not just the 
observation skills said to be used in the natural sciences.
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Recently however this classic debate has been thrown 
into confusion by developments in the philosophy of 
science. There is widespread awareness that the positivist 
view of science has been discredited and that there is 
therefore a need to re-appraise the dispute in social work 
and the research practices which have been based on this 
philosophy.
There is however disagreement about the implications of 
these philosophical changes in social work. Two radically 
different philosophies have been proposed as the 
replacement for positivism, leading to conflicting views on 
the potential role of scientific methods in social work.
On the one hand, some challenge the status of science. 
They argue that if the positivist account of science is 
false then so is any claim that science is empirical, i.e. 
that theories can be tested against the independent 
evidence of our sense experience. If science is not 
empirical then, they argue, it is not superior to the 
humanist ways of reasoning. Adopting a relativist 
position, they claim that scientific method is no more 
valid than any other form of reasoning, or, perhaps more 
accurately, there are no means of adjudicating between 
them. Therefore, science should no longer be held up as a 
model to social workers and they should be allowed to 
continue uncriticised in their humanist tradition.
On the other hand, some, including myself, argue for a 
broader, empiricist view of scientific methods which 
bridges the gap between the two sides in the science 
dispute. This empiricist philosophy does not equate 
empirical with behavioural and so leads to a research
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methodology which avoids the objections levelled by 
humanists at positivist research.
In this chapter I shall present and defend this 
position. I begin by surveying the philosophical 
discussions that have led In recent years to the social 
work re-assessment of positivist research. The first 
section examines the criticisms of social work research 
which. It Is alleged, are due to researchers' acceptance of 
a positivist research methodology. The nature of this 
methodology Is described before assessing the validity of 
the criticisms levelled at It. The following section looks 
at the criticism which has most weight - that the 
Insistence on behavioural evidence to test psychological 
theories placed a severe constraint on research. I examine 
the ways researchers thought this requirement could be met 
before turning to criticisms of positivism Itself. Despite 
general agreement that this philosophy of science Is 
wrong. It will be Instructive to examine Its faults to 
understand the present controversies about what should 
replace It. The next section argues against the 
relativist's claim that there Is no Independent evidence 
with which to test theories. The final part proposes the 
revised, empiricist view on evidence and discusses Its 
Implications for social work research.
POSITIVISM AND SOCIAL WORK RESEARCH
While many of the new critics of social work research 
support a scientific approach, they question the way this 
has been attempted. Labelling the traditional research
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methods "positivist", they condemn them for leading to 
research which has failed to address the important issues 
in social work. Weick (1987) claims that researchers have 
been "either solving the wrong problem or solving a problem 
not worth solving". Another critic, Heineman complains 
that ;
in a misguided attempt to be scientific, social work 
has adopted an outmoded, overly restrictive paradigm 
of research. Methodological rather than substantive 
requirements determine the subject matter to be 
studied. As a result, important questions and 
valuable data go unresearched (Heineman, 1981, p.515).
Research has been particularly restricted, it is
alleged, by the demand that theories must be tested by
quant if iable data. Researchers are accused of thinking that
measurement is so important in science that they have
allowed "measurability" to be the criterion for deciding
what should be studied, and in the process have overlooked
urgent social problems which cannot be dealt with in this
way and so have ignored the needs of fieldworkers.
Ruckdeschel and Farris (1982, p.275) complain that
positivist researchers "have made a ritual of measurement
and therefore cannot answer the questions that are relevant
for effective practice." Heineman also believes
positivism demands that variables be quantifiable and this
has handicapped research:
this requirement that concepts be definable by 
quantitative measurement operations has significantly 
restricted the scope and nature of the questions 
studied in current social work research (Heineman, 
1981, p.373).
Positivism has also been blamed for leading 
researchers to concentrate on the results of social work 
intervention and giving little attention to the process of
171
helping. Smith complains that because of adherence to a
postivist methodology the large-scale controlled trials
carried out in social work suffered "from the serious
limitation that it is impossible to tell what the outcomes
were outcomes of" (1987, p.406).
Another criticism is that research has concentrated on
overt behaviour, overlooking the individual's subjective
world, Ruckdeschel and Farris complain that:
a major shortcoming of many measures and concepts used 
by researchers is that they lack a relationship to the 
perspective of the actors (in this case, the clients) 
within the studied reality (1981, p.417).
Positivist research, they maintain, studies "a
manipulable object" whereas they want to understand a
"communicating and intentional subject" (1981, p.418), a
point of view most fieldworkers share.
The persistent call is for "qualitative" rather than
"quantitative" research. Allen-Meares and Lane (1990)
summarise the contrasting assumptions of these two views of
research. The quantitative model depicts "research as only
empirical, objective data collection associated with
experimental and quasi-experimental knowledge-building
designs" (1990, p.452). The qualitative model, on the
other hand, aims : "to understand and record sensitively the
subjective perspectives and interpretive processes of
individual subjects in situations" (1990, p.454). The
latter reflects the typical fieldworker's concern with the
subjective experiences of clients and, its supporters
argue, can succeed where the quantitative model has failed
to produce research on the issues that really matter to
social workers.
To determine which of the criticisms now being
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levelled at social work research can fairly be blamed on
positivism, I shall first clarify the implications the 
positivist philosophy of science had for research 
methodology in the social sciences.
First a general point: empirical evidence in science
is provided in the form of observation statements. 
Scientific reasoning, whether deductive or inductive,
involves relationships between sets of statements, not 
between statements on the one hand and perceptual 
experiences on the other. A deterministic theory is tested 
by deducing observation statements from it. The role of 
observation is to enable the scientist to decide whether a
particular observation statement is true or false, so
testing the accuracy of the theory from which it has been 
inferred.
The positivist account of science made a sharp 
distinction between theoretical and observation terms. At 
the intuitive level, there is a clear difference between 
the statements "this child has blue eyes" and "this child 
is suffering from maternal deprivation." To describe the 
eyes as "blue" is to refer to a property the presence of 
which we can verify uncontroversially by direct 
observation. Moreover, if several of us look at the child, 
we can usually agree whether or not his eyes are blue. To a 
positivist, "blue" would be an observation term, meeting 
the definition provided by Carnap (1953, p.367), a leading 
positivist, that observation terms correspond to an 
observable quality whose presence or absence can be 
established by observers in a relatively short time and 
with a high degree of agreement.
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Statements about "maternal deprivation", on the other 
hand, cannot be checked so easily. Understanding the 
meaning of the term requires some knowledge of the 
psychological theory in which it occurs; to decide whether 
or not a child is maternally deprived is a difficult 
process and one which, in the current state of development 
of the theory, is likely to be controversial. Terms like 
this were classified by the positivists as "theoretical".
The positivists maintained that because the truth or 
falsity of observation statements could be established by 
sense experience alone such statements provided the 
empirical evidence for testing theories.
In the social sciences, acceptance of the positivists' 
definition of "observable" had major consequences for what 
was judged to be empirical evidence. Psychological terms 
were held to refer to non-observable properties or 
processes in the mind and therefore they were classified as 
theoretical, not observational. Behavioural terms, 
however, were deemed observable and so they could provide 
the empirical base of the social sciences. What someone 
does, rather than what he believes, hopes or feels, 
provided, for the positivist, what Nagel (1961) called the 
"competent" evidence for testing social scientific 
theories.
From a common positivist base, two forms of 
behaviourism developed.
The strict type of behaviourism, associated with 
Watson and Skinner, as I discussed in Chapter 4, limits 
itself to behaviour in both its observations and its 
theories. The aim is to establish relationships between
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observable behaviours and features of the environment
without reference to mental phenomena. It is thus a radical 
departure from our commonsense way of explaining
intentional behaviour. It has proved to be unacceptable to
the majority of social workers and has been the main target
of anti-scientific criticism.
The second form of behaviourism is not in such sharp 
contrast with our ordinary way of understanding human 
actions. The importance of the mind in explaining conduct 
is acknowledged but mental processes are only allowed to 
figure in theories; they are not considered observable. 
Tripodi (1983, p.82) proposing this view in a textbook on 
social work research makes this point: "observations cannot 
be used to describe directly the moods and attitudes of 
clients". All theories and assertions about the mind, it 
is claimed, need to be subjected to empirical test; 
observable behaviour provides the necessary empirical 
evidence.
Social work researchers have argued that this second 
form of behaviourism can encompass our ordinary view of 
human action and can be used to test fieldworkers' practice 
wisdom. The intuitive and empathie skills in understanding 
each other which social workers value so highly are allowed 
a place in that they can form the basis of theories but 
they are said to produce only speculative hypotheses which 
need to be tested by empirical (behavioural) evidence.
Opposition to this claim is widespread among social 
workers however. Some opposition stems from overlooking 
the differences between the two types of behaviourism. The 
humanist view discussed in Chapter 4, for instance, claimed
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that science, as behaviourism, could not study mental 
phenomena, a criticism only pertinent to the first type.
Smith (1987, p.408) also levels at behaviourism in 
general a complaint only applicable to the narrow form. He 
asserts that research can only evaluate practice which is 
"trying to bring about behavioural change in clients" and 
so concludes that it has little relevance to the prevailing 
non-behaviourist styles of working. Behaviourists would 
reply that the aim of therapy is not necessarily 
behavioural; the positivist requirement is that there 
should be some behavioural evidence of whether it has been 
achieved.
The more recent criticisms, mainly expressed by 
supporters of a scientific approach, are directed at the 
second type of behaviourism; social workers have complained 
that the behavioural rule has placed a major, damaging 
constraint on research efforts.
To what extent can their complaints be blamed on 
positivism?
Consider first the claim that accepting positivist 
ideas on methodology led researchers to insist that all 
data should be measurable. To support their allegation 
that researchers have made "a ritual of measurement and 
therefore cannot answer the questions that are relevant for 
effective practice", Ruckdeschel and Farris (1982, p.275) 
cite Hudson's two axioms of social work practice as a 
typical example of the position they dislike: "if you
cannot measure the client's problem, it does not exist" and 
"if you cannot measure the client's problem, you cannot 
treat it" (Hudson, 1978).
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It is easy to find further evidence in social work 
research textbooks that researchers have indeed placed 
great emphasis on quantifiable variables. Tripodi (1983, 
p.44) for instance, expresses an orthodox view when he says 
that all terms must be operationally defined, and adds 
that this involves defining "dimensions of a concept so 
that they can be measured".
The practical consequences of this emphasis are not 
clear; the critics do not give examples of research to 
illustrate their claim that it has led to inadequate or 
irrelevant studies. But even if their allegation were true 
it seems unreasonable to blame it on positivist methodology 
itself. The only sense in which positivist philosophy can 
be said to insist on "measurability" is if it is taken in 
the very broad sense of meaning "observability". Theories 
are tested by empirical evidence in the form of observation 
statements. These can simply assert that a variable is 
present or absent; there is no requirement that they 
should be quantifiable. Although some researchers' views 
are inexplicit, others are quite clearly aware of this 
point. Wodarski (1981, p.3) in his textbook on research 
methods talks of the need to operationalise concepts in 
terms of observables. Reid and Smith (1989, p.195), in 
another research textbook for social workers, recognise the 
confusion the term "measurement" has caused and specify 
that they are using it in the broadest sense where it is 
synonymous with observation.
Neither can adopting a positivist methodology be held 
responsible for the fault Smith (1987, p.406) finds in 
social work research. He complains that researchers have
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concentrated on outcome and have avoided the equally 
important task of studying the social work input. I argued 
in Chapter 4 that this criticism is, in part, justified, 
but positivism does not place any ban on such research. 
Moreover, though the difficulty of formulating practice 
methods may have daunted researchers, this is a point on 
which they have clearly changed. Fischer (1978), Wodarski 
(1981), and Thyer (1989) all share Smith's view that a more 
detailed study of the social work process is essential in 
future evaluative research.
Qualitative research is also not ruled out by 
positivism if the term refers to studies of people's 
subjective experience. But positivist methodology is 
responsible for stipulating that all psychological theories 
need to be tested against behavioural evidence and this 
requirement, although placing no absolute ban on the study 
of mental phenomena, does impose a severe constraint on it. 
Therefore social work criticisms of the limited nature of 
positivist research are, I think, partially justified. 
However, this positivist view on empirical evidence has 
been severely criticised so let us turn to a closer 
examination of it.
POSITIVISM AND BEHAVIOURAL EVIDENCE
Positivists would claim that the stipulation that all 
psychological variables are tested against behavioural 
evidence places no restriction on what can be studied 
scientifically. Their two main arguments have been, first, 
that all psychological language can be reduced to 
behavioural; and, secondly, that all psychological terms
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can be operationally defined in terms of behavioural 
reports.
Consider the reducibility thesis first. This asserts
that we can specify the criteria for using any
psychological term in terms only of directly observable
phenomena, e.g. environmental and behavioural factors. If
this is so, then a behaviourist, in principle at least, can
say anything a humanist might want to using only language
about observable properties.
The thesis has a certain plausibility if we consider
the way we learn to understand and use psychological
language. A child learning the concept of anger, for
example, does so by hearing the word being used by others
in a variety of settings. He needs to work out the rules
for when it is appropriate to describe someone as angry
and, for this to be possible, he must be able to observe
some differences between the contexts in which it is used
and those where it is not. He will notice, for instance,
that it is often associated with loud voices and critical
comments and less often with laughter and smiles. Carnap
expounded the thesis as follows:
there cannot be a term in the psychological language, 
taken as an intersubjective language for mutual 
communication, which designates a kind of state or 
event without any behaviouristic symptom. Therefore 
there is a behaviouristic method of determination for 
any term of the psychological language. Hence every 
such term is reducible to those of the thing-language 
(Carnap, 1975, p.371).
We may illustrate this thesis with an attempt to 
reduce a psychological concept to behavioural terms. 
Tolman, a behavioural psychologist, tries to define "the 
rat expects food at location L" in non-psychological terms :
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when we assert that a rat expects food at location L, 
what we assert Is that if (1) he is deprived of food, 
(2) he has been trained on path P, (3) he is now put 
on path P, (4) path P is now blocked, and (5) there 
are other paths which lead away from path P, one of 
which points directly to location L, then he will run 
down the path which points directly to location L (in 
Taylor, 1964, p.79).
This thesis has been criticised on the grounds that it 
is not practically feasible to reduce psychological terms 
to behavioural (e.g. Putnam, (1978), Scriven, in 
Krimmerman, (1975, Chapter 32), Krimmerman (1975, p.356) 
and Taylor (1964)). Carnap argued that behaviour and 
environment are important factors in our reasoning about 
other minds and learning to use psychological language. 
While this is not disputed, it is the complexity of our 
rules for using mental terms which is seen as the stumbling 
block.
We may illustrate this by returning to Tolman's 
attempted reduction of "expect". He has specified the kind 
of behaviour which would indicate that the rat expected to 
find food at L but his account is not completely equivalent 
to what we generally mean by "expect". If, for example, 
the rat went to the path which went to L but, before, he 
could run down it, someone picked him up, on Tolman's
account he can no longer be described as expecting to find 
food. In ordinary usage though we would still say that he 
expected food but that the unexpected factor of being 
picked up had altered his behaviour. Tolman could also 
accommodate it by adding the proviso "and if he were not
picked up" to his initial definition. The problem to
critics of the reducibility thesis is that there are so
many of these factors which we can allow for in ordinary
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usage that the psychologist cannot realistically hope to 
spell them all out in advance. Putnam illustrates this 
point :
it may be perfectly clear to everyone in a given 
situation that Jones is jealous of Smith's reputation. 
But one couldn't give anything like a ‘scientific 
proof' that Jones is jealous of Smith's reputation. 
It isn't, for example, that 'Jones said blah-blah and 
people who say blah-blah are generally jealous'. Even 
if it is true that people who say blah-blah are 
generally jealous, one can easily envisage an 
indefinite number of situations in which someone might 
say blah-blah and not be jealous. So it is more like 
"people who say blah-blah are likely to be jealous 
unless special circumstances obtain and no special 
circumstances obtained in this instance"....One can't 
"verify" Jones is jealous in isolation: one would have 
to verify a huge "psychological theory" which covered 
all the "special circumstances". And this, of course, 
is implicit in our knowledge of people, and our 
ability to use psychological descriptions - not 
something we can state explicitly (Putnam, 1978, p71- 
2) .
Therefore the reducibility thesis is wrong, 
philosophers have argued, and it is quite unrealistic to 
try to implement it. Behaviourists seem to endorse this 
point by their actions. Zurriff, in his overview of 
behaviourism, having explained why behaviourists deny that 
any reference to psychological states can be classed as 
observational, goes on to comment:
nevertheless, in practice, most behaviourists use 
action language almost exclusively in describing 
behaviour. Action-neutral descriptions of behaviour 
are difficult to formulate, and action language is 
therefore used for convenience. There is a trade off 
between observational purity and usefulness (Zurriff, 
1985, p.42).
In research, behaviourists have not generally followed 
cumbersome attempts like Tolman's to reduce psychological 
terms to behavioural but have used operational definitions. 
It is standard for research textbooks for social workers to
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tell them that, at the start of their research, they need
to define their terms operationally (e.g. Tripodi, 1983,
p.44, and Reid and Smith, 1989, p.58).
Bridgeman (1927) provides an early and classic account
of this approach. The central idea is that the meaning of
every theoretical term must be specified by prescribing a
definite testing operation that provides a criterion for
its application. For example, 'intelligence' could be
operationally defined as the score obtained under specific
conditions on a specific I.Q. test. Operationalism, as
originally expounded by Bridgeman, holds that the meaning
of a term is fully and exclusively defined by its
operational definition:
the concept of length is therefore fixed when the
operations by which length is measured are fixed: that 
is, the concept of length involves as much as and 
nothing more than the set of operations by which 
length is determined. In general, we mean by any
concept nothing more than a set of operations; the
concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of 
operations (Bridgeman, 1927, p.5, my emphasis.)
The claim that terms are defined just in terms of how
they can be measured has been criticised. For instance, if
the length of an object is defined as the mark to which it
reaches when placed against a standard, rigid, measuring
stick, then it does not apply to the circumference of a
cylindrical object which cannot be measured in this way.
To give meaning to the concept of the length of a
circumference of a cylinder, one would need to specify a
new method of measuring it. It would seem that length of a
cylinder is a new concept. This is contrary to the
commonsense view that the concept of length is the same in
both instances but Bridgeman maintains that the second
measuring system does indeed define a new concept of
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length. He argues that the common sense view considers that 
two procedures measure the same property if they are
consistent in the sense that in areas where they are both
applicable, they produce the same results. But the claim
that they generally give the same results is an empirical
generalisation and hence might subsequently be shown to be 
wrong. Because of this fallibility, Bridgeman considers it 
would not be safe to regard two procedures as operationally 
defining the same term.
Hempel (1965, p.123) holds that Bridgeman's advice to 
regard each measuring system as referring to a different 
concept is not followed in current scientific practice and 
he argues that if it were followed it would hinder 
scientific development. Scientists, Hempel claims, do 
consider that two procedures which meet the consistency 
requirement refer to the same term. Physical theory 
assumes one concept of length and many, more or less 
accurate, ways of measuring it. Operational criteria, 
Hempel suggests, are not treated as definitions in science. 
A definition is stipulative; it states what meaning you are 
assigning to a term. Scientists treat operational criteria 
as empirical; on this view they are fallible and subject to 
modification. It is more appropriate then to talk of 
observation or measurement theories rather than of 
definitions.
This distinction between operational definitions and 
observational theories is more than a linguistic quibble. 
Definitions can be stipulated by researchers - for example 
"by 'cohesive family' I mean a score above fifty on the
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family cohesion questionnaire" - and, to a great extent, 
others have to accept their prescriptions. Tripodi (1983) 
for example presents operational definitions In this way to 
social workers, saying that "operational definitions are 
arbitrary, but they allow evaluators to translate concepts 
into variables, which are measurable dimensions of a 
concept." (1983, p.7).
When the testing procedures are seen as theories 
however they are not deemed "arbitrary" but open to 
critical appraisal; the researcher is not claiming to 
define the term but to have proposed a measure of it. In 
assessing the research study, others may question how 
satisfactory a measure it is. And social work criticisms 
of what they call "positivist" research can be more 
satisfactorily reformulated as a general complaint that 
wholly behavioural measures do not provide an adequate 
measure of psychological concepts. The criticisms of the 
reducibility thesis presented earlier lend support to their 
allegation.
However this is one of the areas in which positivism 
has been discredited. In this context the significant 
philosophical change is the revision of the positivist's 
sharp distinction between observation and theoretical 
terms. It is now generally agreed that there are no 
infallible observation statements to provide an absolutely 
secure base for science. As Smith, quoted earlier, has 
told social workers : "facts are not as hard as is often
assumed". Those that the positivists thought had this 
character turn out, on closer analysis, to go beyond the 
evidence of our senses and to be fallible. Popper
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provides a brief account of this point:
we can utter no scientific statement that does not go 
far beyond what can be known with certainty "on the 
basis of immediate experience". Every description 
uses universal names (or symbols, or ideas); every 
statement has the character of a theory, of a 
hypothesis. The statement "here is a glass of water" 
cannot be verified by any observational experience. 
The reason is that the universals which appear in it 
cannot be correlated with any specific sense-
experience. (An "immediate experience" is only once 
"immediately given"; it is unique.) By the word 
"glass", for example, we denote physical bodies which 
exhibit a certain law-like behaviour, and the same 
holds for the word "water" (Popper, 1959, Chap. 5).
It might be argued that observation and theoretical
terms could be distinguished by saying that, unlike
theoretical terms, an observation term can be ostensively
defined. That is, we can point to objects in the world and
say "that is blue", "those are eyes", but not "that child
is maternally deprived." However, although there seems to
be a significant difference here, it is a matter of degree
rather than of kind. As Polanyi (1967) has shown, even
learning an ostensively defined term requires making some
unverifiable assumptions. If we take the concept of "blue"
as an example, we can teach someone what blue means by
pointing to various blue objects. However we are pointing
at the objects as well as the blueness and the learner
needs to conjecture what common property is being referred
to. Telling him it is the colour we are picking out will
only help if he already understands the concept of colour
and to have learned this he will have needed to have made
theoretical assumptions.
If all observation statements presuppose some
theoretical assumptions, then they are not direct,
infallible reports of experience. The underlying theory
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can be rejected or modified and consequently the truth-
value of the report can alter. The foundations of science
are not as firm as positivists thought. Popper describes
the situation graphically:
the empirical basis of objective science has nothing 
"absolute" about it. Science does not rest upon solid 
bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as 
it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected 
on piles. The piles are driven down from above into 
the swamp, but not down into any natural or "given" 
base (Popper, 1959, p.111).
If the observation/theoretical dichotomy falls, what 
are the implications for science? Some distinction between 
observation and theoretical statements is essential to the 
empirical view of science. Observations are deemed to 
provide evidence for or against a theory because they are 
seen as in some way independent of that theory. At this 
point, relativists and empiricists part company. The 
former claim that so-called "empirical" evidence is so 
infused with theoretical assumptions that it provides no 
independent test of theories. Empiricists hold that there 
is still a significant difference between observation and 
theoretical statements though they should be seen as at 
different points on a continuum rather than belonging to 
completely separate classes of statement.
RELATIVISM
Some social workers argue that the defects of 
positivism are so great that they undermine the whole 
scientific enterprise. Hence, they maintain, any claims 
that science produces more reliable knowledge than other 
forms of reasoning are unfounded. This "relativist" view 
has been expressed by, among others. Rein and White (1981),
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Heineman (1981), Paley (1987), Howe (1987), and Wltkin and 
Gottschalk (1988).
Some then argue that social workers should stop 
worrying that their preferred personal style of working is 
in some way inferior to scientific reasoning. They should 
no longer "feel guilty about the subjective judgements for 
which they can offer no theoretical justification" 
(Paley, 1987, p.170).
But how do relativists move from the proposition that 
all observation statements are to some degree theory-laden 
to the view that there is no empirical base to science? 
The social work writers tell us little about the 
philosophical arguments which have influenced them. Smith 
(1987, p.403) tells us that, in the natural sciences "facts 
are rarely as 'hard' as is often assumed." Heineman (1987, 
p.378) gives a little more detail: "there can be no direct
or untainted perceptions because all observation is shaped 
by theory." But how these statements are linked to 
research practices is not explained. A survey of their 
writing however shows that Kuhn is by far the most 
frequently cited philosopher (though usually only in a 
footnote). Feyerabend (who takes a similar but slightly 
more radical position to Kuhn) comes a distant second, 
while Paley (1987) briefly mentions Wittgenstein. 
Therefore, in discussing relativism, I shall concentrate on 
the relativist interpretation of Kuhn's philosophy.
Kuhn conceives of scientists working within a complex 
structure which he calls a "paradigm". Scientists who 
share a paradigm are working on the same theoretical system 
but share far more than this; they agree on what procedures
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and techniques to use in applying the theory; they share 
metaphysical principles, values and attitudes. The 
paradigm is more than a theory; it is a shared world view. 
Kuhn means this more or less literally. Scientists 'see' 
the world through their paradigms and scientists in 
different paradigms, he claims, do not just explain facts 
differently but actually see them differently. 
Observation statements are not just permeated by some 
theory but by the specific theory for which they are 
supposed to provide evidence. Their meaning, Kuhn 
maintains, varies from one paradigm to another so there is 
no common, shared language in which the relative merits of 
paradigms can be judged. This extreme conclusion follows 
from his ideas about how the words in which we report our 
experiences get their meaning.
Positivists had two theories of meaning for their 
separate categories of observation and theoretical terms. 
"Observation terms" corresponded to observable properties 
in the world, but theoretical terms took their meaning from 
their position within the network of concepts in a theory. 
"The concepts of science are the knots in a network of 
systematic interrelationships in which laws and theoretical 
principles form the threads" (Hempel, 1966,p.94).
The problem now arises though that if observational 
terms are theory-laden, then they cannot get their meaning 
just from corresponding to the world. The relativists' 
solution is to extend the holistic theory of meaning to all 
terms. Although relativists are among the most vociferous 
critics of positivism, "the irony is", Newton-Smith points
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out, "that Kuhn and Feyerabend have inherited from
positivism the general holistic conception of the meaning 
of a term as given by the role of the term within a
theory" (1981, p.155).
The relativists' view of scientific advance is not of 
a theory being tested against the hard data of reality and 
being corroborated. So-called empirical tests do not 
expose the theory to external evidence but check one part 
of the theory against another. The terms which are classed 
as observational are part of an all-embracing structure or 
paradigm in which the meaning of every one is connected 
with the others. Which terms are regarded as observational 
is more a question of the confidence scientists have in a
particular aspect of the whole rather than a factor of
their relationship to the world. Rorty defending this view 
stresses :
the holistic point that words take their meanings from 
other words rather than by virtue of their 
representative character, and the corollary that 
vocabularies acquire their privileges from the men who 
use them rather than from their transparency to the 
real (Rorty, 1979, p.368).
With this holistic theory of meaning, judging the 
rival, epistemic value of paradigms becomes problematic. 
In order to judge competing ideas, it is of course 
necessary to be able to compare them. Scientists would say 
that they compare by weighing up the evidence in favour of 
each but the very existence of any shared level of evidence 
is challenged by a holistic theory of meaning. If we have 
a change of paradigm, then, since words get their meaning 
from their position within the paradigm, we have a change 
of meaning of al1 terms. Taking Newtonian and Einsteinian
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physics as an example, as Newton-Smith 
critically comments :
Not only do they mean something different by "mass"; 
they also mean something different by "the needle 
points at 4", "look it's turned green", and so on 
(Newton-Smith, 1981, p.12).
If we apply this idea to theories familiar to social 
workers, taking psychoanalytic theory and learning theory 
as rival paradigms, it does not just imply the expected 
result that analysts and behaviourists will differ about 
what they mean by reports which are clearly theoretical 
such as 'this person has repressed his anger' or 'this 
behaviour is positively reinforced by the actor's 
environment'; it implies that they will mean something 
different when apparently using the same words, such as 
saying that 'this is a person' and 'this person says he is 
worried'. With this holistic theory of meaning then there 
is no common language in which we can state the evidence 
and so comparisons cannot be made. The paradigms are said 
to be 'incommensurable'.
For many critics of this holistic theory of meaning, 
Newton-Smith reports, "its consequences are sufficiently 
absurd to justify its rejection" (1981, p.157). More 
specific objections are made as well.
Kuhn tries to avoid some of these absurdities by 
claiming that the meanings of terms only change when we 
have a paradigm shift but that it stays constant through 
the "minor" modifications scientists make as they work 
within a paradigm. If small alterations led to meaning 
change then it would be difficult for any scientist to find 
a colleague who spoke the same language but it seems clear
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that they do communicate. Although some such concession
looks essential, Kuhn is criticised for his response;
Kuhn does not provide an adequate criterion for 
determining how much change is required before there 
is a change in paradigm. This means that he has not 
provided a means of determining which theory changes 
generate variation in meaning (Newton-Smith, 1981, 
p. 155) .
This leads to difficulties for his theory of meaning. 
Psychoanalysis and behavioural psychology are generally 
accounted different paradigms. But the question arises 
whether, within psychoanalysis, the shift from Freud to 
Adler is a minor one or sufficient to warrant claiming that 
they meant different things by their common terms. Or 
should even the changes Freud himself made in his theories 
be judged enough to imply that the older Freud saw the 
world differently from the younger Freud? Kuhn offers no 
guidance on this point.
Kuhn's views are also criticised for conflicting so 
sharply with scientific practice. Scientists working on 
different theories show every sign of being able to 
communicate and to agree on a level of observation reports.
Putnam (1981, p.114) objects to the Kuhnian 
incommensurability thesis because, he argues, it rules out 
translation of any kind: between paradigms, between
cultures, and even between older forms of our own language 
and the present day. However, translation and
understanding others is possible, Putnam claims, pointing 
out that even Kuhn assumes he can talk meaningfully and in 
a paradigm-neutral way when he presents his 
incommensurability thesis. Kuhn cites Galileo as an
example of someone with a different paradigm from our own
191
and therefore, if his thesis Is true, with no language In 
common with us. However Kuhn then finds no difficulty In 
talking about Galileo's Ideas believing both that he Is 
giving an accurate account and that we shall have no 
difficulty In understanding him. Putnam complains: "to
tell us that Galileo had "Incommensurable" notions and then 
to go on to describe them at length Is totally incoherent" 
(1981, p.115).
Putnam suggests that proponents of the
Incommensurability thesis and the holistic theory of
meaning are confusing or conflating 'concept* and
'conception'. The concept or the reference of a term stays
constant through translation although the conception, our
associated beliefs about It may change:
when we translate a word as, say temperature we equate 
the reference ... with that of our own term 
'temperature', at least as we use it In that 
context....But so doing Is compatible with the fact 
that the seventeenth-century scientists, or whoever, 
may have had a different conception of temperature, 
that Is a different set of beliefs about It and Its 
nature than we do (Putnam, 1981, p.117).
If we turn to the social work advocates of relativism,
they seem to fall Into two groups: the wholehearted and the
faint-hearted. Howe (1987) and Paley (1987) welcome the
consequences of relativism. For them, questions about
collecting empirical evidence are redundant; the various
approaches to social work cannot be compared on
eplstemologlcal grounds. Their Interest Is In the question
of the next chapter - how do scientists evaluate theories,
or, to put It In their terms, why do social workers prefer
one or other approach?
Others however appear faint-hearted In their
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relativism and seem more concerned with rejecting the 
behavioural restrictions on research rather than abandoning 
the whole scientific enterprise. Heineman (1981), Smith 
(1987), and Ruckdeschel and Farris (1981), for example, 
appear to want to reject positivism but not to move to 
accepting a purely relativist position.
Smith is scathing of Sheldon's firm advocacy of a 
scientific approach, saying such a view is now out of date 
because of the developments in philosophy. He describes it 
as :
an anachronism, rather like seeing an airship in 
flight; the effect is bracing, and it is nice to know 
that the feat can still be brought off, but one would 
not choose it as a way of crossing the Atlantic 
(Smith, 1987, p.404).
This looks an unequivocal indictment of science and 
yet his subsequent plea (p.414) is for "a variety of 
research approaches .. ethnographic 'hanging about', the 
analysis of system data, and the use of a quasi- 
experimental design in the assessment of outcomes." None 
of these seems incompatible with an empiricist philosophy 
of science.
Heineman's position is also unclear. She explicitly 
describes herself as a relativist but still declares that 
"science represents our best efforts at solving important 
problems for which there can be no guaranteed or permanent 
solutions" (1981, p.391). She does not explain how she, as 
a relativist, judges science to constitute "our best 
efforts".
It is of course possible to be a relativist and choose 
to work within the scientific culture for non-
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epistemological reasons, but to some extent these writers 
seem unclear how much they are rejecting along with 
positivism. The main conclusions of these writers are that 
scientific research methods need to be extended rather than 
abandoned. In wanting to liberalise scientific methods, 
they may find that the revised empirical position provides 
an adequate answer.
EMPIRICISM
The recurrent complaint of social workers about 
positivist research is that it is quantitative not 
qualitative. The dispute is complicated by the fact that 
the key term "qualitative" is used in vague and ambiguous 
ways. Two features which seem recurrent themes in the 
various calls for a change of direction in research are, 
first, a desire to study people's inner thoughts and 
feelings, and, secondly, an appeal to researchers to 
experiment with novel ways of studying people. I shall 
deal with these two issues separately.
First, positivist research has been accused of ignoring 
the client's subjective experience. This is only true of 
the strict form of behaviourism which did not study the 
mind; positivism in general cannot be accused of excluding 
all reference to the mind. But studying thoughts, 
feelings, and beliefs was undoubtedly harder when 
researchers were trying to satisfy the positivist 
requirement for behavioural evidence only. If this 
requirement is now deemed misguided, what are practical 
implications for social work research?
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To the empiricist, the fallibility of all observation 
statements does not imply that science has no empirical 
base. Nor does recognising that an observation report 
involves some theoretical assumptions imply that it assumes 
the very theory it is being used to test. The rejection of 
a sharp observation/theoretical distinction however does 
have significant implications in the social sciences. The 
positivists' rule that only behavioural reports were 
empirical was based on the assumption that there was a 
sharp divide, with behaviour on one side and psychological 
states on the other. Such a firm rule is as we have shown 
inappropriate. But by what criteria can we judge where 
statements fall on the continuum? We need to answer this 
to understand how research methodology in social work can 
move away from the behavioural restrictions on evidence.
Research textbooks agree that the two main criteria 
for judging the adequacy of observations and measurements 
are "validity" and "reliability".
"Validity" is defined by Reid and Smith (1989, p.199) 
as "the extent to which a measure corresponds to the "true" 
position of a person or object on the characteristic being 
measured ... it attempts to capture an elusive property of 
measurement: 'its truth value'." How valid for example are 
the official unemployment statistics as a measure of the 
level of unemployment in this country? Validity cannot be 
ascertained beyond doubt: it "is inevitably a matter of
judgement based on evidence and inference".
"Reliability" is an aspect of validity which is 
treated separately because it can be assessed reasonably 
precisely. It refers to the extent to which observations
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or measurements are consistent over time and between 
observers, whether, for instance, a blood pressure test 
produces similar results when repeated on the same patient 
whose blood pressure has not changed or when used by 
different doctors. The two main methods of judging this are 
(1) test- re-test consistency, and (2) inter-rater 
agreement (sources: Reid and Smith, 1989, p.199, and
Freeman and Tyrer, 1989, p.133).
The long-standing social work dispute about research 
can be rephrased in terms of these criteria. Researchers 
have used behavioural indicators because they tend to have 
higher reliability than fieldworkers" subjective judgements 
but fieldworkers then complain that these measures have low 
validity, being only a crude and inaccurate measure of 
their psychological concepts.
Burch and Mohr's (1980) study is, I think, a good 
example of research which is flawed in this way, having 
outcome measures which are reliable but of poor validity 
given the complex psychological theories being tested. The 
study evaluated a social work programme for parents who had 
physically abused their children, comparing a group 
receiving the experimental help with a control group 
receiving the standard service. The groups were matched on 
the factors considered causally significant such as age, 
social class, and degree of social isolation. The new 
treatment was based on the assumption that child abuse 
results from an interaction of social and psychological 
factors. It was postulated that abusing parents tend to be 
isolated, to lack knowledge about child development, to be 
under stress which hinders their ability to solve problems.
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and to lack the ability to nurture their children because 
of inadequacies in their own upbringing.
The programme had several goals: 1. to change their
feelings, attitudes, and values about parenting; 2. to 
increase their knowledge of child development; 3. to 
provide support to ease their isolation; 4. to provide a 
nurturing experience. Treatment consisted of a weekly two- 
hour group meeting in which there were episodes of 
socialising, educational presentation on parenting skills 
and child development, and small group discussions on 
personal problems and parenting skills which were also 
intended to provide a nurturing experience.
Evaluation was based on rating scales which allegedly 
measured social isolation and attitudes to and knowledge 
about child-raising. Completing them before and after 
treatment, the experimental group scored significantly 
higher on the second rating than the control group.
The reliability of these rating scales is evidently 
high and is not at issue; their validity is. The programme 
had a complex psychological theory about child abuse and 
offered a treatment with many elements. These rating 
scales seem a test of only parts of the theories underlying 
treatment. At best they have a tenuous link with the 
hypotheses about the importance of stress and lack of 
nurturing in creating abusing parents. Testing whether the 
programme had indeed met its aim of providing a nurturing 
experience or reducing stress might be complicated but, 
since it failed to do so, the study can be accused of 
having low validity. Moreover, these hypotheses are 
typical of the kind used by fieldworkers and which they say
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positive research cannot adequately test. This study does 
nothing to refute their claim. Oddly, the study did not 
record what is surely the most valid and reliable evidence 
of success or failure - the incidence of further child 
abuse.
Researchers might defend their practice by pointing 
out that, though humanists may question the validity of 
behavioural evidence, it does seem to be more reliable than 
psychological reports. It is clearly true that we often 
use psychological language in different ways while many 
behavioural descriptions are quite uncontroversial. It 
must be remembered however that in ordinary language, many 
terms are often very vague and imprecise, particularly in 
comparison with terms in science, and in this respect 
psychological language is not exceptional.
Colour is often cited as a paradigm example of an 
observable property but in general speech there are many 
disputes about the use of colour predicates. There might 
be considerable agreement on what counts as a primary 
colour like red or blue, but there is ample scope for 
argument when it comes to shades like turquoise, violet or 
amber. These colour concepts have much vaguer, varied 
rules of use. However, all colour concepts could be given 
a precise and consistent meaning by reference, for example, 
to wave length. Two factors are important in doing this. 
First, scientists have developed an extensive theory about 
colours which allows them to give any shade a precise 
description in terms of wavelength; secondly they have 
developed instruments which enable them to measure 
wavelengths accurately. The gradual refinement of concepts
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usually goes hand-in-hand with theory development.
The differences apparent in ordinary usage between 
behavioural and psychological terms then are a matter of 
degree rather than of kind. Moreover, intuitive concepts 
typically need to be made more precise to standardise usage 
for scientific purposes. With psychological terms, this is 
usually done partly by reducing the concept to behavioural 
or other relatively uncontroversial indicators and partly 
by teaching people the skill of making consistent 
judgements.
Research widely known amongst social workers which 
illustrates this procedure concerns the relationship 
between "high expressed emotion" and the relapse rate for 
schizophrenia. From clinical experience and research on 
the relapse rates for schizophrenia, it seemed plausible 
that patients who returned to live with families in which 
there was high expressed emotion were more likely to suffer 
a relapse than those in families with low levels of 
expressed emotion.
In a series of studies. Brown et al. (1958), Brown et 
al. (1962), Brown et al. (1972), Vaughn and Leff (1976), 
evidence for the causal significance of levels of expressed 
emotion was accumulated and the concept itself increasingly 
refined. To test their hypotheses, the research team 
trained observers to use this complex concept of "expressed 
emotion" with very high inter-user agreement.
The way this was done is interesting both because it 
reveals the complexity of the task and because it uses a 
combination of empirical indices and user skill. 
Researchers are told not only how to rate expressed emotion
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but are given guidance on how to collect the relevant 
information. In two methodological papers, Rutter and Brown 
(1966) and Brown and Rutter (1966) describe in detail (a) 
the most appropriate techniques of interviewing, describing 
a style which encourages respondents to develop their own 
lines of thought rather than being guided too much by the 
interviewer; (b) a semi-structured interview schedule, 
listing the areas on which information is required; and (c) 
the criteria for rating expressed emotion. This final 
category is broken down into five measurements: of the
level of critical remarks, degree of emotional 
overinvolvement, hostility, warmth, and positive remarks. 
The last measurement is made simply by counting the number 
in an interview of a specified length. The others are 
measured in a more subjective way but nevertheless 
consistently. People are trained "to measure them by being 
given examples of the type of comments which would indicate 
high or low levels but, unlike a positivist's operational 
definition, no attempt is made to spell out the full 
procedure for rating expressed emotions, the interviewer's 
skill in applying the concepts is an essential component. 
To achieve consistency on this, training is provided, using 
case examples and videos to help standardise judgements. 
The research team report that by these methods they are 
able to get very consistent rating of the extent of 
"expressed emotion" (Berkowitz et al. 1981).
Accurate rating has become of clinical importance 
since later research has (a) confirmed the significance of 
high expressed emotion in triggering relapse in 
schizophrenia, and (b) shown that family work which helps
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the relatives lower the level of expressed emotion is 
associated with a drop in relapse rate.
This example illustrates how complex psychological 
concepts can be studied empirically. Using the concept 
correctly requires training; human skills are, as the 
humanist claims, necessary in research. But this is true 
of both natural and social sciences. In medical research, 
for instance, doctors need training to ensure correct 
measurement of blood pressure.
Another empirical study well-known to social workers 
illustrates how researchers can meet social workers' demand 
that they should study the client's subjective experience.
Brown and Harris (1978) investigated the social causes
of depression in women. Earlier research had implicated
what was imprecisely called "life events" in the causation
of depression and methods had been worked out for
interviewing people and rating their "life event score" in
a consistent way. Brown and Harris however thought that a
major defect in earlier rating systems was that they had
not considered the "meaning" of the life event to the
individual; they had treated "a wide range of events as
alike that are not alike. The birth of a child does not
mean the same thing for all women" (Brown and Harris, 1978,
p.81). The existing scheme of rating life events was
therefore considered inappropriate:
incidents once classified as 'events' were treated as 
equivalent as far as severity of threat, disruption, 
and the like were concerned. We now needed in some 
way to bring meaning back (Brown and Harris, 1978, 
p.85).
The interviewing schedule was changed to elicit not 
only whether life events had occurred but the woman's
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response to them "in the sense of the thoughts and feelings 
she had before, at the time, and after the event" (p.86). 
Each interview was tape-recorded and the tapes later used 
to complete 28 rating scales covering each event. These 
were then used to "make a judgement about the likely 
meaning of the event for the average person in such 
circumstances" (p.90). To avoid bias, the raters did not 
know whether or not the women had developed depression 
after experiencing the life event.
These more recent research studies show that, even 
if social workers are justified in complaining that their 
researchers have not given enough attention to the client's 
experience, the deficiency cannot be blamed on research 
methodology itself.
Turning now to the second theme apparent in the call 
for qualitative research: researchers are told that they
should be innovative, trying many novel ways of studying 
people. Numerous new methods are suggested e.g. case 
studies, participant-observation, ecology, phenomenology, 
ethnographic "hanging about" (Smith, 1987, p.404), and 
ethnomethodology. One article (Ruckdeschel and Farris, 
1981, p.419) even reports that the notations of jazz music 
and the "deep structures" of transformational grammar have 
been useful aids to understanding.
As Thyer (1989, p.312) complains, judging these new 
research ideas is difficult because the authors make only 
vague allusions to them and give us no practical examples 
of the type of research they would produce to illustrate 
their alleged value. One common feature seems to be that 
the researcher gets involved with the people being studied.
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In the detailed case study, the participant observation or 
the unstructured interview, the researcher is actively 
engaged with those whose experience he is trying to 
understand. This seems to contrast with the image of a 
scientist as a neutral observer collecting facts but, as 1 
have argued in this chapter and Chapter 4, this image is 
misleading. These methods, since they are designed to 
study meaningful human actions, conflict with extreme forms 
of behaviourism but are otherwise compatible with an 
empirical approach. Indeed some recent textbooks include 
sections on qualitative research (e.g. Reid and Smith, 
1989).
The controversy about these methods of study does not 
centre on whether they have a useful part to play - the 
empiricist can have no a priori objection to them as a 
source of theories and in this capacity they may be very 
fruitful. The question is what weight should be given to 
the theories they produce. Since they resemble the way 
"practice wisdom" is acquired by the individual 
fieldworker, they are open to the same criticisms about 
reliability that 1 made in Chapter 6. To the empiricist 
therefore they need to be empirically tested. Relativists 
however would claim that they had their own internal 
validity; they are a rival to scientific methods rather 
than a component. While a few, such as Paley and Howe, are 
thoroughgoing relativists, the majority of social workers 
who advocate these innovations do not make it clear where 
they stand on this issue.
In summary, 1 have tried to illustrate here the 
revised empiricist view on the testing of theories. On
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this account of empirical evidence In the social sciences, 
the posltlvlst/humanlst disagreements no longer apply. The 
humanists' Insistence that understanding another person 
requires personal skill Is to some degree accepted; we 
cannot write out all our background knowledge fully In 
behavioural language; neither can we make accurate reports 
without drawing on this background knowledge. Our ordinary 
language is however often vague and Imprecise, leading to 
Inconsistent usage and leaving considerable scope for bias 
to Influence the judgement. For scientific purposes, these 
defects need to be minimised and the research examples I 
have quoted give some Indication of how this can be done. 
In none of these features however does social science 
differ significantly from natural science.
Social work criticisms of research efforts at testing 
psychological theories can. In principle, be refuted by 
this revised version. Theories involving elusive 
psychological concepts can be tested empirically and it Is 
easier to study the subjective experiences of the client. 
However, the fact that I have had to turn to related 
disciplines to find examples of Innovative research 
suggests that social work researchers have not yet fully 
appreciated the possibilities.
CONCLUSION
The widespread reluctance among social workers to 
formulating and testing theories empirically In the 
recognised scientific method has traditionally been based 
on a behavloural/posltlvlst view of science. Positivism
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implied that psychological theories needed to be tested by 
behavioural evidence but social workers claimed such 
evidence provided an inadequate test of their ideas and 
preferred instead to rely on personal intuition and 
empathy. This resistance to scientific methods of testing 
now needs to be re-appraised since the model of science 
they reject has been generally discarded. But, as I have 
argued, the sharp dichotomy between observation and 
theoretical terms which is crucial to the positivist 
position is unfounded and should instead be seen as a 
spectrum. As behavioural terms were classified as 
observable and hence able to provide empirical evidence 
while psychological terms were deemed to be theoretical, 
this alleged dichotomy is at the centre of the 
humanist/naturalist conflict.
I have also argued that social workers' reasons for 
opposing empirical testing based on a positivist account do 
not apply to other, more satisfactory, views on the role of 
empirical evidence in science. Research studies in related 
fields illustrate how psychological theories can be 
adequately tested empirically.
Researchers in social work, influenced by 
philosophical criticisms of positivism, have themselves now 
become critical of their traditional approach, conceding 
that fieldworkers had some grounds for decrying past 
efforts. There are however substantial disagreements about 
what the philosophical changes have been and their 
implications for research practices.
"Positivist” research is widely attacked but, I have 
argued, some of the defects of former research cannot be
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directly attributed to positivism. Studying the results 
but not the content of social work services for example has 
been a common fault in evaluative research but it does not 
follow from any positivist doctrine. Researchers are also 
criticised for insisting that evidence should be not just 
observable but quantifiable. While this may have unduly 
restricted the scope of their work, again it cannot be 
blamed on positivism. The difficulty of implementing the 
positivist ruling on empirical evidence, excluding all 
psychological terms, undoubtedly complicated the 
researchers' task. Meeting this proviso seems to have 
distracted them from what should be their first priority of 
conducting research that meets the needs of social workers 
and their clients.
While there is widespread agreement that previous 
research was defective, there are sharply differing views 
on what should now be done. The major split is between 
those who take a relativist view and those who advocate 
some modified but still empiricist position.
The relativists claim that all so-called observation 
statements in science are not just theory-laden (a point 
empiricists accept) but derived from the very theory which 
they are supposed to be testing, therefore providing no 
independent check on the theory. I have presented the 
arguments against the holistic theory of meaning on which 
this claim is based.
On the empiricist side there is disagreement about the 
practical implications of the philosophical change. There 
is agreement that it permits a more liberal methodology but 
just how liberal is disputed. A key issue is expressed in
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terms of rivalry between quantitative and qualitative 
research.
In recommending "qualitative" research, the main 
desire seems to be to study the subjective experiences of 
clients. While positivism cannot be accused of banning 
such research. Its behavioural restriction on evidence made 
It difficult and the modified empiricist view of evidence 
makes such research easier.
Another element In the move towards qualitative 
research Is a desire to see researchers trying out novel 
methods of Investigation - ethnomethodology, phenomenology, 
ecology are all cited as possibly fruitful approaches. For 
the empiricist, such methods may have a part to play In 
developing our understanding but the theories they produce 
need further empirical testing.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
Scientists test theories empirically; they evaluate 
them by collecting evidence through experiments and 
comparative trials. Empirical evidence however does not 
have a decisive impact on a theory, either in proving or in 
refuting it. If social workers were to carry out empirical 
research, how are they to interpret their results? There 
are competing accounts of how scientists weigh the evidence 
and what makes them decide to accept or reject a theory. 
The disputes are not so much about the decisions scientists 
have made but about how and why they made them, why for 
example they prefer Einstein's physics to Newton's.
In social work, this philosophical issue has been 
addressed most by those arguing for a relativist position 
about knowledge. Their attack on the rationality of 
science has two strands; first, as discussed in the 
preceding chapter, the argument that there is no 
independent empirical evidence by which to test a theory; 
secondly a claim that there are no universal rational 
criteria by which the evidence can be weighed. Deciding 
whether to accept or reject a theory in the light of the 
evidence, the relativist claims, is not a rational process
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but determined by social and psychological factors. Howe 
(1987) for example alleges that: "dominant forms of
understanding are based on social processes rather than 
empirical validity". Paley (1987), who shares this view, 
sees those who advocate a scientific approach in social 
work as "imperialists" trying to impose their preferred 
culture on a mainly humanist social work group.
This relativist view, which is of recent origin, has 
far-reaching implications for social work. It claims that 
arguments for using scientific methods such as those I have 
presented in this thesis are irrational. Thus relativism 
is often used to endorse the prevailing style of work where 
appraisal of theories and evaluation of work is left mainly 
to the individual fieldworker. As yet, this point of view 
has been little challenged by the proponents of a 
scientific approach though this will be one of my aims in 
this chapter.
The issue of interpreting the evidence has received 
attention from one strong supporter of scientific methods 
in social work: Brian Sheldon. Because of concern about
social workers' failure to look for falsifications of their 
theories or to pay attention to counter-evidence, he has 
been interested in clarifying the role of refutations in 
scientific reasoning to show social workers what they ought 
to be doing. He turns to Popper's philosophy of science in 
which falsifications play the central part, but, as I shall 
discuss, there are problems with this account of science. 
Sheldon is quite right however to stress the importance of 
refutations in science though there are better accounts of
209
their significance than Popper's.
Other than Sheldon, the philosophical debates about 
appraising theories have received little attention from 
empiricists in social work, who seem to believe that 
analysing results can be left to statisticians. Their view 
is perhaps influenced by the fact that the predominant 
philosophical debate has been concerned primarily with 
deterministic theories, i.e. ones that make categorical 
predictions. Such theories are rare in the social 
sciences: most are probabilistic or statistical, predicting 
outcomes only with a certain probability. The same issues 
arise though in relation to both types of theory.
My primary concern then in this chapter is to provide 
an empiricist account of how scientists judge theories. 
The first section, on inductive support, discusses the 
problems of induction and offers a Bayesian account of how 
scientists decide that a theory is more probable given the 
evidence. Evidence can count for or against a theory as 
Sheldon has emphasised and the second section addresses his 
concerns, providing a critical look at Popper's philosophy 
and explaining how an inductive approach deals with 
refutations.
I then examine the relativists' claim that theory 
appraisal is wholly determined by social and psychological 
factors, not the empirical evidence. Although I disagree 
with their contention that epistemological criteria play no 
part, I shall argue that they are right in saying that 
deciding what to do in social work cannot be determined by 
epistemological criteria alone. Deciding to act involves
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not only judging whether one's therapeutic hypothesis Is 
probable but also whether one's goals and means are 
morally, politically, and economically acceptable.
INDUCTIVE SUPPORT
To test a theory, scientists deduce some of Its 
empirical consequences and then carry out research to find 
out whether those predictions are accurate or not. If for 
Instance we have the simple hypothesis that all swans are 
white, then It Implies that If we find a swan It will be 
white.
If the predictions are true. It does not follow of 
course that the theory Is. It Is logically possible that 
the theory Is false even though the prediction Is true. We 
might for example have studied the swans In Hyde Park and 
seen that they were all white; It Is still possible that 
some of the unstudied swans. In Kew Gardens for Instance, 
are not white.
However, though verified predictions cannot establish 
the truth of a theory, they are often said to give It 
Inductive support. As scientists testing a theory collect 
more and more confirmations, their confidence In the theory 
generally Increases. The reliability and justification of 
Inductive reasoning are the problems which have Interested 
philosophers.
First, consider Its reliability. We usually In our 
practical life assume that past experience Is a guide to 
the future; this Is reasoning Inductively. The problem
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with inductive proof is that the evidence for our theory is 
never conclusive. The general conclusion is reached on 
the basis of our limited experience of particular 
instances. A theory about ALL planetary movements, for 
example, is supported by observations of relatively few 
planets. But how can we be sure that our generalisation is 
true, that hitherto unobserved planets will behave in the
same way as the ones we have seen, or that the ones we have
studied will keep to their current paths? The answer is 
that we cannot know with certainty.
Bertrand Russell's story of the chicken is a famous 
illustration of how the conclusion of an inductive 
inference is not certainly true: every morning the farmer
went to the chicken run to feed the hens; the chicken 
noticed this regularity and, reasoning inductively, began 
to look forward to the farmer's visits and would run out to 
meet him and expect the food; one day though, just before 
Xmas, the farmer did not keep to his routine of bringing 
food but picked him up and killed him instead.
Although inductive arguments cannot guarantee the 
truth of their conclusions, most of us would still accept 
that they provide our best method of reasoning beyond our 
experience. The chicken was certainly disappointed on his 
last day by the farmer's actions but, since he did not know
that the farmer was only fattening him up for market, the
chicken's expectation of food, given his past experience, 
was reasonable though wrong. It is in fact difficult to 
imagine what we would do if we did not accept that the past 
was a guide to the future (and if the world did not behave
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in a way consistent with that assumption). We could not
for example learn language If we did not expect people to
use words In a fairly consistent way.
In science, one can never prove with certainty that a 
theory Is true but. In most philosophies of science, (with 
the notable exception of Popper's, discussed later) it Is 
accepted that Inductive support provides grounds for 
Increasing confidence In a theory.
Philosophers, however, have shown that It Is difficult
to justify Induction. David Hume, In the eighteenth
century, gave the most famous account of this. The most 
obvious justification Is that Induction works; It may vbe 
wrong sometimes but on the whole It produces fairly 
reliable Ideas. But Hume pointed out that this type of 
argument Is circular; the past success of Induction Is 
being used as evidence for Its future reliability when what 
we have been asked to justify Is the very principle of 
using the past as evidence for the future.
Despite many philosophical efforts, the problem of 
justifying Induction has never been solved to everyone's 
satisfaction. Hume though did not see his criticisms as 
undermining our use of Induction. In his view, we cannot 
help believing In a physical world and reasoning 
Inductively about It. Scientists In general follow this 
approach, accepting that a theory can never be conclusively 
proved but thinking that It can be judged as more or less 
probable In the light of the empirical evidence.
For most social workers, although they are hostile to 
scientific method, doubts about Induction are not among the
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reasons for their antipathy. Indeed, Induction plays as 
much a part in humanist social work as in a scientific 
approach. Most social workers believe that through their 
work experience they can develop "practice wisdom" and, in 
using past experience as a useful source of understanding 
of the present, they are evidently reasoning inductively. 
The problem of induction is however an element in two 
schools of thought in social work: it forms a part of the
relativists' attack on the rationality of science and it 
has led some naturalists to propose Popper's philosophy of 
science in which induction plays no part. Both will be 
discussed later.
Learning from experience plays an essential role in 
science. The exact mechanism has however been debated by 
philosophers. How much confidence, for instance, should 
one invest in a theory in the light of evidence; how do we 
compare theories; and when should we reject one altogether? 
The most satisfactory account, 1 think, is provided by the 
Bayesian approach which holds that "scientific reasoning is 
reasoning in accordance with the calculus of probability", 
(Howson and Urbach, 1989, p.12). Not only does this account 
seem to avoid difficulties met by rival philosophies but it 
has a plausibility capturing as it does the way scientists 
talk about their reasoning. Dorling (1979, p.180) reports 
that it is rare to find any scientist in the last three 
hundred years who does not talk in terms of probability. 
The Bayesian approach also has the attractive feature of 
providing a uniform account of deterministic and 
probabilistic theories.
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The Bayesian approach is named after Thomas Bayes, an 
eighteenth century clergyman, who derived the important 
theorem which determines how much more probable a theory is 
in the light of a new piece of information than it is 
without that evidence. If h is the theory being tested, e a 
bit of evidence, and k the background knowledge accepted 
prior to the test, what we want to know is whether e 
supports h and, if so, to what degree it does so. Bayes 
theorem works out how much more probable the theory is, 
given the new evidence from the test. The scientist 
estimates the theory's "prior" probability, its likeliness 
given background knowledge without the new evidence. Bayes 
theorem then calculates its "posterior" probability in the 
light of the additional information.
Bayes theorem can be expressed thus:
P(h/e.k) » P(e/h.k) (P(h/k) 
P(e/k)
In explaining what this equation means, we can also 
see how Bayesian reasoning captures the generally accepted 
features of scientific decision-making.
The P(h/e.k) - on the left-hand side of the equation - 
is the answer wanted: the new (posterior) probability of h
in the light of the test result. Its value is determined 
by the values of the 3 probabilities: P(e/h.k), P(h/k), and 
P(e/k).
First, the P(e/h.k) indicates how firmly the 
hypothesis predicts the result. The higher this probability 
is, the more the evidence will support the hypothesis. In 
a deterministic theory, if h implies e then P(e/h.k) * 1.
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It follows from this that if e refutes h then P(e/h.k) * 0, 
which is the lowest probability, and h is falsified or, in 
Bayesian terms, maximally disconfirmed.
Secondly, the posterior probability of h is dependent 
on its prior probability: P(h/k), its likelihood given
background knowledge alone, before doing the test. Howson 
and Urbach argue that assigning prior probabilities is, in 
practice, an unavoidable aspect of science: "scientists
always discriminate, in advance of any experimentation, 
between theories they regard as more or less credible and, 
so, worthy of attention and others" (1989, p.80). 
Calculating the prior probability involves a subjective 
judgement in the sense that individuals with different 
knowledge, beliefs, or backgrounds may assess it quite 
differently. Social workers should find this part of 
Bayesianism very familiar since so much of their current 
style of individual working requires personal judgements of 
the plausibility of their understanding. The Bayesian 
approach does not imply that social workers should abandon 
this aspect of their current methods of reasoning but that 
they should treat it as the first rather than the final 
stage in evaluating a theory.
The third probability, the P(e/k) indicates the 
likelihood of e given background knowledge alone. The 
degree of support e gives an hypothesis depends on how much 
more likely e is given the hypothesis than it is on 
background knowledge alone. This reflects the value 
scientists give to surprising predictions. Howson and 
Urbach (1989, p.86) argue that this intuition is true in
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everyday experience as well. They give the example of a 
soothsayer. If he predicts that you will meet a dark 
stranger sometime and you do so, your confidence in his 
predictive powers will not be much increased since meeting
a dark stranger is almost inevitable if you live in
Britain. If however, the soothsayer were to predict the 
correct number of hairs on the head of that stranger, you 
would be amazed and your scepticism would be shaken 
because, without the hypothesis that the soothsayer can
foretell the future, making such a correct prediction is
highly improbable.
Having spoken only of the merits of a Bayesian 
approach, let me turn to its critics. Bayes theorem itself 
is not controversial. The axioms from which it is derived 
are common to most accounts of probability. The main 
criticism levelled at the Bayesian approach concerns its 
subjective element: fixing the prior probability of a
theory is said to be a subjective decision by a scientist. 
In this respect, this philosophy fails to meet the hopes of 
objectivists like Popper, Lakatos, Carnap and, in 
statistics, Fisher, Neyman and Pearson who all want an 
account of science in which to use Lakatos's words: "the
cognitive value of a theory has nothing to do with its 
psychological influence on people's minds" (1978, vol.l, 
P.l) .
On this point, Howson and Urbach have two main 
defences of Bayesianism: first, the failure of their
opponents to develop an adequate objective method of 
assigning prior probabilities, and, secondly, the failure
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of their critics to take account of how limited the
subjective element is.
The rival probability approach has tried to establish
the objective probabilities of theories, using only factual
data and the logical structure of the hypotheses - and no
opinions. The assumption is that, if two people have the
same factual data, they should assign the same prior
probabilities. Theoretical views or personal factors
should have no influence on the computing of probabilities.
Howson and Urbach (1989, Chapter 3) argue that not
only have the objectivists failed in their task but also
failure is unavoidable. Purely objective criteria for
determining prior probabilities do not exist; all methods
must make some assumptions about the data;
no prior probability or probability-density 
distribution expresses merely the available factual 
data; it inevitably expresses some sort of opinion 
about the possibilities consistent with the data 
(1989, p.289).
The seekers after objectivity fear that, if prior 
probabilities are assigned in part subjectively then 
Bayesian reasoning is : "a record merely of the whims of 
individual psychology" (Howson and Urbach, 1989, p.289). 
This, argue Howson and Urbach, is to greatly overestimate 
the significance of the subjective element. While the 
individual decides the initial probabilities, what happens 
to them subsequently is determined by the probability
calculus.
They suggest the analogy with deductive logic. This 
does not tell us whether the premises of our argument are 
true or false but, once we have decided their truth-value
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by independent means, it dictates the valid inferences we 
can make from them. Similarly, Bayesian theory does not 
tell us the prior probabilities of our ideas but, once 
these have been given a particular value, it computes their 
posterior probability. "As far as the canons of inference 
are concerned, neither logic [neither inductive nor 
deductive] allows freedom to individual discretion: both
are quite impersonal and objective" (1989, p.290).
One might expect that the subjective element would 
lead to radical variations in the assessment of the 
probability of a particular theory in science and this 
seems counter to experience. Natural scientists generally 
reach a high degree of agreement on the merits of their 
theories. However, applying Bayes theorem, major 
disagreements do not usually last for long because, when 
weighed against a common body of evidence, the posterior 
probabilities typically converge rapidly as evidence 
accumulates. A low prior probability will be substantially 
increased by empirical evidence while a high one will only 
be affected slightly. Therefore, after a few tests have 
been done, most of the initial difference will have 
disappeared.
Scientists often discuss their theories in terms of 
probabilities. Evidence cannot prove a theory with 
complete certainty but it can make it more or less 
probable. The Bayesian approach which bases scientific 
reasoning on the probability calculus offers a coherent 
account of inductive reasoning which captures the generally 
accepted features of scientific judgements.
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REFUTATIONS
Sheldon has been a persistent advocate of a scientific 
approach in social work and a critic of current social 
workers' methods. His particular concern has been 
social workers' disregard for refutations of their 
theories. Social workers, he complains, make little effort 
to find refutations or, if some are found, they fail to 
take them seriously as a challenge to their ideas. They 
use "theories containing built-in defences against 
disbelief" (Sheldon, 1978, p.14) so that any apparent 
refutation can be accommodated. Sheldon claims too that 
social workers have such vague goals that virtually any 
outcome can be interpreted as a favourable one. He cites 
the case of Mary, a schoolgirl known to a particular Social 
Services Department, who was expelled from school. On the 
face of it this is an undesirable event suggesting that 
current social work efforts to help had not yet succeeded.
Her social worker however did not see it in a negative
light. Expulsion from school was, Sheldon complains, 
"massaged into "a not altogether unwelcome opportunity to 
re-evaluate Mary's educational options" (1987, p.583).
This apparently uncritical attitude is condemned by 
Sheldon. He sees it as a dereliction from the kind of 
standards accepted in science. But, in arguing for a more 
critical approach, he is influenced by Karl Popper's
account of science. This philosophy, as 1 shall argue, has 
serious flaws and a better account of the role of
refutations in science is provided by Bayesianism.
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It is easy to see the immediate appeal of Popper's
philosophy to Sheldon since both are prompted by a common
concern. Popper worked briefly as a social worker in
Alfred Adler's child guidance clinics in Vienna. He
reports that many of his friends had enthusiastically
embraced psychoanalytic theories but Popper became worried
by what he saw as their uncritical acceptance of them. They
interpreted all evidence as confirming the theory; nothing
seemed to count against it. The study of psychoanalysis:
seemed to have the effect of an intellectual 
conversion or revelation, opening your eyes to a new 
truth hidden from those not yet initiated. Once your 
eyes were thus opened, you saw [apparent] confirming 
instances everywhere : the world was full of [apparent] 
VERIFICATIONS of the theory. Whatever happened always 
confirmed it (Popper, 1963, p.34).
Popper reports that he was spurred into studying the 
philosophy of science to try to understand how science 
differed from this, as he saw it, dogmatic approach and 
reached his well-known conclusion that the hallmark of a 
scientific theory is that it is falsifiable. While there is 
general agreement however that refutations play a central 
role in science, his account of science has been severely 
criticised.
Let me begin with a brief account of his philosophy 
before detailing the main objections. Popper concedes 
that we cannot prove that a scientific theory is true but, 
because of the asymmetry between positive and negative 
results we can know if it is false. As noted in discussing 
induction, true predictions do not imply that the theory 
from which they were deduced is also true. When the 
prediction is false however it has a quite different
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logical impact on the theory; clearly the theory must be
false. We can reason deductively:
1. if T then P
2. not P 
Therefore not T.
The theory is falsified. Although finding hundreds of
white swans never conclusively proves the hypothesis "all
swans are white", discovering one black swan disproves it.
Popper makes the extreme claim that not only can
evidence not prove a theory but also it cannot increase its
probability. Scientific theories, to Popper, can never be
inductively supported only deductively falsified. When
scientists draw out the empirical consequences of their
theories and design experiments to test them, they are not
trying to confirm their theories but to disprove them.
They do not prefer one theory because it seems more
probable or better supported by the evidence but because it
has so far withstood their attempts to falsify it.
Scientists, according to Popper, can never conclusively
establish that a theory is true or, as a Bayesian would
claim, that it is more probable than another; the only
statement a scientist can make with confidence is that a
theory is false:
the method of falsification presupposes no inductive 
inference, but only the tautological transformations 
of deductive logic whose validity is not in dispute 
(Popper, 1959, p.42).
Where inductivists describe positive results as 
"supporting" a theory. Popper talks of "corroboration". 
This sounds similar but is substantially different in 
Popper's interpretation. Popper's "corroboration" carries
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no implication of increased probability. Indeed he claims 
that the theory remains a highly improbable conjecture but, 
by withstanding attempts at refutation, it shows its 
"fitness to survive". To call a theory well-corroborated 
is to report on its past performance not to make a 
prediction about its future merits. If it were seen as an 
indicator of its future performance, this would involve 
inductive reasoning, which Popper forbids.
Popper has been immensely influential in the social 
sciences. However such damaging criticisms have been made 
of his account of science that it should not be held up as 
a model for social workers.
First, Popper claims that the one certain feature of 
science is that an observation statement, when found to be 
false, can falsify a theory. Yet Popper agrees with the 
argument reported in my previous chapter that observation 
statements are fallible. If it is logically possible that 
the observation is wrong then it is logically possible that 
the theory, although apparently falsified by it, is true. 
The alleged objective certainty is in fact illusory.
In practice, scientists sometimes query the results 
rather than accepting them as counter-evidence. Newton is 
reputed to have done so when the Astronomer-Royal reported 
observations which conflicted with Newton's theories; on 
repeating his observations, the Astronomer-Royal found he 
had made a mistake.
Another criticism of Popper's methodology is that it 
is not the way scientists actually work. They do reason 
inductively and talk of theories being more or less
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probable. At best be is prescribing what scientists ought 
to do not describing what they are doing. This option 
though is also criticised. Putnam (1980) raises an 
objection which seems particularly pertinent to social 
work. Popper's attempt to exclude induction, he argues, is 
based on an unreal picture of science. To Popper, 
scientists are only interested in knowledge for its own 
sake whereas, Putnam points out, science is about 
developing knowledge which can be used; therefore 
scientists must be concerned with the future reliability of 
their theories, not just their past performance and so 
inductive reasoning is an unavoidable part of any practical 
science :
when a scientist accepts a law, he is recommending to 
other men that they rely on it - rely on it, often, in 
practical contexts. Only by wrenching science 
altogether out of the context in which it really 
arises - the context of men trying to change and 
control the world - can Popper even put forward his 
peculiar view on induction. Ideas are not JUST ideas; 
they are guides to action (Putnam, 1980, p.335).
For social workers, this point seems particularly apt.
They want theories for practical purposes. Accepting a
theory affects their actions, having major repercussions on
clients, possibly leading to a child being removed from his
parents, or an offender being recommended for a custodial
sentence rather than a Probation Order. Social workers
have to make predictions; they have to decide which
hypothesis is more reliable, trustworthy or probable.
Imagine the feelings of a client who is told by a
Popperian social worker that he is taking his child away
from him not because the social worker has reasonable
grounds for concluding that the child is likely to be
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abused but because he has a highly Improbable conjecture on
the subject which has not yet been falsified. The
sophisticated client might reply that, in the interests of
science, the child should be left at home so that the
social worker can test his hypothesis; removing the child
would stop the social worker from ever having the right
circumstances in which his conjecture could be falsified.
This however is not an option open to the social worker.
The law requires him to act in the best interests of the
child and this entails reasoning inductively from past
evidence to future probabilities. As Putnam asserts:
since the application of scientific laws does involve 
the anticipation of future successes. Popper is not 
right in maintaining that induction is unnecessary. 
Even if scientists do not inductively anticipate the 
future (and of course they do), men who apply
scientific laws and theories do so (Putnam 1980,
p.355).
Another major problem for Popper's philosophy is the 
Duhem-Quine thesis. Duhem (1905) and Quine (1953) both 
pointed out that experiments in science involve more than a 
single conjecture and an empirical observation. To derive 
a prediction, additional premises are needed, at least to 
state that the "initial conditions" are met, i.e. that the 
circumstances to which the theory refers are present. In 
the simple example of the hypothesis "all swans are white" 
we need an additional premise that "this is a swan" before 
we can infer "this is white." If observation shows that 
this swan is black, we may infer that the set of premises 
as a whole is false but not specifically that the 
hypothesis is.
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Falsification then does not hit a specific hypothesis.
When a prediction is proved wrong, scientists have to make
some change in the premises but no specific hypothesis is
logically targeted by the refutation. Consequently, as
Quine emphasised:
any statement can be held to be true come what may, if 
we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the 
system...Conversely, by the same token, no statement 
is immune to revision (1953, p.43).
In fact, scientific theories are rarely as simple as 
the swan example and so a falsified prediction usually 
contradicts a far bigger set of premises than just two, 
complicating still more the question of which premise is at 
fault.
Indeed, as Kuhn (1962) and Lakatos (1970) have 
highlighted, predictions in science are typically derived 
from several theories. Kuhn, as was mentioned in the last 
chapter, describes scientists as working within a 
"paradigm". Lakatos has a similar concept of "scientific 
research programme", a unit consisting of a so-called "hard 
core", the central theories such as Newton's laws, and a 
"protective belt", comprising the auxiliary theories which 
are needed to link the hard core to empirical observations. 
The latter are described as "protective" because, when 
faced with falsifying evidence, scientists will generally 
revise them rather than the central theories.
When we apply Popper's ideas on falsification to a 
paradigm or a scientific research programme, we run into 
serious problems.
Popper claimed that "scientific" theories, unlike
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"non-scientific" ones, were falslfiable. However Lakatos 
and Kuhn make the point that some of the most highly 
valued scientific theories would be classed as unscientific 
by Popper because, on their own, they are not testable: 
"exactly the most admired scientific theories simply fail 
to forbid any observable state of affairs" (Lakatos,1970,
p.100).
Putnam illustrates this point with Newton's theory of
universal gravitation. This is a law which specifies the
force every body exerts on every other body but:
this theory does not imply a single basic sentence! 
Indeed, any motions whatsoever are compatible with 
this theory, since the theory says nothing about what 
forces other than gravitations may be present. The 
(gravitational) forces are not themselves directly 
measurable; consequently not a single prediction can 
be deduced from the theory, (Putnam, 1980 p.358).
Testing such an abstract theory only becomes possible
when it is connected with lower level theories. In
Lakatos's terms, it forms part of the "hard core" of the
Newtonian research programme. While the research programme
is "progressive" or the paradigm is successful, scientists
assume that the core theories are correct; any
falsification is not seen as challenging them.
Counter-examples are dealt with either by altering one of
the lower level theories or merely by leaving it to one
side as an anomaly while the more fruitful aspects of the
theory are explored.
This version of how scientists treat the most highly
valued theories is a serious challenge to Popper's account
of science. In the face of these criticisms. Popper gave up
his initial claim that theories can be judged scientific by
227
seeing whether they are logically falsifiable. He modified
his position to the claim that scientists should treat
their theories as falsifiable. They could do this, he
suggested, by being willing to state in advance what
evidence will make them give up a theory:
CRITERIA OF REFUTATION have to be laid down 
beforehand: it must be agreed which observable
situations, if actually observed, mean that the theory 
is refuted (Popper, 1963, p.38).
Returning to Popper's original goal of demarcating 
science from what he considered to be the pseudoscience of 
psychoanalysis, he claims that psychoanalysts are not 
scientific because they are not willing to propose any such 
criteria :
what kind of clinical responses would refute to the 
satisfaction of the analyst not merely a particular 
diagnosis but psychoanalysis itself? (Popper,1963, 
p.38, footnote 3).
Lakatos argues that this does not differentiate
psychoanalysts from scientists:
but what kind of observation would refute to the 
satisfaction of the Newtonian not merely a particular 
version but Newtonian theory itself? (Lakatos, 1970, 
P.101) .
Sheldon (1978, p.14) draws on Popper's argument to 
criticise social work use of psychoanalytic theories which, 
he complains, have "built-in defences against disbelief." 
The ability of supporters to deal with all counter-evidence 
without altering the central ideas he condemns as a 
"theoretical sleight of hand." But we can direct Lakatos' 
argument at Sheldon himself and ask, in relation to the 
research programme that he admires, namely behaviourial 
learning theories: what results would lead a behaviourist
to give up not merely one hypothesis but the entire
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approach? In his own textbook on behaviour modification 
(1982), Sheldon does not tell us what results would make 
him give up this approach. He does not seem to regard a 
single refutation as making him question his confidence in 
the central learning theories. But in failing to live up to 
Popper's prescriptions, Sheldon is in line with most 
scientists.
Popper's account of how scientists deal, or should 
deal, with refutations runs into difficulties because, when 
a prediction from a complex set of hypotheses is found to 
be wrong, deductive logic cannot pinpoint the defective 
premise. The Bayesian approach can however offer an 
account of how scientists decide which hypothesis to give 
up or modify. Howson and Urbach (1989, p.97) argue that, 
when a set of premises have been falsified, it is possible 
to determine "which hypothesis suffers most in the 
refutation". Starting with the prior probabilities of the 
theory and the auxiliary hypotheses individually, it is 
possible, using the probability calculus, to determine the 
posterior probability of each, given the falsifying 
evidence. Differences in the prior probabilities lead to 
sharply asymmetric effects on the posterior probabilities 
in the light of falsifying evidence. The authors 
illustrate this with an example where the prior probability 
of the theory, P(t), equals 0.9 and that of the auxiliary 
hypothesis, P(a), equals 0.6. The posterior probabilities 
are strikingly different: P(t/e) - 0.8787 while P(a/e) *
0.073. The probability of a has been markedly reduced 
while that of t is only slightly affected. A substantial
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difference is found even if the prior probabilities are 
much closer. If P(a) is kept at 0.6 and the P(t) is 
reduced to 0.7, the posterior probabilities work out as 
P(t/e) * 0.65 and P(a/e) - 0.21. Given results like these, 
a scientists's decision to keep the theory and modify the 
auxiliary hypothesis is reasonable.
Hence the behaviourist (or psychoanalyst) who has a 
single therapeutic failure and decides that it challenges 
the assumptions made in that particular application rather 
than rather than the learning (or psychoanalytic) theories 
themselves is not irrationally protecting a pet theory but 
acting reasonably given his assessment of the relative 
support for the theories and the auxiliary assumptions.
For Popper, the hallmark of a scientist is willingness 
to reject a theory in the light of the evidence. Lakatos, 
with his talk of scientists "protecting" a theory, makes it 
sound as if scientists are as dogmatically attached to 
their theories as Popper's analytic friends were to Freud. 
This is wrong but interpreting falsifying evidence, though 
a rational process, is not as simple as Popper suggested.
Let us return to Sheldon's initial concern*, social 
workers' indifference to refutations. In Popper's critical 
account of his analytic friends who thought they "saw 
confirming instances everywhere", he gives the impression 
that, to an inductivist, their observations would be 
genuine confirmations and that only his radical revision of 
scientific method can discredit them. This is not so.
On the Bayesian account, the degree of support 
evidence provides for a theory is relative to its
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improbability given background knowledge alone. If e is 
predicted by the theory but is otherwise highly unlikely 
then it provides strong confirmation. But in the case of 
psychoanalysis, such strong support is hard to find. The 
theories do not on the whole permit specific predictions. 
Inferring precise consequences from the theories is
complicated in particular by the conjectured role of 
"defence mechanisms" such as projection and denial whereby 
aspects of the unconscious which are unacceptable to the 
conscious mind are converted into a tolerable form. Hence 
it can for example be predicted that an unresolved Oedipal 
conflict will manifest itself in overt behaviour but its
specific form cannot be specified. Both a display of anger
and one of affection towards one's father might, for
instance, be interpreted as evidence for the underlying
conflict. Indeed the range of behaviour consistent with 
the hypothesis that someone has an unresolved Oedipal
conflict is so great that, as Popper complained, whatever 
happens is consistent with it. Such evidence however does 
not, on a Bayesian account, support the theory. The
probability of a particular item of behaviour is no greater 
given the psychoanalytic hypothesis than it is in general: 
the P (e/h) is equal to P(e/k).
The vague goals of many social workers present a
similar obstacle to testing. Bayes theorem endorses 
Sheldon’s complaint that fieldworkers cannot test their 
hypotheses while they continue to express their aims in 
imprecise terms. The problem with a vague prediction is 
that any of a wide range of results can be fitted into it.
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Suppose the goal of working with a depressed client is 
loosely specified as "improved social functioning", then 
any sign of new behaviour might seem to the social worker 
evidence of improvement. But the probability of some 
change in behaviour is high whether or not the social 
worker is being effective so observing one small change 
does not offer much support to the hypothesis that the 
intervention is producing improvement.
Conversely, if a fieldworker makes a precise 
prediction such as : "the client will start to take her
children to school", something which she has been unable to 
do for months, the prior probability of this happening 
without any help, P(e/k), would seem lower than its 
likelihood if the intervention works, P(e/h). If e is then 
observed, confidence in the hypothesis is substantially 
increased. Unless a theory can be tested in this way it 
cannot gain much empirical support.
In summary, Sheldon rightly condemns social workers' 
indifference to counter-evidence as unscientific. I 
disagree only with his use of Popper's philosophy of 
science to endorse his argument. This attempt to provide an 
account of science without any inductive reasoning has been 
shown to have serious faults. The Bayesian account on the 
other hand not only sustains Sheldon's criticisms but also 
provides a clear account of the impact of refutations in 
science.
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RELATIVISM AND THE SOCIAL CONTEXT
For empiricists in social work there are distinct 
areas of decision-making in fieldwork. Social workers need 
to, first, evaluate theories and decide which, if any, is 
the most probable. In this area, scientific methods can 
help them. Secondly, they need to decide on the goals of 
their intervention. Then, in the light of these two 
decisions, they must judge which of the possible ways of 
achieving them is best. Here several other factors are 
important as well as scientific evaluation of the rival 
methods. Relativists however merge these areas and claim 
that both deciding what to do and how to do it is entirely 
determined by social and psychological factors.
Let me begin by clarifying the role empiricists would 
ascribe to scientific methods before considering the 
relativists' criticisms of it.
For scientists appraising rival theories, the decision 
is typically between theories which are rivals in the sense 
that they are mutually inconsistent: if one is true, the
other is false. Rival theories of this sort occur in 
social work, a classic conflict being between 
psychoanalytic theories and behavioural ones. However many 
theories in social work are consistent and complementary. 
Human behaviour is generally thought to have a complex 
causation and different theories often focus on different 
strands of causation. For example, a theory which connects 
juvenile delinquency to family dynamics usually claims to 
identify a significant cause but by no means the only one.
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It is compatible with theories explaining delinquency in 
terms of other factors such as biological processes or peer 
group pressures. These various theories suggest different 
ways of helping: focusing, for instance, on the family, the 
physical health or the peer group. Empirical research can 
help us learn about the probable effectiveness of different 
strategies but this alone does not determine what social 
workers should do. Even if research shows that a particular 
approach is very effective, consideration of its cost or 
political acceptability may lead the social worker to 
choose an alternative course of action. In deciding which 
theory to draw on as the basis for action, social workers
face a complex decision.
Researchers have been censured for ignoring the 
essential role of values and overstating the scope of 
scientific evaluation in social work. Raynor accuses
empiricists of having "one eye closed" (1984, p.l) because, 
he argues, while empirical research "may help to improve 
the technical efficacy of methods, it can tell us little 
about the desirability of the goals towards which our 
methods are directed, or the social functions they serve." 
In an article very critical of social work researchers, he 
suggests that fieldworkers do not use research because they 
"experience research as existing on some other plane, 
irrelevant to their real concerns" (1984, p .2). 
Researchers, he claims, concentrate "on technical
discussion of means at the expense of consideration of 
ends" (Raynor, 1984, p.7). As evidence he cites two books 
by Joel Fischer, one called "The Effectiveness of Social
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Casework" and the other "Effective Casework Practice". As 
their titles suggest, both books focus on questions of 
effectiveness, not on the social and political context of 
social work or on moral issues.
His accusation that Fischer and other empiricists 
have one eye closed - that they are blind to the complex 
issues of values- is however unfair. It is true that many 
researchers do emphasise the issue of effectiveness but 
this does not mean they exclude moral issues. The reason 
they concentrate on evaluation is simply that this is their 
area of competence and they do not claim to answer all 
questions in social work. Textbooks on research for social 
workers are quite clear about the scope of their subject. 
Tripodi (1984, p.l) begins by stating that evaluative 
research can provide "knowledge about the extent to which 
practitioners have achieved their objectives". Reid and 
White (1989) devote a chapter to the contribution that 
research can make, suggesting that it only a part of 
decision-making in social work. But that contribution is 
important; checking the accuracy of theories and the 
effects of your efforts is or should be a major concern of 
f ieIdworkers.
Even this necessary but limited role of research is 
denied though by many of those who adopt a relativist view 
of knowledge. It appears to be increasingly believed in 
social work that the criticisms of positivism have 
destroyed all of science's claim to epistemological 
advantage over intuitive approaches. For the relativist, 
scientific methods are seen as belonging to a culture which
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is neither better nor worse than humanist cultures but 
certainly less popular in social work. Advocates of 
empirical research are depicted as "imperialists" (Paley, 
1987) trying to extend their sphere of influence by 
attacking fieldworkers with phoney arguments about the need 
for empirical evidence and reliable evaluation.
Paley (1987) is one of the most eloquent in attacking 
the naturalist movement in social work. He also provides 
the most detailed background to his relativism. He bases 
his rejection of empiricism on a relativist interpretation 
of Kuhn's "incommensurability thesis" and Wittgenstein's 
theory of meaning. His argument has two strands. First, 
the claim examined in the preceding chapter that there is 
no common language and hence no shared facts against which 
to compare theories. Secondly, the contention that there 
are no shared criteria of rationality to use in judging 
rival theories.
Paley urges the humanist majority in social work to 
see the value assigned to scientific knowledge as based on 
cultural rather than epistemological factors. He restates 
the naturalist/humanist debate in terms of a power struggle 
between the academic world and fieldwork and incites 
practitioners to defend their position. He maintains that 
the criticisms which naturalists level at current fieldwork 
are based on scientific criteria but fieldworkers generally 
do not share their scientific beliefs and therefore need 
not take such criticisms seriously. I imagine that to 
Paley, an academic's advice to social workers to look for 
independent, empirical evidence of their intuitive
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judgements is like a Moslem encouraging a Christian to 
attend the mosque.
Paley's relativism has far-reaching consequences for 
social work. He rules out the naturalist's hope of ever 
developing a body of knowledge or of being able "to 
identify anything that could be 'taught to future 
generations of social workers'" (1987, p.182). He 
suggests that the only useful research is sociological not 
evaluative, finding out what social workers do and how they 
appraise their work but not judging it by scientific 
standards since there are no rational grounds, he claims, 
for considering them to be a more reliable check than 
fieldworker's own judgements.
Howe (1987) also illustrates the extensive 
repercussions of adopting relativism in social work. He has 
written an introductory text on social work theories for 
students which, taking a relativist line, relegates 
scientific methods to being one approach among many equally 
valid. Therefore in presenting theories to students he does 
not consider any questions about their truth or 
probability. The decision about which theories to use is 
left to the individual student who "pays her money and 
takes her choice" (Howe, 1987, p.166). Her decision 
though, Howe thinks, will be influenced by her social 
context: "theories", he claims, "emerge as products of
their time and place" (p.167).
The aim of Howe's book is to help students make an 
informed choice between theories by clarifying the 
political nature of the type of practice they lead to and
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offering some guidance on their psychological appeal.
Howe classifies theories on two dimensions: first, on
whether they lead to social work interventions which help 
to maintain or to challenge current social structures. 
Those, for example, which imply that problems can be 
resolved by altering individual or family behaviour require 
no changes in wider society whereas those which explain 
clients' problems in terms of social forces imply that what 
is needed is radical change in society rather than in the 
client.
The second dimension Howe uses to characterise 
theories is whether they take, as he terms it, an objective 
or subjective approach to understanding human actions. This 
division reflects the classic (and, as I have argued in 
this thesis, inaccurate) positivist/humanist split between 
studying observable behaviour and mental phenomena. 
Objective, scientific study, Howe claims, sees Man as 
"plastic":
we are essentially passive creatures. We are natural 
and determined phenomenon just as much as the rocks, 
plants and animals around us. Our behaviour is 
therefore predictable in given situations. Plastic 
Man is programmed and can be conditioned (p.27).
The subjective approach in contrast studies the
meaning of actions, what people think and feel:
with the subjective approach, human nature enjoys free 
will. Hollis (1977) calls this self-determining 
individual 'Autonomous Man'. Such a person 
interprets, reflects, plans, decides, acts 
intentionally and is responsible for his choices, 
(p.29) .
Putting these two dimensions together produces four 
categories of theory each of which Howe links to a type of 
social worker :
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1. “the fixers", objective social regulators, theorists in 
the scientific tradition aiming at maintaining social 
structures.
2. "the seekers after meaning", subjective social 
regulators, humanists encouraging the individual to find 
his own solutions through re-interpreting his experience.
3. "the raisers of consciousness", subjective reformers, 
similar to the last category but encouraging a radical re­
interpretation, such as some feminist therapies.
4. "the revolutionaries", objective reformers, Marxist 
social work.
While presenting social work students with the choice 
between these categories, Howe does not address the 
question which would be most useful to them, namely which, 
if any, of the theories are true or probable. Our values 
may lead us to prefer one theory and to hope that it is 
true or that a therapeutic method will be effective but the 
world does not necessarily conform to our wishes. The
“raisers of consciousness" may challenge the social system 
if their efforts have their intended effect. The theories 
Howe calls the "fixers" will only help maintain social 
stability if they work.
Howe does touch on these questions but in doing so he 
is inconsistent. In spite of presenting them as a feature 
of some theories rather than a way of testing theories in 
general, Howe does think they have a particular merit: they 
lead to more effective ways of helping people. In
describing changes in medical theories, he asserts that
later theories are better because they "allow more
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efficacious treatments" (Howe, 1987, p.11). Similarly in
discussing behavioural social work, he says:
if social workers want to be effective they have to 
find effective cures. The rigorous and exacting 
methods of science will help social workers identify 
treatment procedures that lead to behavioural cures 
(p.59) .
But who does not want to be effective? No social 
worker is interested merely in studying people. The 
Marxist, feminist, or Rogerian social worker all want to 
act and to have some impact on the problems they have 
identified. Howe's views are puzzling. Either he 
mistakenly thinks of science as a narrow, positivist 
discipline which cannot be extended to the subjective world 
of mental experience or he holds the relativist view that 
scientific method is only one way of reasoning with no 
epistemological merit - but this is inconsistent with his 
belief that it produces more effective methods of helping.
Whatever his thinking, Howe has produced a book for 
students in which he acknowledges the practical importance 
of theory choice in social work since they may lead to the 
client being offered a different type of help. And yet he 
leaves such a momentous decision to the individual 
presenting the options at times in frivolous language, 
contrasting the "car maintenance manuals" of behaviourism 
with "Freudian who-done-its" and "political thrillers" 
(p.94). He gives no essential role to testing theories and 
evaluating outcomes is reduced to a personality trait 
rather than a rational process. He even appears to see the 
desire to be effective as a quirk not a universal feature 
of social work.
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Relativism as promoted in social work has far-reaching 
practical implications. Kuhn's philosophy of science is 
appealed to by almost all to justify their relativism but, 
I shall argue, it does not provide a good basis.
KUHN'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Kuhn's study of the history of science, as has been 
mentioned, led him to develop the concept of a "paradigm". 
Therefore the issue of theory choice is, in Kuhnian terms, 
how do scientists choose between paradigms and under what
circumstances do they abandon one.
Kuhn's account of scientific practice is similar to 
the Bayesian one but he offers a very different rationale 
for it.
The account of paradigm choice has to be put in the 
context of Kuhn's distinction between two periods in 
science: "normal" and "revolutionary" times. Most of the
time, scientists in a particular subject work within a
common paradigm. Unlike Popper's picture of scientists
striving continually to falsify their theories, Kuhn argues 
that, in a period of normal science, the paradigm is 
generally accepted without question and counter-evidence is 
always interpreted as refuting some auxiliary hypothesis. 
The Bayesian account says that the basic theories are 
tested by the experiments but, because of their greater 
probability, scientists rationally decide that
falsifications challenge lower level hypotheses. Kuhn 
describes the situation more as a gentlemen's agreement to
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assume the truth of the core ideas. Scientists, he says,
are not trying to test the paradigm but to extend and
improve its explanatory power. When they apply it in a new
domain, they are involved in what he calls "puzzle-
solving", using this term to indicate that they assume the
truth of the paradigm and try to make it fit the data. Any
falsifications will be seen as indicating a fault in the
auxiliary theories. The scientist's aim is to think of
adaptations in these lower level theories which will make
the paradigm and the evidence consistent. The challenge in
normal science is to the ingenuity of the scientist rather
than the truth of the core assumptions of the paradigm:
if it [the paradigm] fails the test, only his own 
ability not the corpus of current science is impugned. 
In short, though tests occur frequently in normal 
science, these tests are of a peculiar sort, for in 
the final analysis it is the individual scientist 
rather then the current theory which is tested (Kuhn, 
1970, p.5).
If scientists cannot devise a modification of lower 
level assumptions in the light of a falsification, they 
will not necessarily look critically at the central 
assumptions of the paradigm. They will probably leave the 
awkward result on one side as an anomaly and concentrate on 
areas in which the paradigm continues to be fruitful.
However, at times of "revolution", the paradigm is 
reappraised. Confidence in it is weakened perhaps by an 
accumulation of anomalies. People start to question its 
accuracy or ability to deal with the phenomena; they look 
around for alternative ideas; possibly then a rival 
paradigm is created. Some scientists will opt for the new 
paradigm and then a revolution will take place. At the end
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of it, one of the paradigms will have gained ascendancy. A
new period of normal science then begins within the
victorious paradigm.
In Kuhn's early work, the decision to switch
allegiance from one paradigm to another does not seem to be
a rational judgement. Comparison of the rival paradigms on
rational grounds is impossible for two reasons. First, as
discussed in the previous chapter, he considers that the
meaning of all terms changes with paradigm change. This
means there is no common body of empirical evidence against
which the paradigms can be judged. He therefore rules out
the usual scientific practice of judging one theory better
than another because it provides a better account of what
we have observed.
Secondly, he claims that standards as well as meanings
vary between paradigms; there are no independent criteria
of what counts as a good explanation and hence comparisons
cannot be made. Accepting a paradigm involves judging that
it is better than its rival but, although matters of
evidence and logic will influence this judgement, it is
ultimately due to the psychology of the individual and the
dynamics of the scientific group to which he belongs:
as in political revolution, so in paradigrm choice - 
there is no standard higher than the assent of the 
relevant community. To discover how scientific 
revolutions are effected, we shall therefore have to 
examine not only the impact of nature and of logic, 
but also the techniques of persuasive argumentation 
effective within the quite special groups that 
constitute the community of scientists (Kuhn, 1970, 
p.94) .
To most of his readers it has seemed that Kuhn is 
claiming that paradigm choice is not rationally based.
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Lakatos provides a typical reading:
each paradigm contains its own standards. The crisis 
sweeps away not only the old theories and rules but 
also the standards which made us respect them. The 
new paradigm brings a totally new rationality. There 
are no super-paradigmatic standards. The change is a 
bandwagon effect. Thus in Kuhn's view scientific 
revolution is irrational, a matter for mob psychology 
(Lakatos, 1970, p.178).
Applying these ideas to rival methods in social work,
relativists claim that choosing between say behaviour
modification techniques and client-centred therapy cannot
be based on a rational assessment of their relative
effectiveness. Behaviourists may point out that their
approach is supported by a greater weight of empirical
evidence but relativists such as Howe would maintain that
they are judging by a criterion which is internal to their
behavioural paradigm.
Kuhn (1978, Chapter 13) has strongly objected to this
interpretation of his writings and denies saying that
theory-choice is irrational: "reports of this sort manifest
total misunderstanding." The point he was trying to make
in his earlier work, he says, is that although there are
scientific criteria for theory-choice, they do not
determine a specific answer which all rational scientists
must accept. It is possible to reject a new paradigm
without being irrational or unscientific. He cites his
argument in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions:
lifelong resistance (to a new theory) ... is not a 
violation of scientific standards... Though the
historian can always find men - Priestley, for
instance - who were unreasonable to resist as long as 
they did, he will not find a point at which resistance 
becomes illogical or unscientific (Kuhn, 1970, p.320).
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He does not, he claims, think that all standards vary
between paradigms. On the contrary, his study of the
history of science has shown there is considerable
consistency in how different scientists in different ages
and paradigms judge theories. He agrees with the
empiricist that it is possible to identify criteria which
are constant. He lists five such criteria "not because
they are exhaustive, but because they are individually
important and collectively sufficiently varied to indicate
what is at stake":
first, a theory should be accurate*, within its domain, 
that is, consequences deducible from a theory should 
be in demonstrated agreement with the results of 
existing experiments and observations. Second, a 
theory should be consistent, not only internally or 
with itself, but also with other currently accepted 
theories...Third, it should have broad scope: in
particular, a theory's consequences should extend far 
beyond the particular observations, laws, or 
subtheories it was initially designed to explain. 
Fourth, and closely related, it should be simple, 
bringing order to phenomena that in its absence would 
be individually isolated ....Fifth, a theory should be 
fruitful of new research findings (Kuhn, 1978, p.321).
Given these changes in Kuhn's later work, the case he
is trying to present seems very close to that of an
empiricist. One difference he would claim though is that,
while the empiricist considers that the criteria for
theory-choice are rationally justified principles, Kuhn
thinks that they are values which are influential only
because of their general acceptance:
though the experiences of scientists provides no 
philosophical justification for the values they deploy 
(such justification would solve the problem of 
induction), those values are in part learned from that
experience, and they evolve with it (Kuhn, 1978,
p.335).
Even this apparent difference from empiricists
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disappears If we accept Newton-Smlth's argument (1981, 
p.114). He complains that Kuhn is muddled in his thinking 
here in linking the justification of induction in general 
to the specific issue of justifying scientific principles. 
He argues that if Kuhn is basing his claim that science is 
non-rational on a general scepticism about induction then 
the claim follows immediately from this scepticism and all 
the complex argument of his book is redundant. If on the 
other hand he is claiming that science is not rational 
because particular principles are not justified then to go 
on to describe them as grounded in experience is 
contradictory since this is equivalent to saying that they 
are inductively justified.
In the light of all these points, Kuhn's final 
position appears to be empiricist. The biggest difference 
remaining between his and the Bayesian account is that 
whereas Kuhn only describes (rather vaguely) some of the 
principles scientists use in weighing the evidence, 
Bayesianism provides an explanation for them in terms of 
the probability calculus.
Kuhn contests the charge of being a relativist and 
claims that those who use his philosophy to attack the 
scientific enterprise misunderstand him. Therefore his 
philosophy provides a poor foundation for those who want to 
reject scientific methods in social work.
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CONCLUSION
Theories taught to social workers and applied In 
social work are Influential In that they affect the type of 
help offered to clients. Their truth or falsity Is 
therefore of great significance. At present, decisions 
about which theories to accept as the basis for action are 
mainly left to Individual fieldworkers who, as 1 discussed 
In Chapter Six, appear to reach those decisions on the 
basis of limited and often biassed evidence.
In contrast, scientists judge theories according to 
the empirical evidence for or against them. Scientific 
methods however do not provide a way of decisively proving 
or disproving a theory; science does not offer conclusive 
certainty. It does though enable us to judge the 
probability of our theories. By deducing empirical 
consequences and checking whether they are true or false, 
we collect evidence which supports or challenges our Ideas. 
1 have presented a Bayesian account of how theories are 
appraised In the light of the evidence. The more support a 
theory collects, the more confidence we have In It.
While social workers hostile to science have 
traditionally accepted Its merits but argued It cannot be 
extended to the study of human actions, there Is a new and 
apparently growing movement which questions the rationality 
of science and hence Its desirability as a model for social 
work. Often based on a reading of Kuhn's philosophy which 
the author himself repudiates, these "relativists" claim 
that scientific methods have no eplstemlc validity.
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reflecting only the values of a particular culture or 
paradigm. They quite rightly stress the importance of 
values in social work but overstate their case. In 
deciding which theories to use. social workers are partly 
guided by values. They need to decide which problems they 
should deal with, and which ways of helping are morally, 
politically, or economically acceptable. Scientific 
methods cannot answer these questions but they can help 
social workers judge whether the course of action they 
finally choose has its intended effect or whether it leads 
to unintended and undesirable consequences.
Some present relativism as an apparently pragmatic and 
liberating view. Heineman (1981) talks of choosing 
whichever theory is best in the circumstances. Wilkes 
(1981) suggests using anything that works. Fieldworkers 
often use similar phrases to describe a down-to-earth, 
practical (non-scientific) approach. But these sentiments 
are truisms. Of course we want to use the best or most 
effective methods. But the question which they leave 
untouched is how are we to decide? As I have argued 
throughout this thesis, we need scientific methods to help 
us reach a well-grounded judgement.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE SCIENTIFIC SOCIAL WORKER
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters have examined the debate about 
the role of scientific methods in social work and have
argued that social workers can and should adopt a more
scientific approach. This chapter discusses how social 
workers can incorporate scientific methods into their 
practice and considers what changes this would require in 
the currently pre-dominant style of working.
Large scale, controlled trials of social work practice 
have, to date, been the most prominent example of a 
scientific approach in social work. In recent years 
though, their utility has been questioned. There is 
widespread agreement that, at present in social work, the 
first priority is to get a more precise account of what
social workers are doing. The first section of this
chapter discusses the reasons for this conclusion.
In the remainder of the chapter, I shall focus 
particularly on how individual fieldworkers can use 
scientific methods in their work. The "single case study 
design" offers a way of encouraging social workers to make 
their reasoning explicit and to include scientific methods 
in their day-to-day tasks of making assessments, providing 
help, and evaluating their efforts. In my discussion, the
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stages of the case study are analysed in relation to the 
changes needed in current fieldwork practices if social
workers are to incorporate this method into their work.
LARGE SCALE AND INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH
In the 1960s and 70s particularly, the large-scale 
controlled trial was considered by researchers the most 
reliable source of evidence on the effectiveness of social 
work methods. Fieldworkers though have generally been 
hostile to this form of evaluation which has, for the most 
part, produced mainly negative results on the effectiveness 
of social work, results which practitioners believe (or 
hope) are an inaccurate measure of their efforts. But the 
value of conducting further trials at present is now being 
questioned by researchers, because of doubts not about the 
validity of the results but about their usefulness to 
social workers.
For example, the social work service evaluated in the 
many studies carried out in the U.S.A. is poorly defined. 
We know that it ranged over individual, family, and 
groupwork methods. In some cases, the social workers 
offered predominantly a counselling service; in others this 
was combined with practical help and advice. Unlike most 
British social workers who have difficulty in specifying
which theories, if any, they are using, the American social
workers mainly reported that their counselling was based
on psychoanalytic theories. But this degree of description 
is of very limited value. Within each category, social
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workers may vary a great deal in what they actually do. 
For example, "psychodynamic casework" does not refer to a 
single theory or a specific therapeutic method. There is 
an ever-increasing number of different analytic theories. 
Even use of the same theory does not imply a uniform 
therapy; there are many therapeutic techniques which each 
social worker might have used.
This lack of detail is a serious problem in using the 
results; it is difficult to know precisely what to avoid as 
a result of these trials. Sheldon points out the 
unsatisfactory nature of these studies and complains that;
something long-term, predominantly verbal and vaguely 
psychodynamic" is in many studies our best 
understanding of what we probably shouldn't invest in 
again (Sheldon, 1986, p.231).
Moreover the imprecision makes it difficult to rule 
out alternative explanations to the general conclusion that 
the negative results indicate that the social work service 
was ineffective. For example. Wood (1978) suggests that 
the global results might mask examples of both effective 
and damaging work, the differences being averaged out in 
the final result. This suggestion is plausible enough to 
warrant investigation but this, on the available evidence, 
cannot be done.
Another explanation of the negative results of these 
trials is proposed by Strean (in Fischer, 1976). Defending 
the psychoanalytic theories which underpinned much of the 
work, he maintains that the results are evidence of poor 
practice not poor theory. The problem, he says, is that 
"psycho-dynamic theory is poorly and fragmentally utilized.
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abused, and misapplied by many if not most caseworkers in 
their practice” . Again, the available evidence is not 
sufficiently detailed to check this claim.
Therefore, the primary task at present is seen to be 
the "important task of clearly identifying the nature of 
the input” (Sheldon, 1982b, p.8). In 1978, Joel Fischer, 
a leading researcher in the U.S.A., called for a moratorium 
on group experimental evaluative studies while researchers 
concentrated instead on building up understanding of the 
methods of helping, a view echoed by Wood (1978).
As the discussion on current practice in Chapter Two 
reported, developing a clearer account of social work is 
not just a question of asking fieldworkers because they 
tend to work in an intuitive way and have difficulty in 
reporting their methods or goals. The problem is how to 
help practitioners formulate their work.
In recent years several books and articles have 
proposed the "single case study design" as a possible aid 
(e.g, Fischer (1978), Jayaratne and Levy (1979), Tripodi 
(1983, Chapter 7), Sheldon (1983), and Reid and Smith 
(1989, Chapter 6). This is a research design which studies 
the improvement made in an individual case. Such a design 
is claimed to have two functions. First it provides some 
evaluation of the social work intervention and helps social 
workers to learn from their experience. Secondly, it 
encourages fieldworkers to adopt a more systematic, 
rigorous, and explicit approach to their work.
In brief, the single case study design requires the 
social worker to make an assessment of the client's
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problem, state the goals of social work Intervention, 
record what help is given, and measure what improvement, if 
any, is then observed.
This is very similar to the type of good, reflective, 
critical practice endorsed by CCETSW in its guidelines for 
training (discussed in Chapter 2). It also resembles the 
“case study" which is familiar to all social workers, 
especially students. The typical format of a case study 
also involves an assessment of the problem, a description 
of work carried out, and an appraisal of progress made. 
The "single case study" differs from the standard case 
study though in the degree of care taken in specifying and 
recording the various stages of the study. The CCETSW 
guidelines on social work practice state that one of the 
areas in which social workers must demonstrate competence 
is in "evaluating their work" (CCETSW, 1989, p.13). The 
single case study specifies how this can be done using 
scientific standards of evidence and reasoning.
My aims in the following discussion are twofold; 
first, to show what changes would be needed if the single 
case study were adopted by fieldworkers who currently work 
in a predominantly intuitive way; and, secondly, to show 
how the empiricist view of science defended in this thesis 
leads to a version of the single case study which can 
nullify the standard, humanist objections to its use.
FORMULATING PRACTICE WISDOM
The single case study design requires fieldworkers 
to make their reasoning explicit, providing an assessment
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of the problem, their plan of intervention, and their 
goals.
The scientific approach is not alone in asking 
fieldworkers to be clear and explicit about their 
reasoning. Humanist writers have also argued for its 
importance. England (1986) for instance, although claiming 
scientific testing is inappropriate, wants social workers 
to provide detailed case studies so that their work can be 
critically examined by colleagues.
However studies show that few fieldworkers do 
articulate their work methods in much detail. In 
Sainsbury's study of clients' opinions of their contact 
with social workers, many reported "an uneasy lack of 
clarity" (Sainsbury, 1980b) about the social workers' aims 
and methods. This vagueness arises not only from social 
workers failing to tell clients what they are doing and why 
but also because they seem not to be clear even to
themselves. Goldberg and Warburton's (1979) study of the 
work of a local authority Social Services Department, 
discussed in Chapter 2, reported that fieldworkers had 
difficulty in describing their work accurately and in
saying with any precision what their goals were or how they 
hoped to achieve them.
The single case study requires three main categories 
of information: of assessments, plans, and goals. Let us
consider each in turn.
Social workers appear best able to be articulate in
making assessments of clients and their problems. 
Assessments are a standard part of record keeping and of
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the many reports social workers have to produce for case 
conferences or legal proceedings. Goldberg and Warburton 
(1979) reported that fieldworkers found this aspect of
their work easiest to talk about, often indeed offering an 
assessment when they had actually been asked for their
plans and goals.
The single case study however demands a degree of
precision often lacking in standard assessments. 
Specifically, it wants problems specified in sufficient 
detail to provide an initial measure, a "baseline report", 
against which the outcome can be checked. If the social 
worker is trying, for example, to help a mother organise 
the children's bedtime earlier and with less friction, a 
hazy impression that "the children often get to bed very 
late" needs to be made precise and when exactly they get to 
bed each night should be recorded. Then in judging the 
progress that has been made, any change and the amount of 
change can be seen. The hazy assessment can only produce 
an equally imprecise impression that bedtime has got 
earlier.
But how precise should one be? Clearly it is not 
necessary to state the exact second the child went to bed 
or the number of decibels it created in the process. 1 
shall discuss this question later.
In formulating their plans, fieldworkers have even 
greater difficulty in providing a detailed account. It may 
be that imprecise accounts of their intentions are in some 
cases as accurate as is feasible; some fieldworkers, 
particularly in long term work, seem to drift into a fairly
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aimless, friendly relationship with their clients. Fisher, 
Newton and Sainsbury's (1984) study of long term work with 
people who were or had been mentally ill supports this 
possibility. Despite close discussion, many of the 
fieldworkers were unable to specify their plans as more 
than a vague “supportive" relationship, hoping this would 
improve or help maintain the client's mental health.
Even such general phrases are of course a formulation 
of plans but they do not meet the requirements of the 
single case study. Again, the problem is that they are too 
ill-defined. We need some way of checking that the social 
work help being evaluated has in fact been provided but 
with such an imprecise phrase, it is difficult to judge 
whether or not a fieldworker is being supportive. A second 
function in using the single case study is to encourage 
fieldworkers to make their practice theory explicit not 
only for evaluation purposes but also so that other social 
workers can learn from successful cases; "provide a 
supportive relationship" is not a clear enough instruction 
for anyone to follow.
Asking fieldworkers to formulate their methods is not 
simply asking for a description of what they do. It is 
asking them to say which of the many things they do they 
think are causally significant in helping clients. There 
may be disagreement. Freudians for instance would consider 
that the content of their interpretations was the key 
factor but Rogerians would dispute this, arguing that it is 
not what they say but the relationship within which they 
say it that produces change. As the discussion in Chapter
256
4 reported, the task is similar to that of the scientist 
developing a theory and deciding which of the many 
perceptible patterns in the world are causally related. 
Science does not have a mechanical procedure for generating 
theories; there is no clear-cut process to teach social 
workers. Formulating the methods of working involves 
conjectures not just descriptions.
Turning to the question of goals, social workers show 
most interest in them in the context of debating what they 
should be, especially addressing the question of who should 
decide them, the client, social worker, or society. 
However that controversy is beside the point here. What 
matters is specifying the goals the fieldworker is working 
towards, irrespective of how they were determined.
Again current practice appears to fall below the 
standards of precision required by the single case study. 
The evidence from research, from Goldberg and Warburton 
(1979) and Fisher, Newton and Sainsbury (1984), is that 
social workers have only vague goals, particularly in long­
term work. This provokes the question of how fieldworkers 
can evaluate their own work at all if they have only a 
faint idea of what they are trying to achieve. Evaluating 
fuzzy goals is problematic. What should count as, for 
example, "improved social functioning", a goal reported by 
several in Goldberg and Warburton's study? Equally 
important, what evidence would show the goal had not been 
reached?
As Polansky (1975, p.188) pointed out, choosing 
criteria by which to evaluate practice "requires a practice
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theory which is willing to make commitments about what it 
is hoped will be achieved". For some social workers at 
least, the demands of the single case study are not simply 
that they should state their goals publicly but that they 
should start to set them.
A common feature of the discussion of assessments, 
plans, and goals has been the requirement for greater 
precision and, specifically, for formulations which are 
testable. The changing view on empirical evidence, 
discussed in Chapter 7, has radically altered the potential 
application of the single case study design.
TESTING
The issues concerning empirical evidence examined in 
Chapter 7 re-appear in the arguments about single case 
study designs. Again, both critics and some advocates of 
this type of study take the view that, to the scientist, 
only reports on behaviour not on psychological phenomena 
are acceptable as evidence. From this it is inferred that, 
to use this research design, fieldworkers must specify 
their assessments, plans, and goals in purely behavioural 
terms. Thus Ruckdeschel and Farris (1981, p.413) for 
example reject single case studies because their "key 
element" is measurement of behaviour. They suggest instead 
that fieldworkers who generally work within a humanist 
framework should write "qualitative" case studies which can 
include discussion of the client's and the worker's 
psychological experience. The only discussion among
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critics of a scientific approach of how such studies could 
be evaluated is England's (1986) proposal that they be 
subjected to critical review by other social workers.
As I argued previously, however, this behavioural 
requirement is hardly appropriate in social work but 
neither is it necessary. In the form of empiricism I 
defended in Chapter 7, the distinction between qualitative 
and quantitative data becomes blurred. Brown and Harris' 
(1978) study of depression in women provided an 
illustration of how qualitative data, about the personal 
significance of a bereavement to each woman, could be 
turned into quantitative data for analysis. Evidence, on 
this view, should be judged not by whether it is 
behavioural but whether it is reliable and valid.
This view of empiricism seems implicit in the arguments 
of many recent advocates of the single case study who 
firmly deny that it is specifically tied to behaviourism 
and insist that it has far wider application: "it is quite
compatible with the psycho-social approach, or reality 
therapy, or, for that matter, black magic" Baird (1976). 
Geismar and Wood (1982, p.269) suggest that the single case 
study design is only difficult to use if the underlying 
practice theory is fuzzy but this, they think, is a fault 
of the theory not the research design.
In this account of empiricism the positivists' sharp 
but inaccurate dichotomy between empirical and theoretical 
terms is rejected; there is instead a range of more or less 
reliable evidence. This is a view more easily incorporated 
into fieldwork where practical constraints often impede the
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optimal collection of information. Manuals on single case 
studies therefore discuss in detail the factors which 
increase or reduce reliability.
Bias for instance is a particular source of inaccuracy 
when evidence is being collected by a fieldworker who has 
developed a close relationship with a client. The social 
worker may be biassed by a wish to see progress so that the 
slightest sign of progress appears to be a major 
improvement. Clients may also be biassed in the 
information they give the social worker. Some may feel 
grateful for the attempts the social worker has made to 
help and so understate any continuing difficulties. In view 
of social work’s many statutory responsibilities, many 
clients can have good reason to deceive the social worker. 
Clients for example who are suspected of child abuse and 
fear that the children would be taken away if the full 
extent of the abuse were known may well be unwilling to say 
they have hit their child. In the case of Jasmine 
Beckford, her parents presented a very misleading picture 
to the social workers but the social worker and her senior, 
who had worked intensively to help the parents, were 
severely criticised by the inquiry (Beckford, 1985) for 
their "almost naive" willingness to believe everything 
Jasmine's parents said to them.
Mary Richmond, who published the first textbook for 
social workers, warned: "the danger that commonly besets
case workers is that of becoming so fond of some particular 
hypothesis that it will seem [to them] in no need of proof" 
(1917, p.98). Recognising the risk of bias in their
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personal assessments though, social workers should be 
advised to take care that they have been accurate in 
recording information and have checked it against other 
sources, considering what the client does as well as says, 
and getting the testimony of others involved.
But this check on bias is useless if fieldworkers have 
an unreasonable psychological conviction based on little or 
no evidence but just wishful thinking that they are right, 
leading them to look only for evidence to support their 
hypothesis rather than judging its probability in relation 
to the evidence. The essential role of refutations in 
scientific testing was discussed in the previous chapter. 
In arguing for a more scientific approach, Sheldon has 
rightly criticised social workers for taking a dogmatic 
approach and dismissing counter-evidence as irrelevant. 
Their errors though are not surprising given that they rely 
on intuitive rather than scientific methods of judging the 
truth or probability of their ideas. Intuitive reasoning 
differs from scientific in paying significantly less 
attention to counter-examples with a consequent bias 
towards confirming hypotheses.
It has long been recognised that people tend to notice 
instances that support their ideas more than evidence which 
challenges it. Bacon, in the seventeenth century, noted 
that :
the human understanding when it has once adopted an 
opinion draws all things else to support and agree 
with it. And though there be a greater number and 
weight of instances to be found on the other side, yet 
these it either neglects and despises, or else by some 
distinction sets aside and rejects, in order that by 
this great and pernicious predetermination the 
authority of its former conclusion may remain
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inviolate (Bacon, 1620).
Research in psychology supports Bacon's contention.
Nisbett and Ross, reviewing studies on the issue, reach a
similar conclusion;
People have few of the formal scientist's skeptical or 
disconfirmatory skills. Once formulated or adopted, 
theories and beliefs tend to persist, despite an array 
of evidence that should invalidate or even reverse 
them. When "testing" theories, the layperson seems to 
remember primarily confirmatory evidence and to ignore 
potentially disconfirmatory evidence. When confronted 
forcibly with disconfirmatory evidence, people appear 
to behave as if they believed that "the exception 
proves the rule" (Nisbett and Ross, 1980, p.10).
There is also evidence that people are better at 
recognising the relevance of confirmations than that of 
refutations and that they tend to mistakenly interpret 
neutral evidence as confirming. A problem developed by 
Johnson-Laird and Wason (1970) provides a well-known 
demonstration. Four cards are laid out on the table 
displaying respectively E, K, 4, and 7. People are told 
that each card has a letter on one side and a number on the 
other. They are then asked to test the rule: "if a card
has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the 
other", by turning over at the most two cards. Most 
recognise that the card showing a "K" is irrelevant and 
spot the importance of turning over the "E" to check the 
rule. But over 90% of respondents miss the relevance of 
turning over the card showing "7": if there is a vowel on
the reverse, the rule has been refuted. The vast majority 
choose instead to turn over the "4" although in fact it is 
irrelevant to testing the rule since either a vowel or a 
consonant on the reverse would be consistent with it.
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A conscious effort to test hypotheses would be a major 
change for fieldworkers moving from an intuitive to a 
scientific approach. The dangers of failing to look for 
refutations in social work are highlighted in the inquiry 
into child sexual abuse in Cleveland (1988). This provides 
a well publicised example of social workers, and in this 
case also doctors, treating an hypothesis as irrefutable, 
and illustrates how this affected their subsequent 
gathering and interpreting of evidence.
The inquiry was set up because there had been a 
dramatic rise in the number of diagnoses of child sexual 
abuse by two paediatricians in Cleveland. In five months 
in 1987, mainly in May and June, sexual abuse was diagnosed 
in 121 children from 57 families. Acting on these 
diagnoses, social workers removed all 121 children from 
their homes while further investigations and plans were 
made. The paediatricians and social workers believed that 
they had uncovered a major and hitherto unrecognised 
problem but the scale of the action led to public disquiet 
about the reliability of the professionals' judgement and 
the wisdom of taking the children into care. In response 
to this concern, the Secretary of State for Social Services 
ordered an inquiry chaired by Lord Justice Butler~Sloss.
Among other issues, the report criticises the way 
diagnoses of sexual abuse were reached and sustained, 
looking especially at the diagnostic significance of the 
"anal dilatation test".
The two paediatricians in Cleveland placed great 
confidence in the reliability of this test in detecting
263
anal sexual abuse. A positive result on this test was 
seen, as the inquiry report critically comments, not as 
"grounds of 'strong suspicion'" but as "an unequivocal 
'diagnosis' of sexual abuse" (1988, p.243) The social 
workers to whom the children were then referred seemed to 
have had equal confidence in it. The senior social worker 
who had most responsibility for organising the social work 
response to the referrals told the inquiry that "the 
possibility of misdiagnosis had not occurred to her" (1988,
p.82).
Their critics however, in the first instance the 
children's parents and the police and, subsequently, the 
general public, thought this confidence was unwarranted. 
The validity of the test is strongly disputed in medicine 
at present with little research evidence. Moreover it is, 
in general, used only when suspicions of sexual abuse have 
already been aroused by evidence from the child or others. 
A positive result is then taken to give some support to the 
suspicion. In Cleveland however the test was carried out 
on children admitted with other medical conditions and so a 
positive finding provided the first suspicion of abuse.
This confidence in the test results, as one would 
expect, influenced all the subsequent actions; the 
diagnosis was taken as a proven fact rather than an 
hypothesis needing to be tested. Further investigations 
were made but not in the spirit of testing and possibly 
refuting the diagnosis but to assess the family and plan 
future actions on the assumption that abuse had occurred. 
The confidence was particularly apparent in the way they
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responded to criticism and requests for more proof.
The police were the first to ask for further evidence 
to confirm the allegation of abuse, partly to help them 
identify and prosecute the offender and partly because the 
police surgeon, like many other doctors, considered the 
dilatation test was suggestive but far from diagnostic of 
abuse. Instead of paying serious attention to her 
criticisms however the paediatricians and social workers 
rejected them and excluded her from the investigations. 
Indeed the Director of Social Services went so far as to 
send a memo to all social workers which "directed the 
exclusion of police surgeons from examining children 
referred to social services for reasons of sexual abuse" 
(1988, p.65).
When second medical opinions were needed in the legal 
proceedings, the children were referred to the doctor who 
was known to share the Cleveland paediatricians' view on 
the reliability of the test and indeed who had taught them 
about it. Consequently the second opinion provided a check 
on whether the test was positive but did not question how 
the result was being interpreted by the Cleveland doctors.
Social workers were especially criticised in the report 
for not questioning the accuracy of diagnosis in the light 
of the allegation that further abuse had occurred when the 
children were in foster homes and having no contact with 
the alleged offender, the implication being that a foster 
parent was responsible. Butler-Sloss concedes that the 
first time suspicion of sexual abuse in a foster home 
arises, the Social Services Department should take the
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issue very seriously, but when, in a six-week period, three 
more foster homes are implicated with the dilatation test 
providing the only evidence, social workers should have 
"raised questions about the validity of the diagnosis". 
The families had been through a detailed appraisal and 
investigation before being accepted as foster parents and. 
Butler-Sloss thought, the probability of all these 
assessments having been so seriously flawed should have 
been weighed against the probability of misdiagnosis.
The refusal to doubt the accuracy of the test was also 
apparent in the "disclosure work" that the social workers 
did with the children. The purpose of these interviews is 
to investigate a suspicion of abuse, using play materials 
to make it easier for the children to express themselves, 
for it is accepted that children who have been abused may 
well be reluctant to talk about it. Some people have 
claimed, controversially, that children never make false 
allegations of having been abused but logically at least 
the possibility arises. Therefore in the interviews four 
outcomes are possible: 1. the child who has been abused
"discloses" it; 2. the child who has been abused denies it; 
3. the child who has not been abused denies it; and 4. the 
child who has not been abused claims he has. The inquiry 
found that social workers considered only the first two 
options; they "worked from the presumption that the 
children had been abused" (1988, p. 59) - making the
interviews a Kafkaesque experience for any child who had 
not been abused. Denial of abuse was interpreted as a 
psychological process of blocking out a traumatic
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experience, to be overcome by asking leading questions. 
The report makes the serious complaint that: "those
conducting the interviews seemed unaware of the extent of 
pressure, even coercion, in their approach" (1988, p.209).
Taking a positive result of the anal dilatation test 
as confirming sexual abuse with certainty was, as the 
Cleveland Report says, unwarranted, but as soon as some 
degree of fallibility is admitted, the predictive value of 
the test falls dramatically. Few people can recognise this 
intuitively but the statistics involved are 
uncontroversial; it is a major factor in deciding on the 
utility of introducing screening programmes for 
comparitively rare diseases such as cervical or breast 
cancer.
Campbell and Machin (1990, Chapter 3) provide a 
standard account. Beginning with some definitions: the
"prevalence" of a disease, or in this case sexual abuse, is 
the frequency with which it is thought to occur in the 
population; the "sensitivity" of a diagnostic test is the 
probability that the test result will be positive if the 
disease is present; the "specificity" of the test is the 
probability that the result will be negative if the disease 
is absent. Bayes theorem can be used to calculate the 
positive predictive value of the test, that is, the 
probability that a person with a positive test result has 
actually got the disease.
If we call the probability of sexual abuse P(A), and 
the probability of a positive result on the anal dilatation 
test P(T), Bayes theorem states that:
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P(A/T) * Sensitivity x Prevalence
Probability of positive result
= P(T/A)P(A)
P(T)
Providing values for the variables in the case of
child anal sexual abuse is difficult in the present state 
of knowledge but we can make up some figures since my aim 
is to demonstrate how fallibility has an unexpectedly large 
impact on the predictive value of a test. Being generous 
to those who think the anal dilatation test is very good, 
let us suppose that the sensitivity of the test is very 
good at 90%, and that its specificity is even better - 95%. 
The prevalence of anal sexual abuse could be set at one in 
a hundred - perhaps an over-estimate but it has the
advantage of simplifying the maths. Before calculating the 
probability that someone with a positive result has 
actually been abused, we need to work out the probability 
of a positive test result. This is where intuitive 
reasoning generally produces an underestimation of the 
figure: if used on a hundred children, the test will detect 
the one expected positive case of abuse but, given the 
error rate of its specificity, it will also give a positive 
result on 5% of the 99 children who have not been abused.
Thus the total positives is 1 + 0.05 x 99 - 5.95 and the
probability is 5.95/100 = 0.0595.
Using Bayes theorem with these figures then, the 
probability that a child with a positive result on the anal 
dilatation test has actually been abused P(A/T) can be 
calculated:
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P(A/T) = 1 X 0.01 « 0.168 
0.0595
Where the paediatricians in Cleveland were acting as 
if the probability of abuse given a positive result was 
close to 1 (certainty), allowing even a small margin of
error reduces the probability to as little as 0.168. Even 
if the specificity of the test is raised to 99%, keeping 
the other probabilities the same, its predictive value is
still as low as 0.5, a fifty/fifty probability that the
child has actually been abused.
Accepting the weak predictive value of the diagnostic 
test, the police response in Cleveland was more reasonable 
- taking the result as grounds for investigating the 
possibility of abuse but not collecting evidence with a 
presumption that the diagnosis was infallible.
Noticing and actively looking for evidence which 
tests one's theory is essential in science. Acting 
intuitively, people tend to be bad at this - noticing 
mainly the evidence that apparently supports their theory 
and turning a blind eye to counter examples. Social 
workers who rely on intuitive reasoning alone are also 
likely to overlook or underestimate the evidence that tells 
against their theories. The Cleveland case is an extreme 
example of social workers failing to treat their theories 
critically but it illustrates the pervasive impact this has 
on further investigations: on how critical questions are
treated, and on what evidence is actively looked for, what 
is noticed, and how it is interpreted. There is still no
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consensus on how many of the children In Cleveland had 
actually suffered abuse and perhaps there never will be. 
But the paediatricians and social workers have been 
criticised not for making inaccurate diagnoses but for 
having unreasonable confidence in the diagnoses - showing 
blind faith rather than a critical rationalism.
EVLUATING OUTCOMES
Suppose the results of research show that after
receiving the social work service either the individual, in 
a single case study, or a group of clients, in a controlled
trial, have markedly improved. What can we infer from
these results? The problem is that we cannot simply reason 
that if X happens after Y then X happens because of Y. 
Chance correlations are common : a client may win the
football pools after seeing the social worker but it is 
unlikely that his good luck could be attributed to social 
work skill. Similarly, a client's mental health may 
improve but is it due to the expertise of his social
worker or would it have happened anyway? In evaluating the 
outcomes of research, the issues are when and with what 
degree of confidence can we infer a causal relationship 
between treatment and improvement.
The controlled trial is generally thought to be the 
most powerful way of establishing a causal connection. The 
group of clients who have received the service being 
evaluated are compared with a "control" group of people who 
are similar in all respects judged to be relevant except 
that they have not had the experimental help. If both
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groups show equal progress then it suggests that the 
service is not causally significant. If however the 
experimental group does much better than the control then a 
causal connection seems probable.
Some critics of a scientific approach in social work 
have claimed that this is the only form of research 
that science can offer and that the desire to be scientific 
has hindered the development of understanding in social 
work by discrediting other forms of research. Smith (1987, 
p.406) blames "positivism" for making researchers 
concentrate on "outcome research" rather than studying the 
social work process. Heineman (1981, p.374) also blames 
the desire to emulate the natural sciences for what she 
claims is the prevailing view among researchers that 
studies which lack "experimental manipulation, control 
groups, and randomization" are "not good science".
The claim that science only endorses controlled trials 
is also used by Ruckdeschel and Farris in arguing for the 
qualitative case study over the single case design.
Equating the latter with a behavioural approach, they call 
it "quantitative" research and claim it "is not adequate to 
represent the reality of most social phenomena" (1981, 
p.418). Since, they say, you cannot scientifically
generalise from either type of individual study, the
qualitative study is to be preferred because it at least 
can provide a more accurate account of fieldwork.
Science however does not reject single case research - 
it has indeed long been a respected part of medical studies 
- but there is some evidence that social work researchers
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used to undervalue it. Shyne (1963) for instance, while 
commending the single study design for encouraging clear 
thinking, asserts that no inference about causal
relationships can be drawn from it.
Nowadays though, as I reported earlier, this attitude 
has changed with many considering that single case studies
are to be preferred at the moment to build up a better
picture of social work practice. But how reliable is a 
causal inference based on just one case?
Any inductive inference can only conclude with
attributing a certain probability to causal claims. The 
various strategies used in research are aimed at reducing 
the risk of fallacious reasoning; different designs can be 
seen as on a continuum. The single case study can be more 
or less reliable, depending on how it is done and on our 
background knowledge of the problem and treatment being 
studied.
Campbell and Stanley (1963), in an authoritative 
analysis of research methods, suggest that the power of 
research designs can be measured by "how many plausible 
alternative explanations they rule out or render 
implausible" (1963, p.35). This provides a useful way of 
examining the strength of the single case and the 
controlled trial.
One alternative explanation of improvement in a client 
that is often plausible is that it is due to "natural 
history", that is, the client would have improved at this 
time regardless of social work intervention. It is after 
all well established that many problems in life are short­
272
lived or cyclical. Large group controlled trials are 
designed to test the hypothesis of natural recovery by 
having an untreated control group whose "natural history" 
can be charted. It Is though the most serious limitation of 
single studies that It Is hard to render the natural 
history explanation Implausible. However, background 
knowledge can help to judge the probability of this 
alternative explanation. Sometimes we have a fair 
understanding of the natural course of the type of problem 
being treated and so can predict the probability of a 
spontaneous recovery. In effect a control Is being used 
but an historical one not a concurrent one. For Instance, 
research has shown that a large majority of juvenile 
delinquents become law-abiding citizens when they reach 
their twenties, with or without social work assistance; 
obsessional fears however tend to be chronic.
This point. In Bayesian terms. Is that the degree of 
support that a piece of evidence e (In this case, observing 
Improvement) gives an hypothesis depends on how much more 
likely e Is given the hypothesis than It Is on background 
knowledge alone. From research. It Is known that the 
probability of Improvement In a juvenile delinquent Is high 
with or without social work Intervention while In the case
of obsessional fears the probability of progress If
untreated Is low. Therefore observing Improvement In a
single obsessional case will strongly support the
hypothesis that the treatment was causally significant but, 
with a delinquent, progress only slightly supports the 
therapeutic hypothesis.
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Another explanation which increases the probability of 
improvement on background knowledge alone is that it is a 
general effect of receiving attention. This is often 
called a "placebo" response; the client improves 
irrespective of the type of help given. Such placebo 
effects are well documented in medicine (see e.g. Pocock, 
1983), particularly in drug treatment. In controlled 
trials of drugs, this possibility can sometimes be dealt 
with by giving the control group a "placebo", a pill made 
from an inert substance and administered in the same 
manner, so that both groups have the same experience of 
being treated; it makes "patient attitudes to the trial as 
similar as possible in treatment and control groups" 
Pocock (1983, p.93). Social work trials sometimes give the 
control group a "placebo" therapy. The control group have 
meetings with a therapist in similar circumstances to the 
experimental group but the therapist is, in fact, 
untrained. In this way, it is possible to isolate the 
significance of the theoretical approach of the trained 
therapists.
In single cases, the placebo hypothesis can be tested 
by withdrawing the treatment for a while when progress has 
been noticed and then re-introducing it and seeing whether 
there is a difference between its presence and absence. 
This is the so-called ABAB design, the "A" indicating the 
non-treatment phase and the "B" the treatment. This 
approach is very good but it has ethical and theoretical 
limitations. There would be moral problems in deliberately 
withholding help and thereby probably causing distress if
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the problem has been very distressing and, from other 
evidence, the improvement is probably due to the treatment. 
Theoretically the design can only be used if the practice 
theory predicts that withdrawal of treatment would quickly 
lead to a perceptible reversal of progress. Behavioural 
learning theory does so and the design has been mainly 
developed by behaviourists.
While the plausibility of a causal connection between 
treatment and improvement in a single study may be only 
moderate, it may be increased by comparing it with other 
single cases. In judging whether X causes Y, the frequency 
with which the correlation is seen strengthens the 
inference. Fieldworkers who use the single case study 
extensively may find that several cases show that a similar 
type of problem responds to similar interventions. This 
would increase the probability of a causal connection. If 
their work is clearly formulated, they will be able to 
judge if colleagues are working in similar ways with 
similar problems and then the potential pool of cases for 
comparison becomes much larger. If considerable fieldwork 
experience supports the claim that the intervention is 
effective then a large-scale controlled trial would be 
worth doing to diminish the plausibility of the "natural 
history" and "placebo" explanations of the observed 
improvement. But such trials would differ significantly 
from most of those done to date: they would be testing a
well-formulated method of working which, if shown to be 
effective, could be learnt by other social workers.
The single case study has strengths and weaknesses. It
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cannot refute all alternative explanations of why the 
client has improved though, in some cases, it can make them 
less plausible. In this respect it is weaker than a large- 
scale controlled trial. It is also though much stronger 
than the way most social workers currently practice where 
haziness about goals and methods makes it difficult to 
judge even whether the client has improved.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter was to illustrate how social 
workers could use scientific methods based on an empiricist 
account of science. Both large-scale and individual 
research have been examined. The consensus view at present 
is that large-scale controlled trials have limited 
practical value while we have such inadequate knowledge of 
the social work service being evaluated. The prime 
scientific task in the current state of social work is to 
study the process of helping, to turn fieldworkers' 
implicit practice wisdom into explicit practice theories 
which can then be applied with confidence based on 
extensive evidence. The single case study design has been 
proposed for two reasons: it encourages social workers to
formulate their thinking clearly, and it enables them to 
build scientific standards of evidence and reasoning into 
their practice.
Discussions of the single case study echo the 
philosophical debates examined in this thesis. Early 
exponents and its current opponents consider it is
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necessarily narrowly behavioural in its application, 
claiming that all the terms in the theories need to be 
testable by behavioural evidence. On this view, the single 
case study design cannot be used in the predominant, 
humanist style of social work and few fieldworkers have 
adopted it. However, changes in philosophical assumptions 
about science have significantly altered the methodology of 
the design. The former dichotomy between the behavioural 
and the psychological, or "quantitative" and "qualitative" 
data as it is often described in social work, is replaced 
by the criteria for evidence of reliability and validity. 
Opponents' arguments for rejecting the single case study 
have therefore been seriously weakened.
The aim of incorporating scientific methods into social 
work practice has a long history. Mary Richmond's 
pioneering textbook for social workers called her approach 
scientific in that it emphasised a clear. critical, and 
logical approach throughout: "there can be no good
casework without clear thinking" (1917, p.99). Likewise, 
in the guidelines for training, the regulatory body, CCETSW 
continues to endorse a picture of good practice as a 
clearly-focused, critical process in which the social 
worker has: "a knowledge of both the need for and the
techniques of attaining effective evaluation of the service 
which has been offered" (1986, p.12).
CCETSWs guidelines however do not specify what the 
"techniques of attaining effective evaluation" are, nor do 
they acknowledge the continuing controversy in social work 
about the place of scientific methods in implementing this
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guideline. The proposals presented in this chapter give an 
empiricist account of how CCETSWs goals can be achieved.
Despite the enduring emphasis in the social work 
literature on clear, critical work, research indicates that 
the typical style of contemporary fieldwork is radically 
different. Practitioners work intuitively and are 
reluctant or unable to formulate their work clearly enough 
to permit critical review or comparison with other efforts. 
Nor do they show much interest in evaluation, whether in 
keeping up to date with and using results of studies or in 
systematically appraising their own efforts.
Throughout the thesis, I have been arguing that using 
a scientific approach does not conflict with the humanist 
view of mankind predominant in social work. Nor does it 
entail fieldworkers rejecting the empathie and intuitive 
skills so highly valued at present. It does require them 
to recognise how fallible such understanding is and 
consequently the need to make "practice wisdom" explicit 
and subject it to independent testing. At first sight, this 
looks like only a request that fieldworkers move from the 
private to the public domain but, from the picture of 
fieldwork gained from research, it seems that for many this 
would also entail a substantial change in their way of 
working, moving from a fairly vague, uncritical, non-goal- 
oriented approach to a problem-focused, critical, and 
purposive style of intervention.
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CHAPTER TEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has set out to re-examine the long­
standing debate among social workers concerning the value 
or possibility of using scientific methods to develop the 
knowledge base of their profession.
1 began by highlighting the public significance of the 
knowledge debates in view of social work's growing 
importance in modern society. Legislation has given the 
profession increasing powers and responsibilities in 
relation to the major client groups; children at risk, the 
sick, the disabled, and offenders. These powers have been 
invested in social work in the belief that social workers 
have, or can have, special knowledge and competence in 
dealing with personal and social problems, a belief 
emphasised by the 1983 Mental Health Act which stipulated 
that only social workers who had undergone training could 
be authorised to implement the Act’s legal powers.
Social workers themselves however have to decide how 
to carry out their statutory roles; it is the profession's 
responsibility to determine which skills, theories and 
methods help them provide an effective service to clients. 
My analysis of social work's theories and skills in Chapter 
3 revealed a major conflict of opinion within the 
profession as to whether social work is, or should be,
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based mainly on personal skills or on theories tested 
according to the standard methods of science - whether it 
should be scientific or not.
The scientific approach has always been more strongly 
supported by academics than by fieldworkers. The pioneers 
of training, for example, thought that helping in social 
work could and should be based on more than just common 
sense understanding and practical services. Mary Richmond, 
a leading figure in American social work, looked to science 
for standards of investigation and reasoning, encouraging 
social workers to adopt a rigorous and critical approach to 
assessing clients' problems and making decisions about 
them. Others turned to science for theoretical 
understanding. They believed that the social sciences 
offered more accurate explanations of personal and social 
problems and so had the potential for providing more 
effective ways of solving problems.
The regulatory body, CCETSW, which nowadays lays down 
guidelines on the content of training, endorses this 
scientific tradition, emphasising the public and reliable 
nature of social work techniques; students are advised to 
work in a reflective, goal-oriented, and critical way, 
using theories and therapies in a systematic manner, and 
turning to research for further empirical evidence.
CCETSW portrays an unrealistic picture however of the 
development of social work knowledge in the oft-repeated 
claim that social work has "a common body of knowledge, 
skills, and values". The theoretical knowledge available 
is not "common" since students decide for themselves which
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theories, if any, to use. Moreover it is not well enough 
supported to claim the title of "knowledge", at least not 
according to scientific canons. Students take courses in, 
among others, human growth and development, psychology, 
sociology, social administration, law, and social work 
theories. In most of these subject areas, they will learn 
many rival theories, few of which have been rigorously 
empirically tested. In particular, it is rare to find a 
theory which has been much tested in a social work context 
since the empirical research tradition is poorly developed.
The small number of empirical studies in social work 
may in part be due to the low esteem in which research is 
held by most fieldworkers, few of whom read or use its 
results. Rejecting scientific methods as inapplicable in 
social work, many fieldworkers adopt an individual and 
private style of working that appears at variance with the 
model endorsed by CCETSW. Research studies have 
consistently found that, once qualified, social workers 
appear to make little use of theories in any conscious or 
systematic way despite the fact that they report that 
theories are influential in that they have been absorbed 
into their background knowledge. Such studies have reported 
that the personal skills of empathie and intuitive 
understanding are valued more than social science theories 
or scientific evaluation.
In this thesis, I have presented both empirical 
evidence and theoretical arguments against this individual 
style of working. Evaluative studies have produced mainly
negative results, an outcome which throws serious doubt
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both on social work competence and on the reliability of 
fieldworkers' own assessments of their efforts. Inquiries 
into child abuse tragedies, where a child being supervised 
by social workers has been killed by a parent, are another 
source of evidence about social work practice. 
Fieldworkers in these cases were severely criticised for 
actions which seem to be typical of current methods of 
working rather than instances of exceptionally bad 
practice. For example, they were censured for their 
failure to have clear goals and plans, for overlooking or 
underestimating important sources of information, for 
failing to assess the reliability of sources of 
information, and for being ignorant of the relevant 
empirical research results.
In addition to this empirical evidence, I examined 
theoretical reasons for questioning the reliability and 
scope of empathie and intuitive skills.
The ability to empathise is problematic. First, there 
is the difficulty of judging whether or not empathie 
understanding is accurate. Secondly, its value in social 
work is restricted in two main ways: by the constraints on
our ability to empathise, and, as empirical studies show, 
by its weak therapeutic power.
Two defects of intuitive reasoning were particularly 
emphasised. Intuitive judgements are especially vulnerable 
to distortion because of, first, bias due to the 
fieldworker's close involvement with the client, and, 
secondly, over-confidence due to a failure to look for or 
consider refutations and counter evidence. Both of these
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factors tend to make social workers overlook evidence which 
challenges their intuitive reasoning and to over-estimate 
the weight of supportive evidence.
This examination of social workers' empathie and 
intuitive skills strongly suggests that current social work 
practices have serious defects, but the proposal that 
social workers should improve their reasoning by 
incorporating scientific methods meets with little 
enthusiasm.
Conflicting opinions on the merits of science have 
been an enduring feature of social work but the views of 
both naturalists (pro-science) and humanists (anti-science) 
have altered as assumptions about the nature of science 
have changed so that there have actually been not just one 
debate but several.
Changing assumptions in the science debates are 
strongly in evidence when we look at the debate surrounding 
psychoanalytic theories. They have had an important and 
long-lasting influence in social work but in the science 
debate, they have, at different times, been commended and 
criticised by both sides. When first espoused by social 
workers, they were hailed as the first scientific grounding 
for practice. Now, advocates of a scientific approach 
generally attack them, claiming either that they are 
unscientific because they are unfalsifiable or that their 
plausibility has been undermined by the weight of 
empirical evidence against them.
Opponents of scientific social work have also altered 
their view on psychoanalytic theories. Initially critical
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because of the scientific claims, some have now concluded 
that psychoanalysis is not a science. They suggest 
psychoanalytic theories should be classed within the 
humanist rather the scientific tradition. Thus they should 
not be judged by the scientific criteria of truth or 
probability, standards by which they tend to fare badly, 
but by their "intelligibility", whether they help social 
workers make sense of their clients. However I presented 
arguments why this subjective standard was not adequate. 
Social workers' understanding has public consequences, 
influencing the way they carry out their statutory duties 
and exercise their powers. The truth or probability of the 
theories they use is therefore of public concern and should 
not be ignored, leaving the theories to be judged only by 
whether they help social workers to have a private 
sensation of comprehension.
The debate about psychoanalysis has been somewhat 
outside the main stream of the science debate in social 
work. The traditional social work objections to science 
have been directed at a behaviourist model of science. 
A major criticism has been that scientific methods, they 
claim, can be used only in studying behaviour and not in 
their area of interest which is is understanding mental 
processes. The methodological arguments for such a narrow 
model of science have now been generally discredited. In 
examining them, I argued not only that science can 
encompass theories about the mind but also that there are, 
in fact, strong similarities between social workers and 
scientists in the way that they try to understand
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phenomena.
Few advocates of science in social work would now 
subscribe to such a narrow view of science. The picture is 
however somewhat confused by the fact that many naturalists 
do champion use of the therapies this methodologry has 
produced - behavioural modification techniques. Their 
reason for doing so though is because of their 
effectiveness not because of any unique claim to scientific 
status. Nevertheless, the debate about science is still in 
practice often conducted between humanists and 
behaviourists although the premises of the letter's 
argument have altered.
Humanists also object to a less restrictive version of 
behaviourism which considers that science can study mental 
processes but that only behavioural reports provide the 
empirical evidence needed to test them scientifically. 
This view of science, which has been very influential in 
research, goes some way towards meeting social work 
criticisms but efforts to reduce or link all psychological 
terms to behavioural reports have, with some justification 
I think, been criticised as inadequate.
In recent years this type of behaviourism has also 
been criticised as unduly constrained. Its underlying 
philosophy - positivism - has been shown to have serious 
flaws. Awareness of this development in the philosophy of 
science has produced a new debate in social work. Those 
who endorse a scientific approach are becoming critical of 
the account of science they have championed and which has 
underpinned much of social work research methodology. At
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the same time, a new argument against science is emerging.
Traditionally, social work opponents have accepted the 
merits of scientific methods but claimed that they cannot 
be transferred from the natural to the social sphere. Now a 
growing number have started to argue that, in overthrowing 
the positivist view of science, all claims to empirical 
status are also destroyed. Hence scientific methods have no 
epistemological superiority; they are valued highly in some 
cultures, particularly ours, but there is no rational 
justification of this perceived pre-eminence.
The consequences for social work if this view of 
science is accepted are far-reaching. Science, it is 
claimed, should no longer be held up as a model. Where I 
have criticised the reliability of the empathie and 
intuitive understanding which is such a major part of 
current practice and proposed scientific methods as a way 
of improving social work, relativists contend that practice 
wisdom should be seen as different but not inferior to 
scientific knowledge. Judging theories ceases to be based 
on empirical testing but on individual choice, Howe (1987, 
p. 166) going so far as to say that the social worker 
"simply pays her money and makes her choice". Admittedly 
this is a reasonably accurate account of how fieldworkers 
judge theories at present but the relativist claims that 
the process cannot become more rational.
Thomas Kuhn was the philosopher most often cited on 
this subject, so my defence of empiricism rested on a 
critical examination of the interpretation of his work 
which claims that different paradigms have no shared
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language (and so no common body of evidence) and no shared
standards (and no common way of weighing the evidence),
therefore there are no criteria by which they can be 
compared.
This radical change on the humanist side in the 
science debate in social work is matched by an equally
fundamental development among the naturalists. The claim 
that only behavioural reports constituted empirical 
evidence was based on the now-discredited positivist 
distinction between observational and theoretical terms. 
Behaviourism has been dominant in social work research for 
many decades but there are growing signs that it is being 
replaced by a more liberal empiricism, in which reliability 
and validity are the criteria used to evaluate testing 
procedures. Examples of research demonstrated how 
researchers are showing imagination and skill in developing 
ways of testing complex psychological hypotheses.
The question of how scientists interpret the evidence 
has been a major issue in the philosophy of science. A 
major part of the relativists' argument which I criticised 
is the claim that the decision to accept or reject a theory 
in science is determined by social and psychological
factors rather than the weight of empirical evidence. As 
an empiricist alternative to their view, I offered a
Bayesian account of how scientists judge the probability of 
their theory in accordance with the probability calculus.
Having concluded that social workers could use 
scientific methods, my final chapter examined the practical 
implications of trying to incorporate them into the styles
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of working which are typical at present. Although I have 
argued that adopting scientific methods does not entail any 
radical philosophical change in fieldworkers' assumptions 
about human nature, it does lead to substantial changes in 
the way they work, requiring social workers to formulate 
clear assessments, plans, and goals, to make efforts to 
minimise the risk of bias, and to test their ideas more 
deliberately and critically.
The history of the debates about science in social 
work shows an ever-narrowing gap between the typical 
fieldworker's concern with understanding intentional human 
behaviour and the scientific methods advocated by 
naturalists. The extreme behaviourism which excluded study 
of the mind has been shown to be unduly restrictive. The 
more satisfactory account of empiricism defended in this 
thesis, I consider, invalidates social workers' objections 
to using scientific methods. The implications that these 
philosophical developments have for research methodology 
are only slowly being worked out. But change among 
researchers is not enough since practitioners at present 
pay little attention to them. Fieldworkers need to stop 
rejecting an obsolete view of science and consider how 
empiricist scientific methods can help them develop a more 
reliable understanding and more effective ways of helping 
their clients.
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APPENDIX A
DATA-COLLECTION SYSTEMS
(1) E.M. GOLDBERG and R.W. WARBURTON (1979)
(2) N. RAYNES, J. WINNY, and K. MULGREW (1982)
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Figure 4.1 Case Review Form
N A T IO N A L  IN S T IT U T E  F O R  S O C IA L  W O R K
from  E.M.GOLDBERG and
R.W.WARBURTON (1979)
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APPENDIX A
WHAT DO SOCIAL WORKERS DO? A METHOD FOR CLASSIFYING 
SOCIAL WORKERS' ACTIVITIES
from N. RAYNES, J. WINNY, and K. MULGREW (1982).
APPENDIX 1 The categories below identify the type of 
activities in which social workers are involved
Direct contact with clients
(i) Face-to-face.
(ii) Phone.
(iii) Letter (including checking for accuracy). 
Contacts related to clients
(i) Face-to-face.
(ii) Phone.
(iii) Letter (including application forms, and 
checking for accuracy).
Enquiries related to client not involving another 
person
(i) Action related to acquiring information related to 
client or preparatory to doing something for a 
client (e.g. reading phone messages; case notes).
Record-keeping
(i) Writing information about work done for or with 
client (e.g. plans; aide memories; case notes; 
checking accuracy of these).
Reading service material (no person involved)
(i) Reading circulars.
(ii) Reading in-house material.
(iii) Reading service information.
(iv) Reading research papers.
6. Other contacts (unrelated to client)
(i) Face-to-face.
(ii) Phone.
(iii) Letter (checking for accuracy)
291
Misce1laneous
8
(i) 
(il) 
(iii) 
( iv)
Trave1
Taking papers to and from secretary/filing. 
Walking from one room to another.
Moving paper from one side of desk to another. 
Delivering messages and taking telephone 
messages from colleagues.
(i)
(ii)
(iii) 
( iv)
Going 
Going 
Going 
Going 
area.
to and from visits to clients 
to and from health centre, 
to and from agencies, 
to and from meetings in local authority
Non-productive contacts (e.g. wrong numbers, no reply, 
person out)
(i) Client (phone).
(ii) Client (face-to-face).
(iii) Colleagues (phone).
(iv) Colleagues (face-to-face).
(v) Relatives (phone).
(vi) Relatives (face-to-face).
(vii) Neighbours (phone).
(viii) Neighbours (face-to-face).
(ix) Friends (phone).
(x) Friends (face-to-face).
(xi) Other (phone).
(xii) Other (face-to-face).
APPENDIX 2 Purposes of activities
1. Giving/receiving/obtaining/discussing/information about 
social services.
2. Arranging/facilitating use/access to these.
3. Giving/receiving/obtaining/discussing/information about 
other services.
4. Arranging/facilitating use/access to these.
5. Giving/receiving/obtaining/discussing/information about 
client's history; practical situation; relationships 
with people; opinions, needs; feelings;
resources,service use; future plans, with anyone other 
than a colleague (e.g. client, relative, friend).
6. Giving advice and guidance to client, colleague, 
relative, other.
7. Giving/receiving/obtaining/dlscussing/information about 
a client's history; practical situation; relationships 
with people; opinions; needs, feelings; resources; 
service use; future plans (client's, colleagues, own); 
with a colleague.
8. Acting as an 'aide' for a client (e.g. filling in a 
form) .
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9. Facilitating working relationships between colleagues 
(e.g. arranging dates of meetings).
10. Giving/receiving/obtaining/discussing/matters related
to own working conditions (e.g. hours of work, 
salaries, expenses).
11. Giving/receiving/obtaining/discussing/administrative 
matters relating to client or clients.
12. Supervision.
13. Giving instruction to, and receiving information from a 
secretary or receptionist.
14. Identifying what the social worker and client can do 
and arranging contacts between social worker and 
client.
15. Discussing work-related events, and feelings about 
these with colleagues.
16. Record-keeping. Writing information about work done for 
or with client (e.g. plans, aides-memoire, case notes; 
checking accuracy of these).
17. Travel. Going to and from visits to clients. Going to 
and from health centre. Going to and from other 
agencies. Going to and from meetings in local 
authority area.
APPENDIX 3 Issues arising
A. Relationships outside family
B. Physical health.
C. Medical service.
D. Social service.
E. Family.
F . Education.
G. Utilities.
H. Emotional health.
I. Housing.
J. Finances/DHSS.
K. Leisure.
L . Work.
M. Legal.
N. Criminal.
0. Household management.
P. Combinations.
Q. Unclear.
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